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Preface 
This thesis is the result of an intense and comprehensive effort aimed at 
reaching a concurring and inward understanding about the Persian Gulf 
Sheikhdoms. In this classification, Saudi Arabia is also considered as one 
of the Sheikhdom. Other countries in this category are Kuwait, United 
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman; a group of countries that are 
known as member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.  
Despite their importance arising from their geographical location, oil 
wealth, and enormous oil and gas resources, there is little knowledge about 
these countries. They are not willing to fully and comprehensively present 
themselves; it even can be said that they prefer to remain unknown. This 
attitude is motivated by their traditional culture and tenets that have also 
been corroborated by their experiences of the modern world. These 
countries have the feeling that their stability and sustainability depends on 
denial and concealment; an inclination to hide whatever that relates to 
their inner individual and social realities.  
The psychological backgrounds of such concealment can be traced in a 
deep belief in the harms caused by evil eye, and that others might be 
jealous about their wealth and welfare and might grab this wealth. Such 
beliefs are shared by almost everybody, from the rich and the people in 
power to the ordinary citizens. This general attitude, in itself, is an element 
of social cohesion.  
Taking these into account, it is not an easy task to find an understanding 
of these intimate issues. One cannot find such understanding solely 
through reference to normal sources. Sometimes certain texts might be 
found that cannot be considered as reliable sources of information per se. 
However, such texts could be of utmost significance due to their 
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references to the mysterious social and cultural realities. Sometimes, a 
sympathetic dialogue can also lead to the unveiling of such realities.  
To write this dissertation all such elements have been duly utilized to 
the maximum extent possible. The main objective of this study was to find 
out about the inner realities and to understand how these realities 
contributed to the developments and ultimately what elements are behind 
the social and political stability of the south part of the Persian Gulf 
countries.  
Having the above points in mind, it was quite evident that I had to 
interview different people from all walks of life, from diplomats and well 
educated people, to Muslim clergymen, religious researchers and ordinary 
people, from the elderly people who have witnessed the times of poverty 
and difficulty before the modern era of wealth and welfare, to the young 
people that have been born and grown up in the new era. In this essay, I 
have made reference to some of these people; however it is evident that 
not all could have been mentioned. In any event, many of the views 
expressed here are influenced by such conversations.  
2- The topic of this thesis was accepted and approved in January 2009 
at a meeting in the Faculty of Political Science of Pisa University in the 
presence of Prof. Maurizio Vernassa. The topic is extensive in terms of 
both geographic and temporal scopes of application. The main objective 
was to study the change, development and stability in the member states of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council in the modern era; an era beginning from the 
time that oil was discovered and exported. Moreover, a more accurate 
study of this topic required that it should be seen within the framework of 
regional developments in general, and the current Arab World in 
particular.  
The objective was to conduct a macro-level scrutiny on the stability of 
these countries taking into account their historical, cultural, religious and 
political backgrounds; these are the elements that could not be neglected or 
underestimated. The ruling regimes in these countries are traditional and 
old-fashioned, as are their social structures. The leaders are selected 
according to tribal customs and distribution of power is made on the basis 
of the tribal and family traditions and customs. Social relations among 
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individuals or between the individuals and the rulers continue to fall under 
such traditional frameworks. 
No doubt, significant layers of the society are modernized. Thanks to 
the oil wealth, these countries have become one of the most modern, 
wealthiest and well-off areas of the world. This required that modern 
institutions and infrastructures should also be established; however, the 
political and social structures remain traditional. 
It is interesting to note that this structure has practically shown its 
acceptability, efficiency and a sort of popularity. Despite enormous 
criticisms in recent years directed against these regimes for their 
traditional and undemocratic nature, the experience of the Arab Spring has 
practically proved that these Sheikhdoms are more stable than the other 
more modernized Arab regimes, with regard to their social and political 
structure. 
Therefore, all these issues required neutral and impartial study and 
analysis of these political systems that could be possible through an 
overview of their historical, cultural and religious backdrops. The 
structures are based on such realities and could not be well understood if 
such realities, as well as their actions and reactions are not deeply 
explored.  
This approach is important as the majority of the people who conducted 
studies on these countries had a pessimistic attitude for the previously 
mentioned reasons. Being old-fashioned and undemocratic is the main 
reason for the pessimistic approach towards these countries, although other 
factors are also involved. Even, the majority of the Arab analysts, whether 
being leftist, pro-Arab nationalist or rightist, have followed a similar 
approach. 
In any event, every effort has been made in this research to study and 
analyze this issue at macro-level with complete impartiality. Those topics 
that went beyond the overall framework of the subject matter of this study 
have been studied separately and in a different manner. Apart from the fact 
that these countries are generally studied as a homogenous group by 
observers, whether Arab or not, because of their similarities and 
interdependence as well as their rather similar experience with the modern 
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time, they cannot be considered separately.  
Sometimes it happens that the subject matter of a study is such that it 
should be viewed from a macro level, and not a micro and restricted, 
perspective. The accuracy and validity of such a study depends on such an 
overall perspective. However, this approach is not meant to stick to 
generalizing or inaccurate statements; it is something that is required, and 
even obligated by the nature of the topic.  
3- One of the problems in writing this book was how to make it as brief 
as possible. This thesis should have covered many more pages than it 
currently does, because there are numerous reference sources each 
containing specific notes, and also the temporal and geographical scope of 
the book are extremely vast and deep.  
To achieve this objective, I have tried to study all issues solely in the 
framework of how and why they have an impact on the stability of these 
countries. Other issues will be discussed only to the extent that they 
contribute to a better understanding of the questions of evolution and 
stability.  
The fifth chapter of this dissertation thus took shape to deal with this 
issue and also to find the relationship between Wahhabism and the Saudi 
Arabia's foreign policy, how and where they use this ideology, and what 
has developed over time, and more important, how this ideology has been 
instrumental to the expansion, or better to say, creation of Salafid and 
Wahhabi radicalism. In this chapter, attention has also been paid on how 
the conservative and anti-communist Wahhabism and Salafism turned into 
an ousting, destructive and anti-western Wahhabism which fights anything 
apart from itself, even if it is of Islamic nature.  
The fact is that for good reasons, the theological radicalism, as clearly 
manifested by Al-Qaida ideology, is an Arab phenomenon, or better to say 
a phenomenon from the Persian Gulf region. Although it is true that this 
ideology nowadays has many followers in the vast Muslim territories, its 
founders were Arabs. Even if there were non-Arab initiators, they were 
deeply influenced by the Arab culture and thought. 
For other good reasons, this ideology has more consistency, even within 
the Arab world, with the Saudi history, culture, traditions and spirits. 
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However, it is not solely an ideological indebtedness; it also involves 
various financial and advocacy supports. Not only the first and most 
influential founders were from Saudi Arabia, but also the wealthy Saudis 
and even the wealthy people from other Sheikhdoms significantly helped 
the creation, expansion and sustainability of this wave. Otherwise, this 
wave would have settled down long time ago.  
The same chapter mainly seeks to explain these points, which relate to 
the situation of these countries. Moreover, their social and political 
developments as well as their stability could not be well understood 
without due consideration to this ideology. Other chapters also discuss the 
main issue, in one way or another, although it might be that they serve as 
an introduction for better understanding of the subject matter without 
specific relevance to the main topic. 
The last chapter deals with the links between the Arab Spring and the 
political and social stability of the Sheikhdoms. The Arab Spring has 
emerged quite some time ago and is a continuous movement. It is not clear 
if there will be an end to this movement, and if so when that could be, 
what changes it will bring about, and what would be the internal situation 
of the Arab world and each Arab country.  
Taking into account the nature of the today's world which resulted in 
the quantitative and qualitative increase in the mutual interdependence at 
global level and also the speed and depth of the current developments, it is 
hard to foresee the future of the Arab Spring. However, this issue has been 
discussed in this chapter to the extent it related to the stability of these 
countries. This chapter was drafted in the summer of 2011, and it can be 
studied as it was appeared at that time. 
4- A reference seems appropriate to be made now on the methodology 
used in this research. Noting what was mentioned earlier, I have done my 
best to utilize the original sources more or less all being in Arabic 
language. There have been certain sources that may not be considered as 
reliable sources for a research; however they might be used as indicating 
the views of the author or others who had similar ideas.  
I have also extensively resorted to newspapers, magazines, and also the 
news and analytical websites of the Arab World. As concerns the news and 
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analytical articles, the comments of the readers, which sometimes are even 
more important than the articles themselves, have also been taken into 
consideration. It was not possible to make a reference to all such articles, 
but effort has been made to refer to the most sensitive ones. 
After the subject of the thesis was approved, I met and talked with Prof. 
Maurizio Vernassa every now and then and kept him updated to the 
progress of my research. He was informed about, and expressed his views 
about, almost all parts of what I have written. He constantly told me that 
this region is unknown, but at the same time, remains vital and critical for 
us. It is important for us somebody from within this region describes it. 
The author does not claim to have full knowledge about this region, but 
hopes that his efforts could be the starting point for a better and further 
understanding of this region. Surely, the Department of Political Science 
and Geopolitics of a university, like Pisa, cannot be indifferent towards 
these issues. I also hope that proportionate to the time spent for its 
preparation; this thesis could be useful, for the respected professors, 
students and other readers.  
Mohammed Masjed Jamei 
November, 2011 
                                                                                                 
1 
A Historical Glimpse: Past and Present 
The history of Saudi and the five Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf are 
deeply influenced by nature and geography of the region.  All these 
countries fall in the Arabian Peninsula. This is a vast desert region, arid 
and burning. Only Yemen and Oman falling in the southern fringe of the 
Peninsula is suitable for farming and has a better climate. However, there 
is one big exception, thanks to potable water gushing from springs in 
Bahrain, this island country is suitable for farming. In the same way the 
mountainous regions within Saudi Arabia such as Ta'if enjoy a far better 
living condition.
1
 
With the exception of a very few and small regions the vast Arabian 
Peninsula plateau is one of the most arid and severely harsh regions in the 
world. Actually such features have shaped its history. Its scattered 
inhabitants have always been engaged in fierce war against sullen, rigid 
and helpless nature people whose common feature was perpetual hunger, 
poor security and lack of comfort.
2
 
The region was completely differed with regions such as Mesopotamia, 
Syria and Yemen. Ample water, large rivers and fertile earth allowed the 
formation of big human settlements in the later region, and thanks to such 
favorable conditions, science, art, culture and method of exploitation of 
water and land flourished and moved towards perfection. But in a realm 
like Saudi Peninsula such conditions did not exist.
3 
Human settlements developed in the desert country in the form of 
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tribes, and having lineage from a single father encouraged them to live 
together. Thus, the gathering of individuals inside a tribe was a natural 
congregation and family buildup and nothing less. Moreover, it was the 
climatic factors which necessitated such a trend. No one was able to live 
and survive outside the boundary of the tribe because he would lose his 
security. 
4
 
The Arab in this desert peninsula was compelled to live with others to 
earn his living. The endless desert did not offer food. To such a lone man 
separation from the family exposed various sorts of dangers. He neither 
enjoyed monetary security, nor was his life safe. The individual found 
security because he was dependent on his tribe and once such patriarchal 
dependence was severed he would loose his security.
5
  
In fact, the Arabian Peninsula was the habitation of various tribes, but 
the meaning and quality of such tribes differed very much compared with 
the meaning of tribal life in other lands. The difference was due to 
different living conditions and nature. Of course during the course of 
history, such features gave birth to a peculiar culture and values and 
naturally such culture was not tribal life culture.
6 
The arid and harsh conditions in the plateau prevented a big power or 
adventurous ruler to feel the need to conquer it. First of all the region did 
not incite a desire for conquest. Secondly, there were so many preventative 
factors to discourage a wise man to attempt such a risk. No big or small 
army was able to march in the arid desert void of vegetation. It was the dry 
climate that defeated him and not the defendants of the realm.
7
  
Although, through history it is clear that there were many starving 
tribes in the Saudi Peninsula. In those times the boundaries of the Iranian 
and Roman empires extended to the east and north of the Arabian 
Peninsula respectively. In order to protect themselves from such invasion, 
these empires had installed local vassal governments to resist the 
aggressors, and this policy proved successful.
8 
As long as we are to do with the inhabitants of Arabian Peninsula; the 
importance of these two local vassal governments lay in the fact that they 
were a good source for to give boost to culture, ideology, and customs and 
rites. Naturally these two regions were under the influence of Iranian and 
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Byzantine culture. Therefore, the latter cultures were able to penetrate the 
region from that channel. Of course the Bedouin Arabs in that region were 
also under the influence of other neighboring cultures such as Yemen, 
Abyssinia and to some extent Egypt.
9 
Deep in the Arabian Peninsula there was a hub which was respected by 
all, this capital was probably the only independent town located in the vast 
plateau, and the majority of Arabs looked at the town with humbleness and 
reverence. This town was Mecca which enjoyed so much religious, 
commercial, literary and cultural respect. Moreover being the center of 
attention Mecca contributed to the region's internal solidarity and 
succeeded to dictate, under its umbrella, its own doctrines, customs and 
rites and traditions to various adjacent tribes until the birth of Islam.
10 
Islam in fact revolutionized life of the inhabitants of the Peninsula in all 
aspects. Islam broke the closed door barrier of the secluded community. 
The scattered Arabs in this enormous land became united with each other 
and after that they spread to neighboring regions. Mecca more or less 
continued to retain its significance and Medina also found much credit and 
respect and became the capital of Islam. Such centralization continued for 
almost 36 years, but despite the significance of Medina, after accumulating 
power, the fourth caliph was compelled to shift his capital elsewhere in 
order to stabilize his government. 
11 
Since then, neither Medina, nor Mecca nor any other towns within the 
Arabian Peninsula were able to be chosen as the capital of the Muslim 
empire. Despite the fact that these two towns always retained their 
elevated rank and were converted into a central Islamic hub and dictated 
part of the Islamic doctrines, but they remained only as dispensers of 
ideology and actually lost their universal center of activity.
12 
The main reason for shifting power elsewhere was that the climate of 
Arabian Peninsula and its remoteness did not permit   power buildup. Such 
a center was bound to be shifted to Baghdad, Damascus, Merv, Cairo, 
Istanbul, Isfahan, Neyshabur and Cordoba whose natural aptitude and 
geographical status permitted the rulers of such towns to expand and 
develop. The limitation for progress in Arabian Peninsula and even in the 
sacred Mecca and Medina was such that these towns received the list from 
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Islamic art and architecture. No justified Islamic architectural monuments 
existed in Mecca and Medina and throughout Arabic Peninsula, and the 
few monuments that existed had been built by alien artists and architects. 
That which existed in these two regions towns, especially in Medina, was 
literature, traditions and hadith (traditions from the Prophet) and many 
master craftsmen were non-native artists. Accidentally, these Islamic 
literature and hadith had developed in harmony with the past tradition of 
the Arabian Peninsula and was the continuation of such heritage. These 
two towns paid very little attention to other branches of Islamic sciences 
because there were no grounds for accepting and developing such 
sciences. 
13 
Despite the changes that Islam brought to the plateau, the natural and 
geographical conditions prevailed and again the Peninsula sunk into the 
historical web. Now let us see what the conditions in this region were in 
the contemporary times because the history of the six countries in the 
plateau is closely associated with this historical époque. 
From fifteenth century onward, the Ottoman Turks added Arabia 
specially Mecca and Medina to their territory. The sultans of the Ottoman 
Empire knew well that such an annexation was not economically justified 
and they were compelled to only spend in the newly conquered region. 
Their willingness to annex the Peninsula was partly due to their religious 
belief and partly for stabilizing and authenticating their authority as the 
great caliph of the Islamic world. According to the Muslims, both Mecca 
and Medina continued to be significant. It was also important for the 
pilgrims who flocked to these two towns every year for holy pilgrimage to 
have a safe trip. Naturally a person who governed these two towns and 
provided for the security of the pilgrims enjoyed a lofty rank.
14
  
Since the governors of Mecca and Medina were appointed by the 
Ottoman sultan on the basis of a special customs and arrangements, they 
acted as the sultan's succor in this important task. Sharif Hossein was the 
last of such governors who revolted against the Ottoman Turks at the onset 
of the First World War, hoping to be the head the Arabian empire which 
was supposed to be born after the war, and declared himself independent 
from Istanbul.
15
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The next problem was provision of security and welfare for the 
pilgrims. The Ottomans tried to seek help from the nomadic Bedouin 
Arabs living in the desert with the help of the emirs of Mecca and Medina 
who were respectable and influential figures, to render the roads safe and 
provide for welfare of the pilgrims. Instead they promised to help them or 
to pay tools in order not to disturb the peace and security of the region. 
Such arrangements proved successful and during the Ottoman rule the 
Arabian Peninsula was having one of the most peaceful periods of its 
history.
16 
But all these things were handled by such tribes which fell in the route 
of pilgrims. The tribes living in other regions in the plateau were leading a 
very, very difficult life. It was their extreme poverty which provoked these 
tribes to migrate to distant places and at times very, very far from their 
original habitation. During the past two or three centuries some of these 
tribes migrated to regions which are now known as Arab Sheikdoms.
17 
 To be specific Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates were the 
countries which these tribes had moved and settled. These countries had 
no historical background and the settlement of people in these countries 
was due to migration of tribes in the course of the past two or three 
centuries even earlier.
18
  
Of course Oman and Bahrain have a longer history, but during the 
course of such relocations, mentioned above, some tribes including the 
family that governs Bahrain, moved into these two countries and settled 
there. 
19 
Living conditions in the first three Sheikhdoms mentioned above 
continued to be difficult because it didn't differ much with the mainland. 
Although conditions in Bahrain and Oman were far better, there were other 
factors which adapted the inhabitants with the new environment and gave 
birth to new ethics, customs and mentality.  
They occupied large places to settle and tried to arrange the conditions 
in such a way as to earn their life from the new country to which they had 
immigrated, especially because they had approached the Persian Gulf and 
affluent regions. The sea by itself was a source of blessing. At least the sea 
supplied fish to them and they were living at northern shores of Iran, west 
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of Mesopotamia, east of Bahrain, Oman, and neighbored India albeit at a 
farther distance.
20 
From the time they settled in these Sheikhdoms the Persian Gulf route 
witnessed increased traffic of barges and big and small ships. The big 
vessels mostly belonged to European countries which transported different 
commodities or were warships. Such flow of ships incited them to plunder 
the ships. Competition between different European powers was another 
factor to incite them to loot the ships. They tried to make the passage 
difficult for their rivals with the help of inhabitants of the coastal regions, 
and therefore provoked them to attack their rivals.
21 
The temptation to plunder, stimulated them – or at least part of them – 
to become buccaneers and it led to bloody conflicts which continued for 
many years, but in the end, the coastal inhabitants were defeated and 
subdued. But they were not defeated by the common and conventional 
weapons or method of warfare. The British were the main challengers and 
they benefited from modern technology and military tactics. Such new 
weapons and tactics surprised the Arabs.
22 
 In the same way the strength of the British and correct understanding 
and assessment of internal problems and inter-tribal rivalry and their 
strength to put an end to such disputes and skirmishes was another cause 
for their surprise. Perhaps it was for this reason they accepted the English 
domination and were even willing the English to govern them.
23 
During the absence of Iranian presence in the nineteenth century when 
Tehran had little power the United Kingdom swayed the Persian Gulf and 
they gradually continued augmenting their power. From the middle of 
nineteenth century, India officially became a British colony. The routes 
leading to India at those times were mostly through Persian Gulf. After a 
telegram line between India and England crossed from the Persian Gulf, 
the significance of the waterway was doubled.
24
   
But despite the above factors London did not want to colonize the 
Sheikhdoms like India. India was a populated and rich country and had 
become a good pray for the British. They had small population, an arid and 
warm realm and Bedouin inhabitants who were shy of foreigners. 
Therefore, the English authorities did not give the Sheikhdoms and their 
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meager inhabitants any credit except as ports falling in the route of their 
vessels. What mattered to London was that the residents of the coastal 
towns would not disturb their marine security or disrupt the shipping 
lines.
25 
As a consequence, although they were under the influence and 
domination of the British adventurers, it seemed that they escaped the 
sting of colonization, and they did not witness the bitter changes that 
happened with the arrival of colonial powers. Although Bahrain was an 
exception to some extent, but others were not colonized.  
From the beginning of the twentieth century conditions gradually 
changed and it was as a result of the colonization of India by English 
imperialists. The relationship between the two countries intensified from 
the end of the nineteenth century as the United Kingdom was trying to 
immunize India from invasion of European rivals. As commercial tie 
between India and England was strengthened as fast as possible, the 
British presence was more acute in the Persian Gulf, all of which gave 
more vigorous traffic in the Persian Gulf region.
26 
 The traffic of Indians who were the British servants to the Sheikhdoms 
made trading in the region increase to a remarkable level and gradually the 
Indian rupee became popular. Simultaneously the Americans, the Russians 
and the Germans also found a foothold in the region. These were in 
addition to other European countries which had been traditionally present 
in the region from old times. Traffic between northern and southern ports 
i.e. between Iran and the Sheikhdoms had increased.
27
  
What mattered in between was the influence such new atmosphere had 
left in the Sheikhdoms. The peaceful traffic and interaction converted the 
savage Arabs in the Sheikdoms into mild, realistic, and patient folk and 
more or less free from Arab pride, whereas their ancestors who had 
immigrated to the Sheikhdoms from the Arabian Peninsula had opposite 
qualities - like the tribes that lived inside the Arabian Peninsula.
28 
Compared to other Sheikhdoms such a change happened earlier in 
Kuwait and Bahrain because these two countries were more exposed to 
traffic and communication. Kuwait emerged as one of the important points 
for transit of goods. British and Indian goods flowed to the eastern 
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territories of the Ottoman Empire through Kuwait. Likewise the 
commodities from the latter regions flowed to India and other eastern 
countries through Kuwait. A considerable number of Indians and citizens 
of other nations were living in Kuwait and they were mostly engaged in 
trade and brokerage.
29 
 The possibility of transit from Kuwait made it richer than other 
Sheikhdoms, and the emir of Kuwait welcomed the boom. Gradually 
Arabic magazines, newspapers and books infiltrated into Kuwait and this 
attracted the people's attention. Shortly after that, a new educational 
system, which was a mixture of traditional and modern models, was 
introduced to Kuwaiti citizens and the wealthy people eagerly sent their 
children to such schools. As we can see in the following chapters, these 
western-inspired schools brew a series of problems which frightened the 
regime and compelled the Kuwait authorities to take a series of steps to 
control the schools.
30 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the emir of Kuwait was a 
staunch friend of the governors of Basra and Khorramshahr. The weakness 
of the Ottoman Empire and Iran had helped Basra and Khorramshahr 
governors to rule with some sorts of autonomy. They wished to build a 
tripartite union. The position of Kuwait, however, was a matter of 
significance at that time because Basra and Khorramshahr formed part of 
Iranian and Ottoman Empires and were naturally influenced by their 
historical heritage and the ideology and politics of their countries, 
especially because during those years there was much talk of Arab 
solidarity and unity. But it is doubtful to presume that Kuwait harbored 
such aspirations because Kuwait didn't feel such a need or did not share 
such history or political atmosphere.
31
  
This shows that like other Sheikhdoms Kuwait was not distant from 
Arab mental influence and political upheavals in the Arab world and was 
exposed to such aspirations and inclinations. Kuwait received their 
imported codes and reacted to them. The main reason for such 
developments was their perpetual and close contact with the Indians, Iraqis 
and with the Western nationals to some extent. These were pioneers of 
social (enfetah) and cultural opening within the Sheikhdoms, although 
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they had to pay huge compensation for it both during the reign of 
Abdolkarim Qasem and during the occupation of Kuwait, which will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters.
32 
But Bahrain is an exception. The country enjoys a rich culture mostly 
derived from Shia citizens who form the main inhabitants of the island 
country and the majority of them were farmers, and thanks to continued 
historical link with Iran they are deeply influenced by Iranian culture 
specially by the culture of the inhabitants of the southern regions of Iran, 
whereas the Sunni minority are Bedouin Arabs who have immigrated to 
the island in the past two centuries from the confines of the Arab desert, 
settled there and have  accumulated power.
33 
As a consequence the social and cultural structure of Bahrain is not like 
other Sheikdoms, although the minority immigrants with tribal customs 
resemble the inhabitants of other Sheikhdoms. Moreover, because of 
existence of potable water and agriculture and relatively better climate 
Great Britain chose Bahrain as its main base in the Persian Gulf region 
which process called for closer contact with its inhabitants specially their 
Indian vassals who lived in large numbers in the country.
34 
In addition among the six Sheikhdoms in Persian Gulf, Bahrain was the 
first country in which oil was discovered – during the second decade of the 
twentieth century - and after that Bahrain was seen with an extra interest. 
Thousands of workers from other countries and the country itself were 
employed to exploit and refine oil and this gave birth to such conditions in 
the island. Meanwhile the majority of the foreign manpower came from 
India, Iran and Iraq.
35 
Here we must emphasize that despite similarity between Bahrain and 
other Sheikhdoms mostly between Sunni governors the difference between 
the inhabitants of Bahrain and other Sheikhdoms were far acute than the 
affinity between them. Bahrain's history and culture, its fertile earth, ample 
water, farming and culture and the features emanating from its culture and 
religion and their continued link with Iran and mutual interaction between 
the countries has caused the country‟s inner structure to be different with 
other Sheikhdoms.
36
  
It is only by chance and its geographical location that has made it a 
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neighbor of other Sheikdoms, and of course it is better to say that because 
of different reasons especially for preservation of its security, Bahrain has 
been arbitrary classified with other Sheikhdoms. The fact is that because 
of its instinctive features and identity, Bahrain is deeply influenced or 
rather pressured by its geographical position and has suffered such 
pressure from the on set of its independence – a problem which has 
worsened in the past two or three decades. In fact, one may say that 
compared to other Sheikhdoms, Bahrain has a far different culture and 
identity.
37
  
With Bahrain and Kuwait as pioneers, the doors of the Sheikhdoms 
were opened to the modern world. The influx augmented slowly, gradually 
and with caution. After Abd al-Aziz seized power in Saudi Arabia, the 
doors which had been opened during the reign of Sharif Hossein were shut 
down. It was an ideological and political necessity.
38
  
In fact, the Wahhabi resented the modern culture and civilization. As a 
consequence for a long time they quarreled with Abd al-Aziz, about which 
we will speak in subsequent chapters. On the other hand Abd al-Aziz, who 
didn't want to provoke them, dealt with the modern world with excessive 
caution. Of course his Bedouin temper made him look at everything with 
suspicion, and personally did not wish to open the doors to his country. As 
a result, he closed all the channels to the outside world and this policy 
continued until the end of the Second World War.
39
  
Kuwait welcomed such changes that did not cause danger or tension. 
Kuwait's experience about modern education was bitter and provoked the 
suspicion of its authorities and the conservative strata, but at the same time 
the relative open atmosphere was such that they welcomed changes and by 
such modernist inclinations satisfied their pride and quest for glory.
40
    
Qatar and the Sheikhdoms that formed the United Arab Emirates were 
both sunk in their historical traditions, but to some extent Dubai was an 
exception. They weren't even eager to see changes. Love of seclusion and 
conservatism which had been imposed by conditions in the nineteenth 
century was absolute in the United Arab Emirates.
41 
Conditions in Oman were different. The country enjoyed an ancient 
history and culture and its soil was different from other Sheikhdoms. 
A Historical Glimpse                                                                                 21 
 
Because of invincibility, the Abadhiyah Muslims who were not favored by 
other Muslims and had ill reputation, sought refuge in Oman. These 
immigrants had no intention for propaganda and lived in the remote and 
relatively wealthy land completely shut to the outside world and created a 
closed door and isolated type of culture and government. They were 
farmers, merchants, fishermen and sailors who in the past had ties with 
neighboring countries, especially with Iran.
42
    
During the eighteenth century an Iranian army commander led his army 
to Oman and conquered a great part of the small country and built famous 
castles which are still intact. After this conquest, the migrants from Iran 
especially from Iranian Baluchistan, settled in Oman and were dissolved 
with the Omani population, but since Oman was mostly in touch with the 
Indian Subcontinent, its culture is deeply influenced by India.
43
  
Due to unknown reasons during the seventeenth century the Omani 
citizens moved to East Africa and occupied part of that continent and 
settled there. Along with the native Africans, the Omani migrants began 
cultivating spices which fetched very good income and they left their 
monuments in Zanzibar and Mombasa and the eastern shores of Africa, all 
of which display their very pretty art and advanced architecture.
44
  
Despite the above development due to instinctive Abadhiyah doctrine, 
the Abadhiyah governor in Oman closed all the doors of his country to the 
foreigners. As a consequence, during the twentieth century Oman was 
converted into a completely compact community, shut to the outside 
world. The closed-door nature of United Arab Emirates and Qatar was 
natural. The community was a closed community. But this was because of 
the governor's wish although the Abadhiyah nature, character and 
community is not open (monfateh).
45 
Discovery of oil in the south of Iran during the first decade of the 
twentieth century and in Bahrain in next decade tempted the British and 
other European powers to explore oil in the region until during the 30's, 
the efforts of the American drillers in the Arabian Desert bore fruit. After 
that, they understood that the untapped oil resources in Saudi Arabia were 
the richest in the world. Although the United States had not become a 
superpower in those times or was not known as a superpower in the 
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international circles, Washington decided to monopolize the Saudi oil.
46
  
World War II began simultaneously with such developments and 
everything was under shadow of the war and was being used for the war 
machine. During the first years of the war a sudden outburst of anti-British 
sentiment boiled in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian part of the Middle East, 
which benefited the Germans. The willingness to approach Germany was 
due to their hatred of British influence in the region. Although the 
Germans had left a positive impact in the region since they implemented 
their industrial projects faithfully and with precision, the masses had an 
optimistic opinion about them.
47
  
Nevertheless such an outpouring of anti-British sentiment didn't 
influence the six Sheikhdoms. The number of pilgrims fell drastically 
because of the ongoing war and put the Saudi government in hardship. The 
Saudis requested the British and the Americans to grant loans, and the 
inflow of capital indirectly impelled the oil companies to operate far 
vigorously. The Saudi government which suffered from economical 
deficiency insisted the oil companies add to their effort and discover new 
oil wells. Yet one can hardly say that the war caused a specific problem in 
the other Sheikhdoms.
48
   
After the end of World War II, conditions in the world changed, both 
from political and economical standpoint. The United States and the Soviet 
Union emerged as the two major superpowers, rivals and uncompromising 
enemies. Their biggest preoccupation was acquirement of oil and oil 
resources. What mattered to them was that oil should flow smoothly and 
the rival power should not be able to threaten the oil wells.
49 
In those years, oil became a very valuable commodity. After the war, 
the economical and industrial growth had accelerated and the rehabilitation 
of the war-stricken countries was a matter of paramount importance, the 
rehabilitation engine was powered by oil. Oil, which was regarded as the 
most important energy source become an instrument, rather a strategic 
weapon. From that point of view, a real winner owned more oil wells and 
could prevent its rival from obtaining resources.  
As a consequence, without being aware, or without their wish the six 
Sheikhdoms and the Persian Gulf became core matter in the strategic 
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calculations of the superpowers. Even in those early years the price of oil 
or revenue from oil was not that important. The main question was merely 
the existence of oil and safe access to the oil wells.
50 
As mentioned above, until World War I the above six Sheikhdoms were 
living their traditional life. The big exception was the Saudi Arabia, whose 
peaceful atmosphere owed to the doctrines of Sharif Hossein, his children, 
his small circle of friends, and the famous British captain Laurence who 
played his own role. He secured the confidence of Sharif Hossein and his 
friends and acted as Sharif Hossein's advisor.
51 
Sharif and his comrades wished to set up an Arab caliphate. But the fact 
is that the idea did not originate in Saudi Arabia but was imported from 
outside and was merely in harmony with the ambitions of Sharif Hossein 
and his descendents. The importance of such assertion emanated from two 
sacred towns, namely Mecca and Medina. If the Arabs were to set up an 
Arab caliphate the most suitable place to make such declaration and to 
operate as the centre of the empire were these two towns from historical, 
religious points of view and the respect which these two towns were able 
to incite among Muslims. These two towns represented the brilliant 
history, the grandeur and greatness of Arabs. 
52 
But the flame kindled for such an empire was extinguished at the end of 
World War II and was wholly forgotten when Sharif Hossein and his 
family were sent to exile. It was an imported idea that was not originated 
in the Saudi Arabia community in those years. After that, Abd al-Aziz 
seized power and as we explained before, due to religious and political 
reasons he converted Saudi Arabia into a closed-door country.
53 
In the interval between the two world wars, the six countries were sunk 
in their historical/traditional culture, whilst during this period we witness 
extensive political, social and cultural activities in the Arabic part of the 
Middle East and even North Africa, especially in the Middle East in which 
the anti-imperialist hatred was rampant. All ranks in the society starting 
from religious elites down to social and cultural elites and intelligentsia, 
Christians and Muslims, both were engaged in these activities.
54 
But we do not notice such a burning hatred in the blood of the 
inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms. However Kuwait and Bahrain were, to 
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some extent, exception from such lethargy – Kuwait, because of its 
geographical location and neighboring Iraq and Bahrain because of its 
advanced culture and close relation with Iran. During these years Iraq was 
wreathed under the burden of British imperialism and was struggling hard 
to liberate itself from the yoke. And all of these developments influenced 
Kuwait. The historical and cultural grounds in Bahrain and the gap in the 
island's society incited ideological and political thoughts, especially 
because the majority of the population was Shia followers and suffered 
from tyranny and discrimination.
55 
After the end of World War II, the conditions in the these countries was 
like before, whilst the Arabian wing of Middle East was involved at the 
peak of political, ideological and anti-imperialistic activities. Despite 
British domination in these countries we cannot trace any evidence of anti-
British colonial rule among these countries. Noteworthily, the anti-
imperialistic activities of India, their great eastern neighbor with which the 
Arabs were in close contact, did not stir them to covet a change.  
The fact is that they had become accustomed to the strong and clever 
presence of London and even welcomed the British rule. Not only the 
dominating regimes, but the people at large also welcomed the British 
domination. As a result we don't see any anti-imperialistic movement in 
these countries.
56
  
It was in this manner, these countries achieved independence. The move 
towards independence progressed smoothly with mutual agreement of 
these countries with England. On several occasion they asked the British 
government to leave part of their troops in the Sheikhdoms at their own 
expense in order to provide for their security and peace of mind. When 
London said it would leave the region in 1971 they asked them to stop 
moving away and if the reason for their departure was money the 
Sheikhdoms would pay all the expenses for their stay.
57
  
Yet we cannot deny that the developments in the Arab world especially 
during the 50's and 60's incited some of the population in these 
Sheikhdoms to break from their historical isolation and some of them 
started to move towards political movements. The kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait were the most notable countries which were 
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motivated by such nationalistic aspirations.
58 
Unrest in Saudi Arabia was kindled mostly among the laborers who 
worked in the oil drilling regions. During the 70's the wealth from oil 
increased enormously and every day more laborers were hired by the oil 
factories southeast of the kingdom. All the wealth from oil flowed to the 
pockets of the Saudi Royal family. They considered the huge wealth as 
their personal property and they spent very extravagantly.
59 
Abd al-Aziz died in 1953 and Bin Saud seized power, Bin Saud 
harbored Bedouin ideology and sentiments, and governed the country like 
the chief of a tribe. His extravagant spending paralyzed the country to the 
extent that they were compelled to borrow from outside. Such acts were 
due to his Bedouin sentiments and so much unacceptable that his brothers 
and influential figures in the Saudi family decided to remove him and 
replace him with Faysal. Faysal seized power in 1964.
60 
On the other hand, the workers were sweating in the most severe 
conditions. Poverty and deprivation was rampant everywhere. Such factors 
were expected to lead to unrest in big labor communities, which actually 
happened. Discontent was not possible in other labor communities. Saudi 
Arabia was a big country with little population scattered here and there. 
They were leading a tribal life and suffered from utter illiteracy and 
ignorance. The poverty and deprivation had contained from old times and 
they were ignorant of the oil wealth, and did not expect to benefit from the 
wealth.
61
  
But this was not so in big labor communities. The workers had 
abandoned their desert and tribal environment and were working and 
living under new conditions. Moreover, the amount of their awareness had 
increased. Most of them listened to the radios broadcasted by other Arab 
countries specially the Sawt al-Arab coming from Cairo, which in those 
times had emerged as the most important promoter of political 
awareness.
62
  
Naturally they were expected to protest in gild, social and political 
forms. On the other hand, the Saudi regime reacted against such demands 
with Bedouin brutality which added fuel to the unrest. After Faysal seized 
power, the conditions changed to some extent and he was able to check the 
26                                                               Change and Stability in GCC 
expanding wave of unrest, crack down and control the nucleus of unrest 
when it became alarming and dangerous.  As we can see in the following 
chapters the defeat of Gamal ‛Abd al-Naser and his ideology was a great 
blessing for the Saudi rulers and the other emirs of the Sheikhdoms. After 
extinction of the flame of Arabic nationalist propaganda, the rulers of 
these regions were able to control and manage the labor problems with less 
strain and they succeeded to do it.
63 
Bahrain was another subject in the spotlight. Aside from their abstract 
cultural and social features, Bahrain discovered oil during the second 
decade of the 20
th
 century and the oil rapidly revolutionized the sparsely 
populated island state. Bahrain was the only country after Iran in which oil 
had been discovered and this was a welcome opportunity for the British to 
fill their pockets. Because the new regime in Iran demanded a series of 
changes in the original contract and London was worried about the safe 
flow of oil from the region. They needed a safe source to quickly replace 
the Iranian oil wells and Bahrain was considered a happy replacement.
64
  
Contrary to the other countries in which it took a long time between oil 
discovery/exploitation and export of the oil immediately started in Bahrain 
and thousands of native and migrate workers were hired by the oil 
companies.
65 
Now the salary of native workers was below the other workers and even 
migrate ones. The British personnel enjoyed the highest salary and living 
conditions Bahraini native workers while received the lower wages and 
lived in the most unfavorable conditions. Naturally such discrimination 
could not continue for a long time. Thus unrest flared up even before the 
World War II. But it was curbed and checked by the British managers by 
brewing discord between Shia and Sunni workers.
66 
After World War II, unrest in Bahrain was further aggravated. 
Progressive and leftist ideology was rapidly spreading. Even the Tudeh 
Party, or the Iranian Communist Party, became very active after the fall of 
Reza Shah, and found sympathizers in Bahrain. The secluded class 
difference in Bahrain, social and political discrimination, deprivation of 
the Shia Muslims compared to the dominant Sunni minority that were 
supported by the British authorities added fuel to the fire.
67 
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Bahrain's citizens were the largest and the most ardent listeners to 
Nasser and Arab nationalistic propaganda. That which helped to check the 
unrest was the peculiar difficulties that bothered Bahrain's inhabitants 
most originating from religion and the fact that some Bahrainis were 
inclined towards Iran and some towards the Arabs. This complicated clash 
between the two groups along with the more complicated policies of 
London was the main level that controlled the situation. 
Of course the defeat of 1967 and the recognition of Bahrain by the 
Iranian parliament as an independent state had a remarkable role in 
calming the political atmosphere in the island. Despite all these 
developments Bahrain was the only country in which unrest continued. 
Although other levers were used in   subsequent years to diffuse the 
tensions among which the Saudi dominance was the most important 
factor.
68
   
  Kuwait was another sheikhdom which had enough ground for 
domestic turmoil. This readiness for turmoil was related to the experience 
that they had during the nineteenth century and mid-twenties. More than 
other countries, Kuwait were exposed to developments in the region and 
the traffic of foreign nationals for commerce. Kuwait was an important 
stopping port between India and commerce with England and Ottoman 
Empire, Arab eastern territories and Iran. These countries had 
revolutionized the social and cultural atmosphere of that sheikhdom.
69
  
The anti-imperialist struggles by the Iraqi citizens during the interval 
between the two wars were rampant in that country and Iraqi and Arab 
radical rhetoric during the Second World War had its supporters in 
Baghdad. Kuwait increased its oil exports very vigorously during the 50's 
and converted that country into the biggest oil-producing country in the 
Middle East. This significance was mostly due to the fact that Iran had 
discontinued exporting oil, and had nationalized its oil industry in the 
beginning of the 50's. These development made the unrest more Arabic 
and to some extent radicalization of part of Kuwaiti community, and this 
was an exception amongst Sheikhdoms.
70 
That which controlled this unrest was the claims made by Abdolkarim 
Qasem. The territorial claim struck a severe blow to the Kuwait's regime 
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and inhabitants. Of course the regime managed to thwart the treat by 
taking a series of measures, but the Kuwaiti community became united, 
realistic and nationalistic. Perhaps the Kuwaiti citizen understood for the 
first time that in the first place he was a Kuwaiti subject and the other facts 
should be defined and analyzed from the perspective of his Kuwait 
citizenship. It is true that we belong to the Arab nation, but such a slogan 
should have served his Kuwaiti citizenship and not otherwise, and others 
should not deny their Kuwaiti citizenship or loosen their national bond.
71
  
In fact, Kuwait‟s territorial claim strengthened the Kuwait community 
and solidarity and protected the Kuwaiti citizens from radical and Arabic 
inclinations and threats. The next bitter experience of Kuwait was the 
occupation of the country. The occupation was so painful and outrageous 
that during the first few years after the occupation many scholars of 
Kuwait hated their Arabic root and Kuwait, which at one time was the 
most active member of the Arab League became the most isolated and 
pessimist member of the alliance.
72
  
That which has been mentioned above is related to the social and 
political developments in these countries until 1967.  After that and 
especially after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the developments in these 
countries took another form and quality, as we will explain later. 
The 1967 defeat had in fact killed the seeds of any possible unrest. The 
general conditions in the Arab world and their political condition was such 
that radical and nationalistic and Arabic anti-imperialistic feelings could 
destabilize the Sheikhdoms. Oil wealth was flowing into the pockets of 
different classes of the society. The society was opening at a very quick 
pace, their traditional culture and customs were rapidly evaporating and 
there was no acceptable culture to fill the gap. The consequences of such 
developments were threatening the country's sound and smooth life and 
stability. It was possible that the disturbed society or part of the society 
would be attracted by radicalism, or pro-Western and anti-traditional 
ideology.
73
  
Such a thing had happened in the majority of Arab countries in the 
Middle East and even North Africa. The younger portion of the 
community was attracted by imported ideas and this led to many problems 
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and much unrest. Whether the inclination originated by communist or 
socialistic doctrines or right or liberalistic trends, these countries resisted 
took a hostile stance against religion and religious traditions and culture. 
In subsequent stages they tried to reconcile Islamic principles and 
standards with their modern ideology which gave birth to a series of new 
problems.
74
  
Compared to these countries as a whole, the Sheikhdoms like the 
United Arab Emirates and Qatar did not face such problems. The 
magnitude and depth of the problem was far less and was not in a form 
that could turn to a national disaster. The conservative nature of the 
community in the Sheikhdoms and their late arrival into the modern 
history, their strong belief in tradition and customs, strong link to tribal 
system of movement, realistic political approach resulting from lack of 
ambition and their bitter experience of colonial rule and using the 
experience of other Arab countries helped all the citizens of the 
Sheikhdoms to have a share in their method of dealing with modern 
civilization.
75 
This meant that social and cultural developments emanating from oil 
wealth had impelled them from the last years of the 60's to strengthen their 
cultural identity, fortify their social stability and the power of the ruling 
regimes, and as mentioned before such inclinations grew stronger after the 
1973 war and continued until the 80‟s.76 
Although during this period we can see agitation in some Arab 
countries, as a whole the unrest was exceptional and was limited in scope, 
or like Bahrain the unrest was because of historical reasons which had 
little to do with the developments after flow of oil wealth into the 
Sheikhdoms and the awakening of new political inclinations. Although 
these problems were less acute in Kuwait than in Bahrain, this led to the 
dissolution of the Kuwait's parliament. Another example of revolt in the 
region was the Zofar insurgency which must be analyzed from the scope of 
cold war rivalry and the provocation of the leftist Yemeni activists, 
although the social and cultural factors in Zofar contributed actively to the 
revolt.
77
  
An interesting development in this regard was the exit of the British 
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troops and the rapid accumulation of power by the Shah in Iran. Because 
of his bitter experience of foreign intervention, the Shah was very 
interested in strengthening his war machine after ascending the throne. 
Such a possibility was more viable during the last years of the 60's and 
reached its peak during the 70's.
78
  
In those years Iran was moving towards industrialization and wealth 
and the drive found impetus from the beginning of the 70‟s. Such 
militarization changed Iran into one of the most influential countries in the 
region. Along with Shah's anti-communist drive, and the fact that he 
thought he was committed to fight with communists throughout the region, 
this encouraged Washington to strengthen its tie with Tehran. Because of 
their defeat in Vietnam the Americans were pursuing the Vietnamization 
policy and wished to delegate the regional powers that they were united 
with and ask them to fight their enemies and the communists.  Shah was 
the most ideal choice for Washington in this connection.
79 
Thus, Iran became the nucleus of the American military strategy. Shah 
considered that notion as an ideal notion. Iran was rapidly gathering power 
and the Shah took over the duty of protecting the security of the region, 
especially the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman. Practically taking over the 
British role in the region before 1971 was within the same framework that 
the Shah accepted Oman's king to interfere in the Zofar region and to calm 
the revolt.
80 
All the Sheikhdoms felt that the region needed such a power to take 
shelter. It was for the same reason that they did not insist the British troops 
to leave the region. Moreover, the Shah was not only anti-communist but 
anti-radical too. In fact the Sheikhdoms were afraid of the brutal Iraqi 
radicals, expansionist and interventionist tendency – a radicalism which 
had hidden itself under the cover of Arabic nationalism and had gained 
added vigor with the emergence of Baath regime in Baghdad.
81
  
Despite the above developments, Iran was not an Arab country. Due to 
perplexed historical reasons and especially in the contemporary times 
whenever something came up between Iran and Arabs it kindled their 
negative historical history and hostility. But it would be right to assume 
that Arab hostility versus Iran was the leading attitude.
82
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At the top of such hostility, Saudi Arabia was the more sensitive against 
Iran and because of the strong presence of Arab nationalistic aspirations in 
the Kuwait; media and propaganda machines, Kuwait also displayed 
symptoms of discontent against Iran. But deep in their hearts the other 
emirs of the Sheikhdoms were happy with the prevailing situation and 
displayed no sign of discontent. Although for a series of reasons which 
was briefly explained here they did not wish to openly claim that they 
were happy with the statuesque in the region.
83
  
But this was one side of the story. The other side was the leftist and 
Arab nationalist regimes and Arab media. The leftist Arabs and their 
media did not favor the Iranian power and always provoked the 
Sheikhdoms to show reaction against Tehran. Although the Sheikhdoms 
demonstrated no reaction, such propaganda pushed the Sheikhdoms and 
the rest of the Arab world into each others‟ arms. Since then the 
Sheikhdoms regulated their ties with Iran in a manner that would not 
provoke Arab sensitivity and hostility.  
In 1979, the Islamic Revolution triumphed in Iran. In fact this was a 
domestic affair, but after the revolution Iranian foreign and regional 
policies was completely changed. Although the Islamic Republic had 
repeatedly announced its willingness to have close relation, on the basis of 
mutual respect, with its neighbors, the fact was that the revolutionary 
regime in Iran acted completely different compared to the Shah's pro-
western policies. The complicated things were the change of Tehran's 
attitude and not their heartfelt wishes.
84 
The GCC countries understood, albeit a little late, after the victory of 
the revolution the new regime did not want to go to war with them or to 
blackmail them and was even welcomed, because of Tehran's strong 
emphasis on Islamic culture and values. But, the question was the new 
security arrangements which in the past had been shaped by Iran's 
commitment with the collaboration of the United States. Yet the new Iran 
was completely opposed to the Shah's policies.
85 
Security was vital for the Sheikdoms – both inside the Sheikhdoms and 
in their relations with the world at large which was made possible through 
the Persian Gulf. Oil was flowing from that waterway and whatever they 
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needed arrived from the same waterway starting from foodstuff up to other 
consumable commodities.  
The Sheikhdoms were unable to provide for their internal security 
alone, the security of the Persian Gulf. In between there were other 
subjects of worry for them. The emirs in the Sheikdoms believed that the 
Soviet Union had been looking for such power vacuum in Persian Gulf. 
The communist regime in Afghanistan and Moscow's intervention was an 
alarm signal which proved that the Soviet Union was moving towards the 
warm waters in the south. Their allies and Arab friends of USSR were 
their neighbors stretching from southern Yemen to Iraq and Ethiopia.
86
  
Moreover revolutionary Iran was regarded by the GCC as a gateway for 
the Soviet Union to spread their influence and move toward south. In those 
frantic years, they did not believe much in the independent nature of the 
Iranian Revolution, and even some Arab rulers believed this revolution 
was a product of communists. Their main dilemma was how and by what 
mechanisms they could ensure their internal security and the security of 
the Persian Gulf.
87
  
Iraq invaded Iran under such circumstances. It was a large scale and all-
out war to topple the Islamic regime or segregate part of Iranian territory. 
In short, the Arab wanted to punish and unfetter Iran's strict policies. 
During the first days of the war which coincided with the rapid advance of 
the Iraqi troops into Iran, some Persian Gulf countries lauded Saddam 
Hussein and when Iran began its resistance following the post-
revolutionary chaos the sheiks started to worry.
88
  
Following the outbreak of the war, a series of steps were taken by them. 
One of their most important steps was their firm determination to help 
Iraq, although they had started the assistance by sending money, weapons 
and logistic support to Baghdad and initiated their anti-Iranian propaganda 
and religious and political harangue. Iran's unexpected resistance changed 
the scales. Khorramshahr was retaken and after that it was Iraq which was 
threatened by Iran. The collapse of the Baathist regime in Baghdad and its 
consequences was too dangerous than they could imagine. They could not 
tolerate the bitter consequences of Saddam Hussein's fall. 
Another important step was the formation of the Gulf Cooperation 
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Council (GCC). The Council was established when the Arabs were at the 
peak of their anxiety at the beginning of the 80's and it‟s objective was to 
integrate the Sheikhdoms in a manner that they could defend the security 
of each other.
89
  
In the beginning this innovative step targeted the security of the 
member states, although later on the Council was active in other fields too. 
What is important to note is that the formation of the Council led to a 
series of changes among the member states. Despite much similarity 
between the Sheikhdoms, practically it was after the birth of the GCC that 
their destiny, regional role, pan Arabic and international role were so 
closely interconnected and they emerged more or less like a united 
confederation.  
It is true that the majority of the native inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms 
were the offspring of those who had migrated to the Sheikhdoms deep 
from the Arabian plateau, but presently these two are made of different 
textures. 
This is because of their different history. The Saudis were the children 
of the desert and the others dwelt in the shores of Persian Gulf and Sea of 
Oman. Their geographical situation, their living condition and the 
dominating power of Great Britain in recent years had bred a sort of spirit 
among the natives which differed with the savage and bigotry temper of 
the Saudi Bedouins. Aside from the fact that the capacity and the power of 
the Saudi Arabia was far above the other members, it was natural for the 
bully Saudis to tame the peaceful Arab inhabitants who lived for a long 
time at the margin of the Persian Gulf.
90 
Despite the above developments GCC was established, and they 
succeeded to assemble. Such a confederation gave birth to a new political 
culture. It was perhaps for the first time in the Arab world that a council 
composed of strong countries and smaller and weaker states had formed a 
treaty which was able, to some extent, to cooperate with each other.  
Saudi Arabia was the biggest member. In other words, like a big brother 
in this confederation, and they had far larger population, capacity and 
resources. Their internal problems were not like the internal problems of 
the other member states which were due to the nature of the Saudi regime 
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and society. And this led to troubles. The other members suffered their 
peculiar problems and some of them had border clashes with each other 
and clashed with Saudi Arabia itself. But despite such rift, they suffered a 
common enemy threat and common points of interest, which impaled the 
countries to assemble and become the most firmly consolidated and lasting 
federation in the Arab world.
91
  
The new Council suffered from its peculiar weak and strong points and 
was not able to resist against tangible and real threats. This became 
evident, during the occupation of Kuwait and under American pressure 
after the September 11. They couldn't take the least action against the 
advancing Iraqi army and to push them back from Kuwait.
92
 When George 
W. Bush pressed them to make internal reforms, the Council was not in a 
position to adopt and to protect its members within the framework of the 
GCC. Every country chose its own policy and reacted in a different 
manner. 
Despite this fact, under ordinary circumstances and not alarming 
conditions were able to preserve their solidarity and unity and assume a 
united stance. This united stance was mostly aimed against Iran in the past 
three decades. As a matter of fact because of different reason Iran was the 
most suitable country to help them to move closer to each other. Neither 
Arabs nor Yemen, as neighbors of the Council, had such capacity and 
there was no other country or source like Iran which could further 
consolidate them.
93
  
Iran was a Shia and non-Arab country and because of being neighbor to 
Arabs and having mixed with them in the course of the history, the Arabs 
had a series of positive and negative recollections from Iran and their 
culture and such negative parts of relationship could be the employed for 
foreign policies and propaganda.
94
  
On the other hand, Iran was continually criticized by the big powers in 
the world. Therefore, taking a united position against Tehran was 
something these countries wanted and it fitted their policies. As 
consequence, by raising such accusations the Persian Gulf littoral states 
were accumulating privileges. Moreover, they were sure that Tehran did 
not wish to risk adventurous policy against them like arrogant Saddam. 
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This possibility was perhaps the most important factor that impelled them 
to resort to fiery rhetoric and media propaganda against Tehran.
95
  
Thus, the GCC whose members before 80's had followed a conservative 
Arab policy – nay far conservative policy –resorted to a relatively radical 
Arab stance against Iran. The main reason that led to this radical drive was 
only Iran. The Arabs in the Council felt that under such a policy, they 
could secure the support of Arab states and they would find a better 
position among the Arab masses and scholars, by pretending to be faithful 
to their Arab nationalistic roots. Which to some extent checked this 
radicalism drive was the wish of some members to preserve a passive and 
shy attitude against Iran and not the heartfelt wish of the members of the 
Council.
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The years Iran and Iraq were waging war were years of fear and alarm 
for the members of the Council especially for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
These two countries had gone too by linking their destiny with that of Iraq, 
and for this reason, as a patron of the warmongers they showed reaction. 
The fact is that the four other Sheikhdoms in the Council did not harbor 
such attitude and policy, although all of them supported Baghdad. 
This difference was due to the nature and makeup of Saudi and Kuwait 
regimes. We will deal with this subject in forthcoming chapters and will 
explain the special features of these regimes and will point out the factors 
that led to their stability and instability. We will also explain what their 
idea about Islamic regime was and what threats they felt from Iran and 
how they analyzed the attitude of Iraq and its war against Iran. For a better 
understanding of such fear we must examine the nature of the war and its 
progress, especially where it has to do with the Iraq war policy.
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The war broke out at a time that the Baathist regime was at the peak of 
power and Iran was excessively troubled by chaos and internal problems. 
The revolution had triumphed only two years ago and Iran was sunk into a 
whirlpool of domestic and foreign problems. Revolution moved quickly 
and triumphed. From one aspect this was positive, but since the revolution 
had not set up necessary administrative structure for the country it faced 
enormous problems. It was as if the problems which had to be solved 
before the victory of the revolution had been postponed to the post-
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revolution era. It was possibly due to the popular nature of the revolution 
and unarmed struggle for victory.
98 
Contrary to Iran the Baathist regime was in its most favorable and 
strong position. The regime had suppressed domestic unrest and the leader 
of the Baathist Party had eliminated all real and possible rivals. Saddam 
was in full control of the army, the Baath Party and the nation's internal 
and foreign policies. Iraq was in the best shape in the region, inter-Arab 
web and international level in its contemporary history.  
Baghdad started the war in such favorable circumstances. The war was 
openly and explicitly or tentatively supported by all the countries in the 
region and many powers outside the Middle East. This made it necessary 
for Iraq to achieve a definite and quick victory. The conditions were such 
that both Iraq and its main supporters expected a blitz. 
Taking all the above into account, the battle was not limited to certain 
fronts at the borders with Iran. Baghdad had to inflict a big blow on all 
fronts in order to achieve a rapid and definite victory. Simultaneously with 
the advance of Arab troops inside Iran they bombed Tehran and other 
cities. The strategy to expand the battlefield during the war was the fixed 
strategy of Baghdad. At first the war stretched to the Iranian inland and 
seas, and after a while Baghdad targeted the whole Persian Gulf, which 
became known as war of oil tankers.  
The thing that was worrying the Sheikdoms was the war in the Persian 
Gulf. They felt that the battle was spreading to their borders and every 
moment was likely to pull them into the whirlpool, especially because 
Baghdad had such a wish, only by dragging the Sheikhdoms into war, 
could save its skin. The best way was to push the other countries into the 
war and to shift part of the burden of the war to them.  
After regaining Khorramshahr Iraq was exposed under Iranian pressure. 
While on another side, Baghdad continually attacked the Iranian ships in 
the Persian Gulf and Tehran was compelled to retaliate likewise. This 
meant chaos and lack of security in Persian Gulf.  
Since then, there were three factors that worried the Sheikdoms. Firstly, 
the fall of Saddam, would have leave evil consequences for them in 
general and specifically for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Secondly, cause of 
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fear for the exports and imports, and thirdly, arbitrarily being dragged into 
the battle. In short, they were afraid that the war would lead to unrest and 
conflict in their countries. All these three factors were likely to shatter 
their fragile security.  
Iran took back Khorramshahr and inflicted heavy defeat to Iraqi troops, 
this made the Sheikhdoms seriously nervous. After that, they tried to 
encourage Iran to cease the hostilities, but Iran did not wish to stop the war 
as long as its conditions were not fulfilled. As result in order to save itself 
Baghdad decided to bring more and more countries into the battle and to 
expand the front to new regions. Among the countries in the region the 
best countries which could contribute to Saddam's war goals were the six 
Sheikhdoms. Countries such as Jordan, Northern Yemen and Egypt 
supplied the biggest help to Baghdad but they were unable to open a front 
against Iran and take part in the onslaught, but they were not able to act 
like Sheikhdoms in this polity. 
Thus, the Persian Gulf was exposed to new conditions. The most 
important question was the stability of the Sheikhdoms. Contrary to former 
decades such as security was threatened from outside and not from inside. 
During those turbulent years, they enjoyed good internal stability even 
their traditional dissidents such as the Shiites in Saudi Arabia or the 
western-oriented Saudis, liberals and leftists were silent because of the war 
conditions. But despite all their silence they felt that they were being 
threatened from abroad.  
The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council was partly due to such 
reactions. A bigger part was to invite big powers to move to the region and 
support them. Another idea was to buy massive weapons which were 
happening for the first time. As a result, the region was moving towards 
militarization.
99 
Considering the wealth of these countries and the significance of oil and 
its continued flow, the geopolitical and geo-economical importance of 
Persian Gulf, such an invitation was received warmly by Washington and 
major powers in Europe and even the Soviet Union. Various weapons 
started to pour into these countries and military contracts were inked, with 
military bases built. This was a policy that remained effective post-war 
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and changed the regional situation altogether.  
In fact this militarization process fetched them security and stability, 
although the anxiety remained till the end of the war. In the same way they 
succeeded to change the conditions to such a mode that the continuation of 
the war would have been detrimental to Iraq and Iran. The war ended and a 
ceasefire was proclaimed. The Sheikhdoms were relieved of their anxiety, 
but peace didn't continue for a long time and suddenly, Kuwait was 
occupied by Iraq.
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After the end of the war, Tehran focused on its infrastructure, 
reconstruction and repair of the damages that had been inflicted during the 
war, and tried to encourage the Sheikdoms to forget supporting Iraq and 
establish friendly and positive relationship. But conditions were different 
in Baghdad. The Baathist regime felt that all the Sheikhdoms and 
especially, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were indebted to it because they had 
defeated the Arabs and the Arab cause. Therefore, at this stage of 
economical and social crisis Saddam expected the Sheikhdoms to help 
him.
101
  
In addition, the Iraqi war machine could not easily be used for the 
reconstruction of the country. During the war, in Iran, a sort of spirit of 
resistance, innovation and self-devotion developed among the masses and 
that could easily be mobilized such powerhouse to the reconstructional 
process. Whereas Iraq had in fact a giant war machines well – a machine 
which was equipped with modern weapons which had exploited all the 
resources of the country and therefore, could not contribute to the 
country's progress. After the cessation of hostilities the war machine had 
become a conundrum for the government and needed another battle. The 
most ideal scenario would have been a definite swift and end up with 
complete victory.
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Along with such developments, there was the temptation of Arabic 
nationality having an ideology of using everything towards Arab 
nationality. Furthermore, Baghdad‟s proclaim of Kuwait being an 
integrated part of Iraq. Thus, the regime tried to use it as a national slogan 
and demand. Hence, from the viewpoint of internal politics, Baghdad 
needed all these elements.
103 
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Aside from such realities, years before the occupation of Kuwait, 
Saddam's regime had betrayed symptoms of discontents against the 
Sheikdoms. But those who thought that the end of war would put an end to 
all the problems and fears did not realize or were perhaps unable to 
understand such evil discontents. It was as if the Iraqi optimism and trust 
of the regime that prevailed in the 70's had returned to the country and 
there was no ground for pessimism and upsetting the joy of victory.
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The occupation of Kuwait was a severe issue. Perhaps it was for this 
reason that some Sheikhdoms tried to distance themselves from Kuwait 
and defend Kuwait. The active force behind such unwillingness was Saudi 
Arabia because Iraq was openly and directly threatening that country and 
its propaganda targeted Saudi Arabia.
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The most important result of the blow was the change of the relations 
between the Sheikhdoms and other Arabic states. In the subsequent 
chapters, we will explain that after the 1967 war and the defeat of Nasser 
and Naserism the center of power of the Arab world had shifted towards 
the Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms. And after the 1973 war such a shift 
was accelerated, and with the accumulation of wealth by Sheikhdoms and 
the weakness of other Arab leaders, the centre of political balance had 
inclined to Persian Gulf region.
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This led to many results including attraction of millions of migrants 
from various Arab countries which were employed in various sectors and 
at times, in key positions.  
The occupation of Kuwait opened a gap between the Arab states. Some 
countries filed behind Saddam while some stood against him. The reason 
for such political stand had its perplexed background. What is important to 
note is that such positions were not merely political, rather due to public 
pressure. Even a regime like Jordan which always had a very close tie with 
Saudi Arabia and the Sheikdoms stood behind Saddam Hussein.
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This excited confrontation between the Persian Gulf States and the 
migrants from those countries who supported Saddam Hussein 
consequently resulted into their mass expatriation. Moreover it incited 
gross pessimism about Arab nationalism and Arab nation in which the 
immigrants were their staunch supporters. Above all, the Sheikdoms had 
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spent billions of dollars for fortification and stabilization of their 
nationalism ethnicity. They felt that such slogans and ideology would 
serve as a weapon against them and their wealth by Arabs who believed to 
be committed to comply with Arabic nationalistic goals.
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The occupation of Kuwait ended with severe defeat of Iraqi army, but 
the result of the ugly nightmare had spread in the entire region and they all 
sweated dumb and undecided, especially because the Arab world was 
ruptured between the supporters and opponents of Saddam. Such a process 
inflicted severe damage to the international dignity of the Arabs in the 
world and this process continued for a long time.
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What mattered was that Saudi Arabia had lost both its popular support. 
In forthcoming chapters we will explain how, in the beginning of the 60's, 
they established religious and propaganda stations in the Muslim and non-
Muslim states which pursued different goals, but at the behind all these 
machines were at the service of the Saudi foreign policy. The majority of 
these religious centers supported Saddam during the occupation of Kuwait. 
Actually, in those bleak days the conditions were such that even regimes 
that were the enemies of Iraq and had joined the war against Baghdad did 
not expose their hostility fearing internal discontent.
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Under such chaotic circumstances the Arab inhabitants of the Persian 
Gulf Sheikhdoms gave up their past Arabic slogans and were no more 
willing to be gravitated to the Arab nationalism or become one of the 
important centers of such Arab aspiration. They felt that their stability and 
security necessitated them to stay away from such aspirations. Such 
conditions led to many difficulties in the Arab world, especially among 
countries which from political viewpoint before the occupation of the 
Kuwait were in line with the Arab Sheikdoms and many of their citizens 
were working in the Sheikdoms.
111 
After the 1991 War, we face new conditions in the international arena. 
The Eastern Bloc had collapsed and the giant Soviet Empire disintegrated. 
The two-polar situation had vanished. In the interim, Palestine emerged as 
one of the priorities of international politics and even the public. The Arab 
world and especially Arab leaders, politicians, intelligentsia and the 
Palestinians themselves were ready to have a new approach to the 
A Historical Glimpse                                                                                 41 
 
Palestinian issue. The defeat of Iraq, and Baghdad's failure to hit a blow to 
Israel had an important role in this feeling of disillusionment.  
Under such circumstances, the world powers demanded the Arab world 
to start negotiation to pave the way for peace between the Palestine and 
Israel and normalize their relations with Tel Aviv. Now they did not know 
who they had to address and with whom in the Arab world the West had to 
speak. The Palestinian Authority and leadership were too small to be 
addressed directly. Moreover the West wanted to solve the dispute 
between the Arabs and Israel and not the discord between Palestine and 
Israel, and they thought that Palestine was part of the problem.  
Taking into account every consideration Egypt was thought to be the 
best choice. Egypt which up to the end of 80s, often due to domestic 
problems and pan Arab drives, was willing to play an active role in the 
talks and for this reason, it was looking for economical and political 
assistance. Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms too had left aside their 
former claims and did not want and were unable to speak on behalf of the 
Arabs. Above all the new Egyptian foreign policy adapted to the 
expectations of the western powers and Cairo itself had enough potential 
to play the role of a peace negotiator. 
This encouraged Mubarak's Egypt to step into the field. As to the Arab 
Persian Gulf countries they preferred such a choice, and the political 
magnitude of the Arab world once again inclined towards Egypt. The 
inhabitants of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms welcomed such a role by Cairo 
and tried to stabilize Egypt's position from political and economical 
viewpoints. According to an old belief, they thought that the welfare of the 
Arab world owed to the welfare of Egypt and naturally, Egypt should 
become their mouthpiece and leader of the Arab world.
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The 90's ended in this manner. From the point of view of potential 
world powers and a great part of the world the most important dilemma 
bogging the Arab world at that time was peace between Palestine and 
Israel for which a series of innovative plans had been envisaged. The 
Sheikdoms were standing outside their dialogue and efforts and in fact 
wished to stay clear from that subject. The Sheikhdoms stood out of these 
talks and they preferred to remain neutral. Neither the regimes nor the 
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inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms desired to participate in the talks. The lack 
of interest was because of the recent occupation of Kuwait, but the talks 
contributed greatly to their stability. 
The reason for lack of interest among the sheikhs was that from the 
very beginning many groups both among the Palestinians and other Arab 
countries had looked at such peace efforts with suspicion, and regarded the 
process with pessimism on the basis of their bitter past experience. As a 
matter of fact the peace partisans too had a negative look at the inhabitants 
of the Sheikdoms. Had they participate in the peace talks they would have 
been surely criticized by these groups of Arabs and the peace supporters, 
and such an involvement was likely to brew internal problems. But they 
escaped the trouble by delegating the responsibility to Egypt probably 
without their wish or expectations. 
Other things happened during that decade including the war in Bosnia 
and Chechen against which the Sheikdoms because their reclusive attitude 
showed no reaction. It was only Iran which worried them. The 
Sheikhdoms moved so far in their conservative and lethargic attitude and 
fear of Iran that they recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the two out of three countries 
that recognized the Taliban regime. The reason for the reorganization of 
Taliban government in Afghanistan was merely because of pressuring Iran 
and of course, they gave lots of money to the Taliban government in 
Kabul.
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From the mid 90's normalization of relations between the Sheikhdoms 
and the Arab countries, which had supported Saddam Hussein, began. 
They continued their secluded and closed-door attitude as before and were 
not willing to be present in Arabic troublesome spots or in international 
skirmishes, yet such neutrality did not conflict with their good relations 
with such countries. The end of 90's their relations with radical countries 
were more or less normal. Even Kuwait acted like the Sheikhdoms or was 
perhaps forced to do so.
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Yet they could not ignore their Arabic origin. They lacked a history or 
civilization to rely upon and in the meantime remained aloof from Arabs 
or pretended to be non-Arabic. They were compelled to return to the Arab 
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camp and they did so, of course with a different policy and approach. The 
only exception among the Sheikhdoms was Qatar. The crown prince of 
Qatar revolted against his father in the mid of 90s, deposed him in a 
bloodless coup, took over the reigns and completely revolutionized his 
country's policies and laid down the needed structures for open and active 
politics within the region and on international level. Of course, Qatar 
enjoyed the support of influential world in its new open policies.
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The most urgent issue which undermined the internal security and 
stability of these countries during the 90's was the widespread protests 
against the nature of the governments which at last ended with the 
formation of Salafid approach. Such protests mostly flared up in Saudi 
Arabia inhabitants.
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The Saudi rulers were compelled to seek western military assistance to 
cope with Saddam Hussein and to give quarter to western troops in the 
mainland Saudi Arabia - a land which according to traditional Arabs was 
sacred and non-Muslims were not permitted to enter. Such an attitude must 
be examined from the scope of ideological and religious changes which 
had developed during the 80's. Without such traditional sentiments neither 
an ideology would have developed nor would the ideology gain strength 
and spread.
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At this juncture, it was the religious theologians and orators in the 
mosques of Saudi Arabia who had a critical tongue and rebuked the 
passive policies of their leaders against the Americans, and this was 
happening for the first time. Such a censure was not only leveled against 
the Saudi leadership but against all the clerics and official organization of 
the Wahhabi organization, which added to the significance of the matter. 
More or less it was the first, that a traditional religious establishment was 
being criticized on such a large scale by the theologians.
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The criticism was welcomed by young citizens and the government was 
not in a position to openly show reaction. There were only two opinions 
available to deal with the threat. The first option was for the Saudi 
authorities to put more emphasize on Wahhabi principles inside the 
country to prove to the people that they were committed to their religious 
obligations. The second option was to send the dissident youth whose 
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blood boiled with religious zeal and fire to regions such as Bosnia, 
Chechnya, Central Asia and Afghanistan.
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These two alternatives proved a good solution. Open criticism by 
clerics grew less and the tone was softer, but the main ideology which 
provoked the criticism was influencing the masses and was spreading. It 
ultimately ended with a new branch of Wahhabi Sect differing with the 
official Wahhabi doctrines and its existing teachings. The difference lay 
both in the understanding of religious edicts and people's thoughts and 
political ideology.
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Another problem was the unrest in Bahrain, which will be discussed 
later on. The problem was tyranny and discrimination, which the minority 
Sunni in power had imposed on the majority Shiites. The Shiites were the 
real owners of the island and had lived in the country for centuries. The 
ruling class belonging to the Caliph Family (Al-e-Khalifeh) had 
immigrated to Bahrain about two centuries ago and had grabbed power. 
This, itself had disturbed the balance of power, and during the British 
dominance the English repeatedly benefited from such discord and 
hostility. In order to cope with the criticism, the Bahraini authorities 
fanned the flame of sectarian disputes and tensions.
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The unrest during the 90's was the fruit of criticism that usually flared 
up in the sheikhdom, but the protest that erupted in the 90's had another 
aspect. It was a protest against the change of the dimension of the 
population. The ruling regime was trying, with the help of its confederates, 
to bring in Sunni migrants into the island and impose them upon the 
Bahraini citizens and on the other hand, they deprived many Shia 
followers of their right of citizenship. Such offensive measures incited a 
general protest among the Shia community which led to violence and was 
brutally curbed.
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As mentioned above, after the occupation of Kuwait a large number of 
the migrant Arabs were expelled from the six Sheikhdoms. The most 
cogitative thing was that the Kuwaiti rulers had placed new laws and very 
hard conditions for accepting workers from Arabic countries. This policy 
decreased the number of Arab applicants. This discrimination lessened the 
number of Arabs in the Sheikhdoms - a circumstance that will influence 
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more obviously in the future.
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Alongside, such problems gave birth to a serious desire for economic 
presence outside the region among the inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms. 
United Arab Emirate and Dubai were the harbinger of such a trend, but 
after a while, the other members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council 
joined those who wanted to invest outside the region. They understood that 
in order to preserve their security and interest they were compelled to rely 
on Americans and to some extent to European countries, although their 
choice of Europeans was made to remove the blame that they were in 
league with Americans. Of course, due to historical reasons and their deep 
knowledge of the region the British played their specific role.  
Various factors contributed to such a wish for foreign presence. The 
object was to merge in the free global economy, but in this region 
economy was treated as commerce and commercial brokerage. In order to 
achieve that end it was not necessary for them to acquire industrial and 
economic mechanisms and trained personnel, technology and science. The 
aim was to have a transit of goods.
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They were pursuing such goals at a time that both manufacturers and 
consumers needed them especially because the conditions in the region 
was such that many consumers, because of sanction and lack of 
information with the vast network of production and main suppliers of 
goods, were unable to meet their needs.  
On one side there was Iran and Iraq. The first was under relative 
sanctions and the other bore the brunt of complete sanctions. On the other 
hand, there were Russia, Ukraine and Central Asian States, which after 
collapse of Communist had suddenly grown  wealthy but had no way to 
purchase their needed commodities. Principally, were not familiar with 
trade. Countries like, Pakistan and Afghanistan and some other countries 
in the region suffered more or less from the same problem.  
In the meantime, there were the European and Southeast Asian and 
even American, Australian and Canadian manufacturers and exporters 
which preferred to sell their goods to countries like the Sheikhdoms. Trade 
with the sheikhdom was done smoothly and they were able to secure the 
legal consequences of such trade.  
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Under such circumstances Dubai, which had a good background for 
trade stepped in the field. The British advisors who saw their profit in the 
new haven assisted the Dubai merchants. Dubai's successful and profitable 
experience incited the other towns in the United Arab Emirates to follow 
the same policy. After a few years the same stream spread to all 
Sheikhdoms.  
No doubt, the enormous revenues from oil, the security achieved with 
the presence of foreign powers, their positive approach to such foreign 
support, their interest and knowledge of the inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms 
with trade, the flexibility of the responsible authorities, their lack of 
interest in bureaucracy, their lack of political ambition and a sort of 
realistic approach to things, all contributed to such economic boom.  
In their next phase, they tried to expand their service substructures 
especially in the field of aviation, education, medical services, to some 
extent banking and commerce as well as their tourist industry. Ultimately, 
they tried to build modern residential complexes which become a nucleus 
that attracted the wealthy people from within and outside the region.
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Such innovative steps began during the 90's when their successful 
experiments in trade gave boost to their economy. Surely their strength 
identity which was a mixture of their religious identity and ethnic 
tendencies played a big role for their stability. Had they lacked religious 
identity and ethnic teachings they would not be able to march the arduous 
path with an acceptable degree of success. We will discuss this issue 
again.
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All these countries are now members of the World Trade Organization 
and are active in the international commerce. Despite all the changes that 
have happened in this big and highly consuming region, the Sheikhdoms 
continue to be the most important transit bases for import and even export 
of commodities. Due to sanctions imposed on Iran many Iranian goods are 
being exported to foreign countries through the Sheikhdoms. 
Eventually, the last ten years of 2000 ended and the new millennium 
began. The Sheikhdoms more or less continued their former domestic and 
foreign policies. The big shock was the explosion of the twin towers in 
New York on September 11 that shook the whole world. The United States 
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blamed the Arab world, in particular, the Sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia. 
 During the crisis Saudi Arabia showed its peculiar reaction which is 
not like the attitude of the Sheikhdoms. In this instance too Saudi Arabia 
acted in the same manner. We will discuss about Saudi reaction in the 
forthcoming chapters. But the other Sheikhdoms remained silent and tried 
to betray no reaction. What mattered for them was to evade crisis and not 
confront with it. They wish to thwart every crisis with silence and denial 
and do so as long as they could. This is a quality that history and 
especially modern history has instilled in them and has strengthened it. 
Their approach to the New York catastrophe was not like other Arab 
states.
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After the first shockwaves and excitement had blown over, several 
questions loomed in the political circles. Where the mistake had 
happened? Why the catastrophe had happened? What were the reasons and 
factors behind the sabotage? Did the Americans adopt a correct policy 
against Arabs? What could be done to prevent similar incidents? And what 
policy Washington had to follow? 
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Extensive studies with different methods were conducted about the 
Arab world. In the meantime, the Saudi society, culture and policy and 
government were more than other places under scrutiny. A big list of 
problems, deficiencies and shortages was prepared. A true example of this 
incident was the problems suffered by Saudi Arabia. According to the 
Americans and observers the other Sheikhdoms suffered in the same 
manner.
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In all such research works the main problem was discovered to be the 
compacted and traditional nature of the political system. The criterion for 
evaluation of good and bad regimes was in harmony with their modern and 
non-traditional nature of political system and not their acceptability or 
legitimacy. In such classification, a country like Tunisia was found to be 
far more acceptable than countries like United Arab Emirates and Qatar.    
Among Arab states the above six Sheikhdoms were at the bottom of 
such classification and for this reason the pressure on them was heavier. 
The regimes preferred to remain silent, but the ordinary people felt the 
brunt of the pressures in different forms. They felt themselves, their 
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history, culture and religion was being humiliated and insulted.
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The result was consolidation of social solidarity. One of the objects of 
Washington was to find individuals and groups who could think like them 
and try to reform their community, government and culture in a way that 
may satisfy their style, and in return they promised to support them. But 
such attitude had a contrary effect and all other countries more or less 
sided or supported the governing regimes.
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As we said Saudi reaction was quite different, but these pressures led to 
a series of changes in the Sheikhdoms. The most important thing was to 
see the changes according to the local community. For example, the active 
presence of woman in the society which the U.S. had called for could be 
seen and the new conditions accelerated and facilitated the process.
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After the September 11 blast, Afghanistan was attacked and the Taliban 
regime was toppled. This incited the traditional Afghans but the political 
systems showed no reaction to the change of regime in Kabul. After that 
Washington spoke about attacking Iraq and although, such a war 
conflicted with the stability of the Sheikdoms no sheikhdom approved the 
aggression except Kuwait. As a matter of fact the other Sheikdoms had no 
specific policy about that matter.
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Among the Sheikhdoms it was only Kuwait which welcomed the fall of 
Saddam Hussein. The remaining Sheikdoms remained silent. After that 
they expressed their anxiety about the Shia government in Baghdad and 
the increasing influence of Tehran in Iraq and tried to cope with that 
problem using different methods.  
In all these cases, it was Mubarak who was the spokesman of the Arabs 
and the Sheikhdoms. The Sheikhdoms preferred to convey their demand 
and opinion through Egypt, although Saudi continued its former policies, 
and had harmonized its stance with Cairo and sometime it expressed its 
own opinion.
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During his second term, George W. Bush showed a softer, far respectful 
and realistic stance versus the Arab world and the members of the Persian 
Gulf Cooperation Council. This change of position helped a lot to relieve 
the anxiety of the Sheikhdoms. They were assured that Washington was 
not after changing the regimes and tried to cooperate with the U.S. plans. 
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In fact, the blow that fell on New York on September 11 helped to 
intensify the solidarity of the Sheikhdoms.
135 
As a whole Barak Obama, the next U.S. president had a different 
attitude about the region and his approach delighted the Sheikdoms. 
Actually the inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms wholeheartedly favored a 
president with the doctrines, slogans and character of Obama, although a 
few months after his election Obama understood that there are many 
factors in the region which he could not overlook and that he had to adapt 
his policies accordingly. The Sheikdoms too understand that change of 
president cannot change the U.S. policies to the extent that they wanted. 
In the recent decade, we do not see any important problem threatening 
the security and stability of the Sheikhdoms. What is notable is the 
question of Iran and its problems with the United States and American 
threats. But instead of treating the crisis between Tehran and Washington 
as a threat against their security it has served as a tool for political 
propaganda. In fact the U.S. threat has further consolidated the 
Sheikhdoms and has pushed Arabs, the United States and Europe closer to 
each other. Furthermore, it has given a pretext to Washington to expel 
their rivals under the pretext that they are cooperating with Iran and are in 
league with Tehran. Moreover, we must approach and analyze the question 
of Iran and the Sheikhdoms through the process of history and historical 
relations between the two.
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The last important incident was the impact of fall of Bin Ali and the 
beginning of Arab Spring. The Arab Spring proved the falsity of 
presumption of the researchers who attributed the problems in the Arab 
world including the six Sheikhdoms to their compacted and traditional 
systems of government. In fact, it was the modern regimes which 
collapsed and suffered problems and it was the traditional regimes that 
remained calmer and more stable. At least, the traditional regimes 
possessed the mechanism to overcome and digest their problems to an 
acceptable level.
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The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council are among these 
traditional countries. No doubt the systems governing these Sheikhdoms 
are the most traditional and non-democrat governors. This system is a 
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tribal system which was used in the past centuries and their rulers are 
thinking, deciding and acting on the basis of the same principles.
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At a first glance, GCC does not adapt with the modern world especially 
thanks to oil dollars. They are becoming more modern and wealthy but call 
the modernization of their system of government. 
This is in fact the core issue. We must not forget that in many respects 
these systems are in harmony with the conditions in which their people are 
living and the history, culture, religion and structures, which they have 
inherited from the past, form part of such conditions. In the forthcoming 
chapters we will study and analyze all these factors. 
Among them Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are two big exceptions. Bahrain 
suffers from division in the society and not from traditional or modern 
system of government. If the governors of the island country had tried to 
solve or lessen the gulf and difference in the population on the basis of its 
traditional principles and culture the Bahrain dilemma would not have 
grown so much complicated and brutal.
139 
Kuwait too suffers from a similar problem, albeit at a lower scale. The 
Shia Sect in Kuwait form a big minority and the regime in Kuwait does 
not differ much with other Sheikhdoms, but those on the helm of power in 
that county are trying to solve the social division and conflict on the basis 
of their old and traditional system of government and have succeeded in 
this respect to some extent.
140 
But there is no such determination in Bahrain. Instead of incompetent 
tribal and traditional systems, the real problem bogging that country is lack 
of realistic approach to the problem, bigotry and a sullen willingness to 
suppress. Of course, there is another factor which prevents the solution of 
the social difference or discrimination and that is the Saudi government. 
The authorities in Saudi Arabia see their interest in the present statuesque 
because if Bahrain tries to solve the discrimination or lessen the difference 
between the inhabitants of Bahrain, the Saudi rulers will be compelled to 
adopt similar stance towards the Shia followers living in the east of that 
country. As a whole, Saudi Arabia doesn't want or is unable to accept such 
methods either with regard to the Shia community or others. 
Another exception is the system of Saudi government. Despite 
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similarity of Saudi population, culture, politics and regime with the other 
Sheikhdoms there is a fundamental difference between these two. In fact, 
one might examine and analyze the problems in Saudi Arabia separately 
and without comparing to the conditions in the Sheikhdoms.
141 
To summarize the matter, we must say that the internal structures and 
networks in the Saudi system have been formed in a manner which does 
not allow any serious change or modernization. Accepting any change in 
such system will immediately lead to crisis and cause the fall of the 
regime. The regime has always tried to give concessions to those who will 
contribute to the preservation of the existing system. This is mostly related 
to excessive use of Wahhabi codes for the administration of the country. In 
the first instance the Wahhabi faith has a rigid and severe psychology. 
Secondly, it does not favor any change and thirdly, the ultimate decisions 
in the country rests with the Wahhabi theologians and not the regime. The 
regime must act in a way that will not provoke their antagonism and this 
cleric influence limits their power more than one can expect.
142 
All these countries can digest the excitement of the Arab Spring as far 
as it is related to their country. Their internal and external policies are not 
such that would provoke the discontent of a vast majority and incite them 
to protest or succumb to unrest. They have the capacity and possibility to 
digest such protests of course, in case the developments in the Arab world 
will not upset the existing conditions.
143
  
In between the condition in Bahrain and to some extent Yemen is 
threatening. The common fate which the men on the helm of power have 
defined for themselves has pushed the conditions in Bahrain into deadlock. 
The regime and the Bahraini opposition cannot have dialogue with each 
other within the framework of internal means and demands. Moreover, 
change in a country must not be regarded as a dangerous model for another 
country. Those in power in the Gulf Cooperation Council have so much 
existed the overcharged atmosphere in their countries that they look at 
every change in any of these Sheikdoms as an alarm bell for other 
Sheikhdoms and they assess the matter from that angle.
144 
If the conditions were not such, the question of Bahrain could have 
been controlled by more suitable methods. Aside from that, a feeling of 
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common fate can be converted into a big dilemma in the future and can 
prevent freedom of action by countries which due to various reasons are 
willing to effect political changes. 
Despite all these factors in fact it is the Saudi regime which is the 
architect and supporter of the idea of common fate of political systems in 
the GCC. The Saudis are suffering from their own problems and feel that 
in order to control their internal discontent they are compelled to take steps 
outside their borders. The first immediate point outside Saudi border is the 
Sheikhdoms. According to Saudi politicians the Sheikhdoms most not take 
such steps to solve their problem and make reforms which they cannot use. 
They believe that such unpleasant steps will push them into difficulties and 
compromising. 
From that angle the GCC member states are considered by Saudi Arabia 
as safety margin instead of being their partners and allies. The idea of 
common fate of regimes in the Sheikhdoms instead of originating from the 
realities in the Sheikhdoms or the will of the governors of the Sheikhdoms 
is an invention of Saudi authorities in order to secure their internal security 
and to further strengthen themselves against foreign pressures and threats.  
Although Bahrain is facing a big crisis and many problems, we witness 
shy or less mounting protest inside Saudi Arabia and the regime in Kuwait 
because of open and extensive protests by those who have stepped into the 
field to protest the financial corruption among the authorities, they are 
faced with a series of problems. But it is doubtful whether the Arab Spring 
will cause a big change in the Sheikhdoms. As a whole they have the 
capacity to preserve their stability. 
The question is not of only money or the benevolent financial help of 
the regimes in the region. Such privilege incites mounting demands and 
expectations, and leads to further instability. The question is that the 
acceptability of regimes is at the lowest ebb and they cannot keep their 
balance against such turbulent waves of protests – a legitimacy resulting 
from coordination with the historical, social and cultural realities.
145
  
Although, most probably the Sheikhdoms will face new problems 
which will differ with things which incited the Arab Spring, among which 
the question of expatriate workers who are working in the Sheikdoms and 
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often their wage is far below that which they deserve to receive. The 
question is more applicable when we consider the common and non-expert 
workers. The tribal culture and the tribal regime more or less treat them 
like salves who before the abolition of slave trade labored in this region.
146 
The foreign manpower forms almost 80% of the inhabitants of the 
Sheikhdoms. The majority of which are the workers who are working with 
the lowest salary and means and often in the most difficult conditions. The 
government or the employers do not feel any commitment against their 
welfare. These workers are working in exceeding fragile circumstances 
and might be dismissed any moment, even without a plausible reason.  
Moreover such a condition makes the real citizens of the six Sheikdoms 
lethargic, indolent and urges them to seek excessive fund to the extent that 
they are not prepared to do any regular work. Although, sometimes it is 
said that in these countries, especially in Saudi Arabia, the youth like other 
Arab countries suffer from unemployment, but the problem is that many 
young people do not wish to engage in serious jobs. Instead, they are 
seeking such jobs which they want and not the jobs available in the 
business market.
147 
Such a condition cannot continue for ever. If one day this massive 
workforce demands its rights and succeeds to mobilize all the workers and 
international organizations responsible to defend human rights and the 
right of migrant workers, everything will suddenly deteriorate. Although 
such a collapse is unlikely to happen under the existing circumstances; 
however we must not overlook the quick pace of developments and 
upheavals in the region. 
Their fragile status is not from domestic movement. It is from factors 
which bring welfare and a balanced and modern life to them. The danger 
will be thwarted only when the regime adopts a new approach versus the 
workforce and especially common workers. 
2 
Politics and Tribal Structure 
In order to correctly understand the social and political developments in 
the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms, we must understand their political structure 
first. This is a tribal structure which, because of late entry into modern 
history, had absolute authority for a long time, and still enjoys 
considerable strength and influence. The developments of the Arab Spring 
has clearly shown that in many Arabic countries still tribal structure is one 
of the important stimulants, and above all developments grows in this 
spectrum and finds its shape and progresses within this framework. 
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In order to better understand the situation and developments in the 
Sheikhdoms is to focus on their ethnical stun true. It doesn't mean that the 
ethnic structure is still strong and is a determining factor as in the past in 
all fields and cases. On the contrary it means that these countries have 
entered the new history under the shadow of such structure and this 
structure has played the biggest role during transition from traditional 
community to modern community, although presently, various factors 
shape their foreign policy. The essence of this policy is the nationalistic 
structure and tribal education and culture.
1 
As mentioned before, the inhabitants of all these Sheikhdoms were the 
surplus population of the main peninsula, who gathered at the fringe of the 
Peninsula because of difficult living conditions, hostile and unbearable 
nature, poor fertile land and endless domestic skirmishes which had no 
output, sought refuge in these regions. Moreover, due to historical reasons 
and the arbitrary geographic conditions looming over this vast Peninsula 
from the first time they were become known they always lived within 
tribal framework and culture.
2
  
In this burning land of hardship every person belongs to a tribe. No one 
lives there without a tribe and one who doesn't belong to a tribe is doomed 
to die. For a man who has fallen apart from his tribe must undergo a 
sophisticated process to seek shelter in another tribe and receive support 
from the new tribe, because if he is rejected by the new tribe he will lose 
all sorts of security and opportunities to live.
3 
Here, the tribe forms the social cell and not the individual. Everything 
is defined and is limited on the basis of this reality.  The prevailing culture 
and customs are the tribal culture and customs, in the same way that the 
structure is a tribal structure. The chief of the tribe is accepted and elected 
according to this structure and tradition. The position, duties and ethnics 
and commitments of the chief is determined by this ethnic structure. In 
rare cases, when the chief of the tribe is dismissed still the criterion for 
action is this tribal tradition and custom.
4 
This means that the chief of the tribe is acceptable and legitimate. The 
factor that determines his acceptability (and legitimacy) is the ancient and 
acceptable tradition of the tribe which has neither opponents nor it occurs 
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to anyone to oppose it. Maybe a person or several persons can complain or 
criticize a tribal chief, but in all these cases, the special tribal tradition 
always prevails.
5 
Now, the question is that the significance and status of this tradition and 
structure differs with its status in other communities and even other 
traditional communities. In this region, the rank and status of a person 
accepted in the tribe is the person himself. He exists because his tribe 
exists and he finds dignity and importance because he is attached to the 
tribe. The man finds social prominence through the tribe and since this is 
the prevailing procedure whatever is related to the community is accepted 
without question, including the tribe's tradition and culture.
6
   
Notwithstanding the above the relationship between an individual and 
traditional society and even the most closed-door societies is not so 
anymore. The individual exists and of course is dependent on his tribe's 
traditions and customs. He can protest or disobey orders, or least think 
about such things. But due to the practical dissolution of the individual's 
character within the realities of the tribe such a protest is not possible.
7
  
Such features have strongly shaped the society and history and the 
modern history of the Sheikhdoms. Despite this fact, the social 
developments and political conditions in Arabian countries closely 
resemble that of the inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms. The developments in 
Sheikhdoms in fact differ with other countries. Such a claim is acceptable 
even compared to countries which enjoy tribal traditions and structure. 
Although in countries such as Yemen, Iraq and Libya the social structure 
is ethnic structure, in these cases the tribal structure has acted as a part of 
social reality, and it has never shaped the political and social structure of 
such countries.
8
  
But with regard to the Sheikhdoms and of course with some difference 
with regard to Bahrain and to some extent Oman, the whole political and 
social setup is influenced by tribal structure. One can say that the political 
and social structures are the culmination of the foreign structure of ethnic 
tradition on national level throughout the country. No doubt, the most 
important reason for the late entry of these countries into modern history is 
the fact that until the beginning of the 20
th
 century and even until the end 
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of World War II they lived in their ancient historical format which is an 
important reason for such lifestyle.
9 
Now we must see how this culture and structure operates. Here we will 
study only two parts of such reality. The first part zooms on the social 
dimension and the second part examines the political results.  
When the tribe's cell is the community and not the individual transition 
from traditional society to modern society happens with far less difficulty. 
At least with an eye to the strong tradition and culture in the Sheikhdoms 
such an assertion seems to be correct.
10 
All the problems resulting from such transition which ends up with the 
social and political instability is because under the shadow of the 
developments during this period, individuals and various classes of the 
community are influenced in different manner. The result is that after the 
transitional period, each individual or group of individuals belonging to a 
traditional society who have more or less enjoyed the same social position, 
have fallen into a different condition and such a difference of class has led 
to unrest, insurgency and quarrels, and all of these helped them to fall 
deeply apart from each other from the point of view of social position and 
wealth.
11
  
The eventual result become thus, each of these individuals develops 
their peculiar personality, opinions, and ideal goals, and for the same 
reason, their opinions, profits and interests are defined. Even sometimes 
they may be changed to individuals align from their identity or persons 
who are in full conflict with their past traditions and suffer from a sort of 
mental and idealistic disorder, and benefit from  such factors as a lever to 
destroy each other and emerge as enemies. This is a dilemma which many 
countries in the Third World have encountered.
12 
Such problems either did not exist in the Sheikhdoms or was faint 
compared to other countries, and this is because of the reasons we 
mentioned before. It was through its entirety that the tribe was passing the 
transition period. During this critical period, the tribe was transiting its 
members. Under such circumstances the individuals were impressed by 
new developments in the same way and in the same direction, and 
therefore many of the problems which were the result of different 
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impression of individuals from the transition did not happen to them.
13
  
In traditional communities, especially ancient communities dependent 
on ancient civilizations, in the surface the individuals seem to be similar 
and live a similar life. Yet, potentially these individuals differ with each 
other, and only the absence of suitable conditions which prevents such 
difference to come to the surface. In a closed society there is little 
possibility for class difference. But when the traditional boundary of the 
society breaks down, various individuals in keeping with their mental, 
spiritual and material benefits and closeness or distance to the hub of 
changes that has started, are influenced in different ways. Such a process 
leads to ideological, social, political and economic factions and the gulf 
widens gradually, and hurls the society into chaos and tension.
14 
But facts are not such in a tribe. The individuals in the tribe as a whole 
and from all angles are thinking in the same way and have the same 
potential. They think like each other and have the same aspirations. Their 
imagination about the past and future are the same and all of them are sunk 
deep in tribal culture and customs. They have grown with the tribe, and the 
mother tribe has fed its children reared them in the same manner.
15 
And since this is so, the new wave influences all of them equally. 
Therefore, we do not witness the problems and fragile nature we have seen 
among others in the Third World. Moreover, the power buildup and 
distribution of opportunities, resources and wealth is done in such a 
manner that more or less all individuals benefit from economic and 
financial resources under the new conditions. Maybe the individuals' share 
of these resources is not the same, but the difference is based on the 
acceptable tribal tradition and as a result it brows no problem.
16 
Another point is related to the social structure of the tribe, and this also 
is affected by its thousand-year old tradition. Instead of being the 
commander the head or the sheikh of the tribe is the supervisor and the 
manger of the tribe. The individuals in the tribe look at him with this 
mentality and he looks at his subjects in the same way. From that point of 
view, this title in proportion which is a rank confers a responsibility to the 
chief which all have accepted and since it is thus, the sheikh has seldom 
rivals or is envied and he seldom tries to trample the rights of his 
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subordinates. These are two subjects which have led to all historical, social 
and political tensions.
17 
But this is not the whole story. Tribal tradition has also fixed the quality 
of the successor. Therefore, such a matter is settled according to tribal 
traditions and often without any quarrel. Whether the successor is the son 
of the sheikh, one of his relatives, friends or another person.
18 
These two factors in fact play an important role towards the stability of 
Sheikhdoms particularly because giant wealth has flowed to these 
countries in a short period of time and these states are located in the most 
unsettled geographical location in the world. Besides, they belong to the 
Arab world and are influenced by these countries, - a world full of change 
and chaos. But notwithstanding all these factors they succeeded to 
preserve their balance.
19 
Surely many factors have had a role to preserve such balance on top of 
which we can see the will and determination of big powers. But one cannot 
ignore the very significant and sensitive role of domestic factors in this 
process. It was in fact these factors which gave the Sheikhdoms strength 
and endurance and enabled them to preserve their internal solidarity, and 
on top of these factors it was their tribal structure and culture which 
contributed to their stability.
20 
Still this tradition and culture is strong. Although their political and 
power buildup and the method of transfer of power in the Sheikhdoms has 
been censured, often by Western observers, the inhabitants and even the 
elites agree to that which has existed in the past and that which exists at 
present in the Sheikhdoms. At least they don't oppose the system or are not 
prepared to practically take action against it. Despite the present rapid 
developments which  threatens the power of such traditional system of 
government still the tradition seems to continue although it might continue 
in the future for other reasons, which we will explain in the future pages. 
What matters is that this fact has shaped their political destiny and has 
practically protected them, and most probably, it will be emphasized and 
will prove useful.
21 
They know well the significance of this factor and are aware that a slip 
in this matter will not only damage their dignity but their survival even. 
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For this reason presently those who are defending the traditions are more 
than those who defended them in the past. The influence and power of this 
principle in the past was based on an unwritten colloquial consensus, but 
presently to a large extent the tradition owes to its defenders. This is a 
process which may gather force in the future.
22
  
                                                      
3 
Politics and Social Changes 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century all these countries were 
living with their historical traditions. One might even assume that some of 
these countries were sunk in their past until the years following Second 
World War. Thus we can maintain that their changes were not due to 
internal changes in the society but were the result of decisions and changes 
in the hand of the authorities.
1 
Due to Kuwait's geographical and geo-economical conditions from the 
closing years of the nineteenth century this sheikhdom was influenced by 
various developments, which spread deeply and on a large span. The main 
reason was because this country had fallen in the route between England 
and India.
2
  
Such a process gave Kuwait, which in the past was a dissident 
dependent of the Ottoman Empire, found a semi-autonomous status and 
fall under London's influence. This happened simultaneously with the 
economic and commercial bloom in the sheikdom. During this period 
commerce between India and eastern of Kuwait increased and the trade 
conducted through Kuwait. More or less Khorramshahr and Basra also 
enjoyed the same opulence. Khorramshahr was owned by Iran and Basra 
was owned by Iraq – which in those years was dominated by the Ottoman 
Empire. By relying upon their historical heritage and their ideal aspirations 
for the future these two towns were influenced by the communication and 
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commerce as well as the economical and commercial boost. All these 
factors encouraged the governors of Khorramshahr and Basra and Kuwait 
to move close to each other. Moreover, the weakness of the Qajar kings in 
Iran and the weakness of Ottoman Empire in these years gave a far better 
chance the governors of Khorramshahr and Basra to maneuver.
3
  
Such a tie with England and India influenced Kuwait more than its two 
neighbors because Kuwait enjoyed more freedom of action and the other 
ports were under the rule of two alien countries and eventually joined their 
parent mainland. It is exactly at this point that Kuwait emerges as an 
independent state.
4 
The main reason for social changes in Kuwait was because of the 
educational system of the blooming sheikhdom. In other words, the emir 
of Kuwait decides to open new schools and was compelled to invite 
teachers for the schools. In those years suitable Arabic speaking teachers 
were invited to Kuwait from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. These 
teachers were under the spell of the ideology and activities of their 
nationalist countrymen and therefore, opposed the presence and influence 
of United Kingdom and above all, they censured the British policy with 
regard to the question of Palestine.
5
  
Such ideas left their impact on the students in these schools, and for the 
first time in Kuwait's history, the authorities were faced a sort of political 
inclination that demanded them to change their behavior and policy. At 
that time, Kuwait was virtually a colony of the United Kingdom but the 
students had been taught anti-British tendency.
6
  
The problem resulting from the presence of these teachers impelled the 
Kuwaiti authorities to dismiss them and invite Iraqi teachers instead, but 
the Iraqi teachers who had lived and breathed in an environment pregnant 
with anti-imperialistic and anti-British domination harbored the sentiments 
of the former teachers. Above all they were Iraqi nationals and this had 
intensified their wish to see Iraq and Kuwait united and such a desire had 
found root in the hearses of the Kuwait students who had been educated in 
that system. Moreover one must note that in those years the government in 
Baghdad wished to annex Kuwait to Iraq.
7 
When the Kuwaiti authorities sensed the danger emanating from the 
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Iraqi teachers, their textbooks and method of teachings, they again tried to 
invite Egyptian and Syrian teachers
8
, but this time they were opposed by 
the Kuwait citizens
9
 because they desired Iraqi teachers and Iraqi teaching 
system which incited unrest and demonstrations.
10
 Since the agitation was 
the result of lessons which was somehow linked with Arabic history, 
culture, civilization, and Arab and clannish identity, the emir of Kuwait 
said that Kuwait only needed accountants and oil technicians and nothing 
else, and these schools must zoom on accounting and oil industry and not 
others subjects.
11 
As a sheikdom which had earlier link with the modern times Bahrain 
must also be examined. These two countries enjoy two important features. 
Without taking these to factors into account we cannot understand their 
contemporary history.  
First of all, the majority of the population in Bahrain are Shiite, 
although the ruling system is composed of Sunni Muslims. The Shiites are 
the real inhabitants of Bahrain and the Ale Khalife family who now holds 
power in the Island have migrated from the inner recesses of Saudi 
Peninsula and accumulated power in the island.
12
  
The second point is that during various periods in the course of history 
Bahrain has belonged to Iran
13
 and being a province of Iran and the 
citizens of Iran and Bahrain  have always and often moved to the 
sheikdom and Iran – a process which continued on a large scale until the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
14
  
From that standpoint the developments in Bahrain if not as an integral 
part of Iranian it must be regarded as  a region which has been  deeply 
influenced by the developments in Iran, aside from the fact that the 
culture, civilization, art and architecture, folklore and methods of farming 
and handicrafts in Bahrain are deeply impressed by Iran and Iranian 
culture.
15 
To examine the contemporary history, the new schools in Bahrain have 
been established either by Iranian residents or Bahraini Iranian-origin 
nationals. In the beginning, the educational curriculum was under the 
influence of the Iranian educational system of those times
16
, although 
because of language difference these teaching methods were later on 
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influenced by Arab states.
17
  
The result of introduction of modern teaching methods in Bahrain 
differed with that which happened in Kuwait and this was because of two 
factors which we mentioned above. Since the Bahraini rulers had come to 
the island state from an alien country and dominated its main Shia 
inhabitants, and the historical influence of Iran was declining. The 
authorities made life difficult for the Bahraini citizens, and the sort of 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled which was influenced by tribal 
traditions, and culture that prevailed in other sheikhdom did not exist in 
Bahrain.
18 
This had led to a sort of perpetual dissatisfaction and when anti-
colonial, leftist and nationalistic ideology flared in the region, more than 
any other groups the Shia Muslims were attracted to the propaganda at the 
southern side of Persian Gulf
19
, and from the moment that such thoughts 
was blended with Arab nationalism the Shiites were attracted to that 
ideology. They even laid more emphasis on such doctrines than the Arabs 
to prove their loyalty to Arabs and to deny the allegation that they were the 
vassals of the Iranian government.
20 
Social developments in Bahrain happened under the shadow of such 
developments, but despite the importance and deep impact of such 
changes, the changes influenced the internal and foreign policy of the 
authorities in Bahrain far less in scale compared to Kuwait and other 
Sheikhdoms. This is because in order to defend itself the regime in 
Bahrain had changed the population into two-pole or tribal zones. These 
two zones and tribes were the Sunni and Shia Muslims. According to the 
regime in Bahrain the Sunni Arabs were faithful to the country, the Sunni 
rulers and the interest of the people and Arabs in general, but the Shia sect 
was aligned to Iran and was opposed to the ruling authorities and the 
interest of the Arab nation. Furthermore, the regime tried to portray Iran as 
the enemy of Arabs and the Bahraini Shiites as Iran's paid agents and 
vassals.
21 
No doubt, the assistance of the British officials and other powers in the 
region whose interest owed to the stability and continuation of the existing 
Bahraini regime was a very strong determining factor, but as we said 
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earlier, the social changes did not apply too much pressure upon internal 
and foreign political realities in the sheikhdom. Most probably the biggest 
impact of these changes was reflected on the culture, ideology and internal 
realities in Bahrain.
22
   
Now we must see how Saudi Arabia entered contemporary history and 
how much social changes affected the process? 
The appearance of Saudi Arabia as an independent and unified country 
was due to the steps taken by Abd al-Aziz
23
. Before that a series of tribes 
were living in the Arabian Peninsula most of which were engaged in 
useless and endless skirmishes. Although the Ottoman Empire was 
tentatively in charge of affairs in Mecca and Medina and the governors of 
these two towns which were chosen from Sharif family and use to 
discharge their duties under the supervision of the Ottoman sultans and 
were appointed governors by their mandates, it was mere formality
24
. One 
of the important factors which helped the Ottoman sultans to add to their 
influence and legitimacy was the fact that they governed these two sacred 
towns through Sharif family which had retained that position from 
generation to generation.
25
  
Of course, during the reign of Sharif Hossein, who was the last emir of 
Mecca and Medina, rather of Hijaz region a series of small changes 
happened in that region, most of which was because of British influence 
and the steps they took to separate these two towns from the Ottoman 
caliphate. Moreover they promised Sharif Hossein and his children to help 
them to become Arab caliphs, and naturally such promise was likely to 
leave its impact and attract individuals who had such dreams within the 
Arabic world, and indeed, it happened.
26
  
Despite all these things, the conditions in Saudi Arabia were such that 
such innovative measures did not bring social change, even to a scale 
comparable to Kuwait. The vastness of the realm, the scattered nature of 
the people, and scarcity of fertile land, and lack of communication 
between the people, continued hostility between the tribes, lack of wish to 
associate with others and many other factors helped all these dangerous 
developments to pass over Saudi Arabia without influencing or agitating 
them.
27
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Aside from the above facts, every year Saudi Arabia hosted tens or 
perhaps hundred thousands of pilgrims who flocked to the country from 
various countries and lived for a considerable period of time in Mecca and 
Medina, and even settled in these two sacred towns. These people came 
from relatively higher classes of the community who enjoyed the least 
wealth and culture and religious commitment, to suffer such long and 
dangerous journeys. No doubt many of these pilgrims were learned 
scholars and were more or less educated in the sciences of the modern 
world, but as we said earlier the conditions were not such that their 
presence could change the conditions in Saudi Arabia.
28
    
This trend continued until Abd al-Aziz seized power and laid down the 
foundation of the Saudi Arabia, as a unified realm, in the early 1930‟s. The 
opinion and ideology of the supporters of Abd al-Aziz and his pragmatic 
character was such that discouraged any change in Saudi Arabia unless he 
was obliged to accept them. Of course the country's empty treasury was 
another reason to prompt such attitude.
29
  
Such an attitude continued until the end of World War II. Up to then 
one can seldom find a factor that points to social change in this vast 
country, but things changed after World War II. After years of exertions 
oil was discovered and it was proven that the country possessed vast oil 
resources. The Americans who had played the biggest role in this 
discovery were now facing a new atmosphere. The United States was not 
merely a single country but the leader of a big bloc and Washington felt 
committed to defend its allies against communist which were their sworn 
enemy. This made Washington to ponder far seriously about the oil 
reserves in Saudi Arabia. Washington not only wanted the oil wells to 
remain immune from the intrusion of Soviet Union and its allies, but to 
exploit from the wells as much as possible and in the best possible manner. 
This meant that Saudi Arabia was placed at the top of the U.S. strategic 
goals.
30 
The Saudi regime too quickly understood Washington's intentions, and 
understood that they could no more survive with their old closed-door 
policy. Therefore, not only they didn't resist the modern realities but tried 
to take the initiative because some members of the Saudi family supported 
Politics and Social Changes                                                                    69 
 
the idea among which Faysal and Fahd were the most prominent figures 
and both of them succeeded to accumulate power.
31 
Contrary to Kuwait and Bahrain, the opening of the Saudi community 
was not only because of new teachings. Contrary to the two former 
Sheikhdoms, Saudi Arabia had accumulated considerable wealth at that 
time and of course, the mounting number of pilgrims called for the state to 
spend part of its income for hajj affairs and to build necessary 
substructures for easy traffic of pilgrims. Which processed gradually 
revolutionizing the inner mentality of the Saudi inhabits. In fact, hajj 
pilgrimage and facilities and accommodations needed for the pilgrims 
affected the inner circle of the traditional Saudi community.
32 
With regard to modern teachings, in the beginning the authorities tried 
to dispatch the youth to other Arab states, especially Egypt
33
. These young 
Saudi Arab students were affected by an atmosphere which was deeply 
charged by politics, revolutionary zeal and leftist and clannish aspirations 
in Egypt and upon their return they brewed a series of problems. After that 
the authorities decided to invite professors and teachers in order to be 
immune from former troubles.
34
  
The teachers and professors were invited especially by Fahd who, for a 
long time, had been the minister of education. He established many 
schools and imported teachers from various Arabic states who later, 
conveyed revolutionary and anti-traditional slogans. The conditions in 
Saudi Arabia differed with Kuwait. Kuwait was a thinly populated, weak 
and small country and few teachers were able to undermine its social 
balance, but not Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the experience of other countries 
had taught them how to deal with such problems.
35 
Due to the aforementioned facts social changes that could influence the 
Saudi Arab population and policies were effective. Although the new 
teaching subjects had a role in the changes, the biggest change emerged 
from other factors especially economic and sometimes from propaganda 
and politics.
36 
The fundamental steps taken for the development of the substructure of 
hajj pilgrimage ended up with the emergence of a new class of wealthy 
elite from outside the Saudi royal family circle
37
, including the big and 
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wealthy Bin Laden family. These people accumulated fame and wealth 
during the first years of the development measures which had helped the 
Saudi family to become rich. Later on, these wealthy individuals and 
families caused big changes in the Saudi community. Although one can 
say that the Saudi community had succeed to a great extent to make them 
conservative as was the style of the Saudi family, but the matter becomes 
important when we compare their principle, inclinations and expectations 
with their non-Saudi counterparts.
 38
 
 Another reason for the agitation is related to the oil industry and other 
industries which were set up with the strength of oil wealth. The personnel 
and the laborers in the oil industry who had been discriminated and poorly 
exploited, during the 50‟s and 60‟s, gave a good pretext for advertising at 
the hand of Radio Cairo at the time, when Nasser was enjoying the peak of 
his popularity.  In fact, the unrest and ant-government demonstrations in 
Saudi Arabia happened during the 50's and 60s in the oil rich regions.
39 
But above all, it was the vast propaganda that had been started by Arab 
progressive circles and Nasirite cohorts against the so called Arab 
reactionary regimes
40
. In their opinion Saudi Arabia was the 
personification of such reactionary trend. Although according to the 
progressive elements, there were many other reactionary regimes in the 
Arab world that served the interest of the West and the United States in 
particular. Due to many reasons they criticized the Sheikhdoms in the 
Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia in particular were charged to be 
reactionary, backward and servant of the western powers
41
. It was the 
Saudi anti-leftist, traditional and conservative attitude which emboldened 
their enemies to label them with such qualities and propaganda that left 
their influence on the countries domestic and foreign policies.
42
  
Social changes in UAE, Qatar, and Oman started late and at a time, 
when the other three Sheikdoms had already experienced several stages of 
changes. The experience of these Sheikhdoms and the special status of 
UAE, Qatar and Oman who earned oil wealth lately led to relatively 
similar social changes in the six Sheikhdoms which we will describe in the 
following discussion. 
Before entering this topic, we need to make a few observations. As 
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mentioned before, the experience of the six Sheikhdoms were different 
before the 70's and most of the change occurred in their social conditions 
and is related to their entry into modern history with different approach 
and the extent of oil reserves they had discovered. Nevertheless, the whole 
region braced with the excitement caused by Nasser and his supporters. 
During the mid 50's especially after the nationalization of the Suez Canal 
in 1956, the war between Egypt and Israel and between England and 
France. In fact this was their first serious encounter with such 
revolutionary developments which left its impact in all the Sheikhdoms.
43
  
However there was an important element added to this influence. In 
order to understand that element and its deep impact we must reexamine 
the Nasirite philosophy during mid 50's. According to Nasser's supporters, 
Nasirite movement was anti-imperialistic and anti-Israel. During the 50's, 
they looked at Israel as a country which had occupied the Arab territories 
when the Third World was boiling at the peak of excitement in their quest 
for freedom and anti-imperialistic activities. All these converted Cairo into 
the capital of Arab world and Egypt were considered a cause for dignity 
and pride for the Arabs.
44 
This movement had other peculiarities in view too. It was a movement 
against the reactionary regimes and colonial powers in which the United 
Kingdom and the United States were the prime targets. It was a 
nationalistic movement, but within the framework of Arabic nationalism 
that called for Arab unity, liberation from colonial rule and backwardness. 
It aimed at the unity of Arabs by means of united struggle against colonial 
powers, backwardness and reactionary traditional governments. Moreover, 
they wanted to topple royal regimes and regimes which chose their leaders 
on the basis of old traditions. Of course, due to certain reasons, the 
movement had worn the garb of socialism, and they believed that Arabic 
nationalists should be faithful to the drive for progress and socialism.
45 
Such definitions of nationalism helped the strong wave of excitement, 
bubbling from nationalization of Suez Canal, to conflict with the Saudi 
authorities and their social and traditional background. What was more 
dangerous was that due to certain reasons there were groups of activists in 
the Sheikhdoms who were deeply under the influence of the new wave of 
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nationalism and a larger group used to listen to such fiery propaganda with 
interest, although the larger mass had not adhere to their exhortations.
46 
Such a scenario more or less was shaking all the six Sheikdoms and was 
undermining their stability and their traditional social and political 
background. The peak of the unrest was in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and 
provoked their governments to react firmly to such alien aspirations.
47
  
In the beginning of 60's, we can observe a series of incidents that to 
some extent controlled the Nasirite sentiments. Egypt's military adventure 
in Yemen and direct or indirect confrontation between Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia and Abdolkarim Qasem's claim that Kuwait belongs to Iraq 
(although Qasem's territorial claim was not related to Nasser and his 
supporters) led Kuwait and other Sheikdoms to feel that during those years 
Egypt that claimed to be the guardian of sovereignty of Arab states was 
not supporting Kuwait.
48
  
Aside from the above factor, all these regimes were trying to improve 
their relations with Egypt in order to escape from the evil consequences of 
the propaganda, continuously aired by Radio Cairo and its supporters, and 
that policy proved successful, especially in Cairo; because during that time 
a remarkable number of Egyptians had flocked into the Sheikhdoms while 
their warm and active relation with Egypt was controlling these workforce, 
the Egyptians did not want to say things against the regimes in the 
Sheikhdoms. Their policy and attitude was quite different as compared to 
teachers who had gone to the Sheikdoms earlier.
49 
Here, we need to focus on another subject. During the 50's and 60's, 
there were signs of inclination towards communism among the Arabs 
which was gathering force. In those years, only Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
suffered from the leftist rhetoric because the authorities in these 
Sheikhdoms were tyrannizing their citizens
50
. Since during those years 
Arab nationalism was containing ant-imperialistic and anti-socialistic 
slogans and had quest for justice, naturally it overshadowed inclination 
towards communism. Above all, they didn't allow the communist 
supporters to maneuver because Arab nationalism responded to all their 
demands and was faithful to Arab legacy and aspirations. Naturally, under 
such circumstances the Arab nationalists looked with suspicion at those 
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who supported communism.
51 
Moreover, the good relationship between the Sheikdoms and Egypt and 
lovers of Arab nationalism satisfied both sides. Now Egypt, Syria and their 
allies were not openly criticizing the Sheikdoms and they seldom 
provoked the public agitation in the Sheikhdoms. On the other hand, the 
lovers of Arab nationalism did not wish to spread the seeds of unrest 
because of their close relations with the Sheikdoms. And of course their 
policies nullified and defeated communist propaganda.
52 
These two developments succeeded, to a great extent, to control the 
brittleness and instability of the Sheikhdoms during the 60's. A turning 
point at this juncture was the war of 1967 and the heavy and unexpected 
defeat of Arabs from Israel, to which neither the Arabs nor Egypt had 
anticipated. The defeat of the Arabs left surprising impact in the 
Sheikhdoms as far it was related to their social and political stability. We 
will discuss about this subject later on.
53
   
Here, we need to call the reader's attention to another point. Since 50's 
we can witness calm, continued and increasing social and cultural changes 
in the Sheikhdoms. Communication between them was intensified and 
more books were imported in Arabic language, the newspapers and 
magazines in other Arab countries such as Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt now 
reached the people. In the meantime, because of the need for education 
and accumulated oil wealth gradually paved a way for inviting scholars 
and religious theologians to the Sheikhdoms from advanced Arab 
countries and some of them settled there. Gradually, local newspapers and 
publication houses were established and this gave birth to a new class that 
were familiar and interested in media and alongside, a small group of 
writers also flourished within the countries.
54 
Since the public in Bahrain and Kuwait were more ready to digest the 
news, the press rapidly expanded and influenced the people who gradually, 
began speaking about parliament and election of representatives for the 
parliament in these two countries.
55 
The spread of press in the Sheikhdoms gathered force by 1960. In the 
60's, we witness new institutions in these two Sheikhdoms and daily 
newspapers started publishing, preliminary foundations for establishment 
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of universities were laid and educational system, parliament, medical and 
service centers, administrative institutions and nearly every institution 
related to modern society existed in Kuwait and Bahrain.
56 
King Faysal accumulated power after the dismissal of King Saud. King 
Saud was deposed because he objected to the modernization of the 
management of the nation. It is said that King Saud objected to the 
establishment of ministries and naturally he didn't tolerate any control of 
his method of governance and he acted exactly like a traditional tribal 
chief.
57
  
King Faysal and his sympathizers seized power in Saudi Arabia 1964. 
He was in fact, the new architect of Saudi Arabia and was trying to set up 
necessary institutions for the management of the nation in the new world 
and he succeeded in his exertions. It was exactly from that period that 
Saudi Arabia stepped into the new world in its new shape.
58 
Thus during mid 60's Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia lived under 
different conditions and they paved the way for change in the other 
Sheikhdoms. What is important to note is that despite all the threats from 
outside these Sheikhdoms underwent the change with an acceptable degree 
of stability. 
This process continued until 1967. The severe defeat of the Arabs in 
that year created a completely new atmosphere in the Sheikhdoms. The 
Nasirite nationalistic drive began to peter out and this meant the collapse 
of the foundations of radical doctrines which had opposed the regimes of 
the Sheikhdoms more than other regimes in the Arab world.
59
  
As we can question is not that the Sheikhdoms' most dreaded rival or 
enemy had collapsed. More than anything else, things in the Arab world 
changed in a manner that the centre of the Arab world was shifted from 
Egypt to the Sheikhdoms. The change of the centre started in 1967 and 
reached momentum in 1973 and has continued ever since, although after 
the 1967, conditions in the Arab world were such that capital of the Arab 
in another country would have not been as influential and strong as Cairo 
when Nasser was the most favorite leader among Arab countries.
60
  
It was under these circumstances that the Sheikdoms accumulated 
wealth. Global development called for more oil and the big oil magnets 
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attacked the rich oil fields in the region. Oil exploitation was augmented in 
the oil producing countries and new explorations were made in new 
countries such as Qatar, UAE and Oman. This necessitated rapid 
development of the region in every dimension.
61
  
The fact is that the rapid development of the Sheikdoms did not conflict 
with their political and social stability. If the Arabs had not been so 
severely defeated in 1967 such an inference could not be right. In the 
absence of a potent ideological and political rival of Arab stock the 
Sheikdoms succeeded to plan for their development, in a manner that the 
development should not affect themselves.
62 
If an Arab capital like Cairo was going to criticize their tribal and 
political system and blame these factors for their backwardness and blame 
them to be traitors to the Arabs and Arab nationalism, surely all these 
Sheikhdoms, especially the Saudi family, would face many difficulties and 
much unrest. In the same way if Cairo was to continually criticize the 
Sheikhdoms for hiking agreement with oil companies and non-oil 
companies used for the development of the substructure of Sheikhdoms the 
Sheikhdoms could never take any initiative.
63
  
In fact, Arab nationalism in the sense which was known during 50's and 
60's backfired, exactly at a moment, when it could prove dangerous for the 
Sheikhdoms. Although during several periods before 1967, Arab 
nationalism had endangered the Sheikdoms, the danger were transient and 
were merely political and had little to do with the policies that led to their 
development, because first of all, there were no such politics in those early 
years and secondly, a huge wealth which could provoke such policies had 
not been accumulated. Moreover, the tone of the criticism was political 
and was mostly emanated from their hostility and nothing else.
64 
Thus, social development in its broader sense began almost in all the 
Sheikhdoms, but instead of undermining their stability the changes 
contributed to their social stability, albeit with a few exceptions.  
A series of unrests happened in Bahrain. That was the continuation of 
the unrest which had always existed in the island country and still going on 
due to discrimination and violation of the rights of the Shia majority by the 
minority ruling Sunnis. From that angle, the unrest in Bahrain was not due 
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to new social and economic changes. It was the continuation of unrest 
which had existed in the past.
65
  
The worsening conditions were mostly due to leftist activities of the 
dissident groups that contain mostly Shia Muslims. As we have mentioned 
earlier that the decline of Arab nationalism in the 50's and 60's had 
overshadowed the supporters of Marxist movement. The defeat of Arabs in 
1967 and the downfall of Nasirite system had paved the way for the 
emergence of leftist groups in the whole Arab world and Persian Gulf. 
Thus, we can see these leftist activities in Bahrain and even Oman and to 
some extent Saudi Arabia.
66 
But unrest in Bahrain led to unrest in the parliament in Manama and 
eventually ended with its dissolution
67
. We can witness a new scenario in 
Kuwait, but that which happened to Kuwait was not like Bahrain. Because 
of Abdolkarim Qasem's territorial claims and threat that Kuwait always 
felt from Baghdad it had attained an acceptable level of social solidarity 
and due to various reasons contrary to Bahrain the politics in Kuwait was 
not sectarian politics. In this sheikhdom tribal inclinations and lack of 
parliament was the main factor that had given rise to tension which 
eventually led to the dissolution of the parliament.
68
  
The unrest happened mostly in the oil-producing regions and in oil 
refineries and installations in Saudi Arabia. The accusation, at those times, 
inside Saudi Arabia and by Saudi allies and supporters of Saudi regime 
justified the regime's harsh suppression of the dissidents by blaming the 
dissidents to be communists for brewing unrest and provoking government 
action against them. It is not clear whether the protesters who were hanged 
subsequently were really communists. Perhaps it was merely an 
allegation.
69 
Anyhow from 1967 until 1973 which coincided with the fourth Arabs 
and Israel war we can notice how these Sheikhdoms became important, 
wealthy and their rapid pace towards modernism in the Arab world – 
developments which contributed to their stability and not instability.
70
  
One important incident during these years was a wish by the British 
government to withdraw from the Persian Gulf. With the appointment of 
the labor government in London and due to other economic problems and 
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mostly due to money shortage London decided to withdraw its forces from 
Persian Gulf. The withdrawal of the British troops stirred much alarm in 
the Sheikhdoms.
71 
Although Nasirite nationalism was not considered as a threat by the 
Sheikhdoms and even Nasser dominated Cairo was trying to improve its 
relation with the Sheikhdoms because of the financial crisis that Egypt was 
going through, there were other threatening factors in the region. 
According to the emirs of the Sheikhdoms the biggest threat was Iraq and 
the country's territorial claim versus Kuwait, as well as the danger of 
spread of communism and Soviet Union and their sympathizers in the 
Middle East such as Southern Yemen and Iraq.  Although the Shah was 
also considered a threat because of others reasons.
72 
As a result of such anxiety the Sheikdoms suggested London to retain 
its troops in Persian Gulf at their own cost, but the labor party government 
refused their request because the Labor Party's policy and approach to the 
region was otherwise. But they promised the Sheikhdoms to hurry to their 
rescue whenever they needed military support, and this calmed the 
sheikhs.
73 
The British officials had noticed that that which ensured the territorial 
integrity of Kuwait against arrogant Abolkarim Qasem was dispatch of 
British troops. The mere movement of the British troops and even without 
armed struggle with Iraq thwarted the attack and turned the scale to 
Kuwait's favor. In fact, they felt they needed such support – a need which 
has continued until today.
74
  
Eventually, London withdrew its troops from Persian Gulf in 1971. 
Immediately after the removal of the British troops the United Arab 
Emirates, composed of seven emirates which had been under British 
domination earlier, was established and they achieved independence and 
Iranian troops settled at Greater Tomb, Smaller Tomb and Abu Musa 
islands.  
Such shift of power incited a series of changes in the Arabic region of 
the Middle East either politically or socially, and after that the result 
became far more significant than earlier. 
In those times, the only power which could fill the British vacuum in 
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Persian Gulf was Iran, not because of Tehran's military power but for its 
special features which the countries located at the south of Persian Gulf 
needed. Their biggest concern was the expansion of communism and 
provocation of the Moscow's allies. From that point of view the Shah was 
an ideal ally. The Shah was in fact against communism and Soviet 
intervention. He always resisted such Soviet adventurism and always 
encouraged others to adopt a similar stance.
75 
Apart from being his anti-communist, the Shah opposed radical 
movements, either Iraqi Baath radicalism or clannish Arab radicalism, or 
Nasirite or Mu‛ammar al-Qaddafi radicalism. The Sheikhdoms too hated 
Arab radicalism. We will explain this subsequently that how they 
welcomed Arab tribal traditions as far as it was related to history and 
culture of Arabs, but were not ready to accept it while discussing the issue 
of revolution and social changes.
76 
From that angle the Shah was a favorable power and they needed such a 
power. Moreover, the Shah was not Arab and would not pose danger 
against the Sheikhdoms. The sheikhs had seen Arabic nationalism and 
radicalism as a pretext for the expansive aspirations of strong Arab 
powers. They wanted such Arabs which could support them against 
possible danger instead of posing a threat.
77 
While on the other side, the Shah enjoyed all these good features. 
Moreover, because of constant and historical communication with the 
northern and southern ports of Persian Gulf and reciprocal cultural 
impacts, the majority of the Sheikdoms had positive regard towards Iran. 
Although we must accept that due to historical and religious reasons the 
Arabs had no positive view about Iran or there were many negative factors 
to consider Tehran as enemy. But such a verdict is not completely right 
with regard to the Sheikhdoms during the 50's and 60's. The opinion of the 
Sheikhdoms was under the influence of their peculiar culture and they saw 
very little negative and worrisome points in their relations with Tehran.  
Even we can say that in many instances they didn't look at Tehran with a 
hostile eye. The negative opinion of Arabs against Iran, which will be 
explained later, started at the end of the twentieth century.
78 
The fact is that to some extent with the exception of Saudi Arabia the 
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Sheikdoms regarded Iran as a support and tolerated Tehran's presence in 
Persian Gulf as long as it did not offend the Arab nationalistic pride, 
because they always were afraid of evil Arab nationalistic propaganda. 
The Shah was strong enough at that time and loved to play the role of a 
gendarme in the region. He openly spoke about his regional role and 
candidly expressed his wishes. His policy for Iranian army was designed 
in a manner to make it strong enough to play a dominant and protecting 
role in the region, and of course such a policy was acceptable Washington 
which was the Shah's big ally.
79
  
But there is more to come. There were many elements in the Arab 
world who could not tolerate such a role by the Shah among which the 
Arab nationalists were at the top. There were many sophisticated 
historical, religious, political or ideological reasons for Arab nationalism 
that had developed in the new era especially those allied to radical or 
nationalist elements.
80 
According to these radical Arabs Iran of the Shah's era was an 
expansionist or probably racist regime which was looking for political 
expansionism and territorial gains in the Arab world. Moreover they 
always thought Tehran was looking for an opportunity to avenge the 
historical defeat from Arabs which had destroyed the Iranian glorious 
Sassanid Empire. 
81 
Of course, the revolutionarily nationalists had a big pretext to blame 
Iran. They maintained that Iran was an instrument in the hands of the 
United States and global imperialism in the region and was fighting 
against progressive Arab factions or supporters of the socialist bloc.
82 
No doubt there were many other reasons for such hostility. The 
historical neighboring of the two ancient nations reminded them of bitter 
and sweet recollections about each other, and in order to aggrandize and 
justify their apathy they looked for a suitable atmosphere to rekindle their 
unfavorable recollections about Iran's hostile attitude versus Arabs. But 
that which the Arab nationalists had in their minds or based their rhetoric 
and propaganda was not like the calm, peaceful and long centuries of 
popular intercourse between the northern and southern shores of Persian 
Gulf and the spirit of fellowship that prevailed between the two camps.
83 
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Thus these Sheikhdoms confronted with a new propaganda machine 
which was formerly used to fight imperialistic powers in the region and 
now have taken arms against Tehran, but contrary to the movement which 
had directly challenged the imperialists such a radical propaganda could 
not cause social instability. The Arab anti-imperialistic propaganda in the 
50's and 60's could at least impress the educated strata and the elite among 
the Arabs, but Iran was not in a position where the evil propaganda could 
antagonize the Arabs in that period. 
As we mentioned before in the face of such hostile propaganda and 
during the process of modernization of traditional Sheikdoms the new 
generation of Arabs harbored a completely different attitude toward Iran 
which was closer to Arab nationalist ideology than their ancestors' 
traditional opinion especially during the post-revolutionary era in Iran 
when the new regime moved with a completely different mentality and 
very close to Arab tribal inclinations. Thus the new conditions in Iran 
paved the way for new ideological and social changes which eventually 
undermined their policy versus Iran.
84 
Although the 1973 war was not as fierce as the 1967 war, it created new 
conditions for the Arab world and left its deepest impact upon the Persian 
Gulf littoral states. The reason is that the 1973 war was fortified by a large 
scale Arab oil embargo and scarcity of oil that helped the oil prices jump 
four times compared to pre-war period, and it proved that oil could be used 
as a weapon, and that the security of the big countries and the whole world 
depends on natural, uninterrupted and smooth flow of oil.
85 
These factors enhanced the strategic position of Persian Gulf as a region 
which preserves the most important oil sources, and allows oil pipelines to 
pass through it. Under these circumstances it was natural for Saudi Arabia 
and other Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms to be examined from another angle. 
Thus, the dignity that these countries had achieved during the 1967 
Arab-Israel war in the Arab world reached its momentum. Despite the fact, 
that the halfhearted Arab victory had been achieved by Egypt and Syria 
during the 1973 war, due to Sadat's post-war policies this half-hearted 
victory actually benefited the Saudi Arabia, specially King Faysal, and to 
some extent the other Sheikhdoms.
86
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Of course, such a prominence which was besides shifting of the capital 
of the Arab world from Egypt to Persian Gulf Arab states left other 
important consequences. The rise of oil prices four times before the war in 
these wealthy countries made them more and more rich. Moreover this war 
fetched a new dignity for the Arabs. Above all, the oil embargo slapped 
against the West helped to boost their strategic significance, to the extent 
that in those years industrialized countries tried to satisfy the Arabs and 
the Sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf in order to ensure smooth flow of 
energy, even if they were blamed to be acting unilaterally and overlooking 
their commitment to their allies.
87
     
Under these circumstances it was natural for the Arab center of gravity 
to shift to this region. The fact is that these Sheikdoms did not take any 
special step to shift the capital of the Arab world. The nature of the post-
war developments necessitated such a shift and of course the Sheikdoms, 
especially Kuwait and then Saudi Arabia welcomed the shift of power.
88
  
The rise of strategic international position of the Arabs happened during 
this period. The question was not that oil producing nations had gathered 
immense wealth in a short space of time. The conditions were such that the 
whole world - both poor and developing countries in Africa and Asia and 
developed countries in the western bloc - felt that they needed the oil.
89
  
In addition to the above the importance of continued and safe flue of oil 
reached such proportions that it became the top priority in the strategies of 
the two major blocs and it become one of the most important grounds for 
rivalry between the two superpowers and impelled them to plan to occupy 
and seize oil-generating regions.
90
  
All these things helped to boost the significance and the position of the 
Arabs. The things that occupy the minds of the western authorities and the 
world as a whole about the Arabs was shaped more or less in these years, 
starting from their wealth up to anything spoken against, and all of these 
things have strong link with the wealth accumulated from the sale of oil.
91
  
Naturally under such circumstances those countries are considered the 
more important which posses more oil. Therefore, the question was not 
that the shift of gravity of the Arab world towards the Sheikdoms. On the 
contrary the general opinion of the world versus Arabs was such that they 
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practically looked the center of the Arab world in the Arab part of the 
Persian Gulf.
92 
Such a process even changed the mentality of the Sheikhdoms about 
themselves. They no more looked like their fathers or compared 
themselves with their fathers. They felt that the whole world was eager to 
see them step into the scene of action or were eager to communicate with 
them and in return the Sheikhdoms were expected to help them. 
Aside from such talks and the position of the authorities and political 
leaders of the West such things can be seen in the media and the press of 
these countries during the 70's. This means that the new conditions had 
influenced various classes of the society. Their universal outlook, their 
expectations, behavior, personality, pride, propaganda, ideal goals and 
methods, domestic and foreign policies, regional and inter-Arab policies 
and their international policies had all been affected and influenced.
93 
What matters to the researcher is that such developments as a whole 
benefited their ongoing policies and consolidation of such policies. The 
new conditions not only failed to conflict with their policies but even 
endorsed and strengthened them in the end. The general condition of the 
region after the 1973 War and victory of Islamic revolution in Iran was 
such.  
Two contrasting factors beset such a process. The first was the question 
of Zofar and the armed revolt of that leftist camp. In those years Oman 
was not in a position to curb that revolt or to come to compromise with the 
insurgents, because the Zofar activists were supported by South Yemen, an 
ally of the communist bloc in the East.
94
  
Sultan Qabus requested various countries as well as Arab states to help 
him in his dilemma, but none of them offered to help him
95
. Eventually he 
asked the Shah to help him and the Shah complied with his request
96
. The 
question of Zofar uprising that had become a menacing was settled, but the 
Iranian intervention increased suspicion against Tehran. These augmented 
suspicions was the propaganda aired by the nationalist Arabs especially 
the leftist camp, which awakened the past bitter and favorable experience, 
Iran's mounting military power and the change of the attitude of the 
sheikhs from their traditional beliefs and customs and their modernization. 
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This suspicion did not change the parameters much during the Shah's rule, 
but it had a big role in shaping the relation between Iranians and Arabs 
after victory of revolution in Iran.
97 
Another factor was the steps taken by the Sheikdoms and specially 
Saudi Arabia to set up Islamic centers and institutions in other Muslim and 
non-Muslim countries, developed or developing countries. The giant 
wealth they had acquired from oil had raised much expectation among the 
Muslims. Meanwhile the most natural channel for these countries to 
emerge in the world arena was the religious channel. The Sheikdoms felt 
that not only they had become the center of Arab world but a gravitating 
nucleus in the Islamic world.
98
   
The weakness of traditional religious centers in the Sunni world, 
starting from al-Azhar University in Cairo down to Fas and Zeituneh and 
Baghdad, Damascus and Aleppo and the many Islamic institutions in the 
Indian Subcontinent and Afghanistan and Far East contributed greatly to 
such propaganda. Moreover, the need to cope with leftist inclinations and a 
wish to better lure the Saudi authorities assistance called for supply of 
further facilities and funds to these religious institutions.
99
  
The result of such missionary activity is also notable after 1980 which 
deeply affected all the religious, mental, social and political fields and 
gave birth to extremist factions and often subversive groups. We will 
discuss about this subject in detail in the forthcoming chapter. 
 Here, it is necessary to refer to another factor which although foreign, 
but made important ideological and religious upheaval among a group of 
youth in these countries especially Saudi Arabia. After the Arab defeat in 
1967 the Egyptian regime, which had been severe against Islamic factions 
to the extent that they hanged Seyyed Qotb, their important figure, offered 
more freedom to them.
100
 After Sadat seized power the regime offered 
more freedom and the Islamic groups were better organized and 
consolidated
101
. Simultaneously with such developments most the young 
people who had been trained in traditional and religious families entered 
universities and deeply shocked by the 1967 defeat and the prevailing 
conditions and the doctrines of Qotb and other demands which turns back 
to the beginning of the Islamic history and the formation of the first 
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preliminary pious groups, developed extremist ideas.
102 
The eventual result of their studies led to the following conclusion: the 
problems, the defeats and the failures of Muslims were the result of 
estrangement from Islam and resorting to non-Islamic strategies. The 
community that existed was Islamic superficially, while deep in their 
hearts the people were non-Islamic and heathen and therefore, it was 
necessary to fight with such enigma. They maintained that such non-
Islamic and apostate groups must be excommunicated and the Muslims 
must avoid them. Furthermore, those who are engaged in such a pious 
religious war will form the preliminary nucleus of a society whose goal is 
to mend and rectify ignorant and heathenish communities. After receiving 
enough education and organizing themselves such groups can implement 
their mission. No one and nothing can stop them from discharging their 
responsibilities and accomplishing their mission, and religious scholars 
thinking otherwise are not true clerics but flatters of kings and servants of 
the kings and their interests and they must be destroyed. There is no way 
to act towards the interest of true Muslims except by such methods.
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Such extremist doctrines during the 70's when the conditions were ripe 
for change in Egypt was expanded and consolidated and they succeeded to 
take a series of measures that was curbed by the governments‟ 
intervention. But this method and doctrine penetrated into Saudi Arabia 
and attracted the attention of the young Wahhabi sect whose opinions and 
behavior were similar to them.
104 
The reason for being attracted to this extremist camp was not because 
of similar social and cultural conditions but ideological resemblance and 
affinity. This ideology which had been born in Egypt greatly resembled 
the excommunicating attitude of the Wahhabi sect, although it had been 
suppressed by Abd al-Aziz and the clerics who supported him, and this 
was why they were attracted to the Egyptian movement and brought about 
big changes in the Saudi Arabia.
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Such a process continued until the last part of 70's but suddenly during 
1978 and 1979 we face a new phenomenon which deeply changed the 
internal and foreign policies in these countries and that was the victory of 
Islamic Revolution in Iran.  
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Although some observers and experts of Iranian politics in the 70's had 
predicted a great change in Iran, none of them expected a revolution with 
the volcanic shape that happened in the country. No one in the Sheikdoms 
too expected such a rapid change in Iran. 
The developments that had happened before the revolution in Iran were 
such that led observers to expect the fall of Shah's regime, but we have no 
evidence that the Sheikdoms had such an expectation. Even evidences 
pointed to the contrary. King Fahd, who was the crown prince in Saudi 
Arabia at that time, had said two days before the victory of revolution that 
the Shah would remain and would control the revolution which was 
provoked by the communists.
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The main reason must be attributed to the opinion of the authorities in 
the Sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf about the Shah and his regime. 
According to them Iran was an island of stability which presented stability 
and calm to other countries and strongly resisted against communist 
advance or extremist individuals and groups. In the same way they 
believed the unrest in Iran was provoked by the communists and the Soviet 
Union and for a long time maintained that the Iranian religious leaders, 
who had actually directed the revolution, had been deceived by the 
communists.
107
  
The Shah's regime collapsed under such circumstances. The Shia 
Muslims in the region who had been impressed by months of struggle of 
their Shia brethren in Iran expressed their heartfelt joy. Some non-Shia 
followers in the region who, for various reasons, had monitored the 
developments in Iran joined their voice to the jubilation not as delighted as 
the Shia Muslims. Most of them observed the developments in Iran in awe 
and surprise and had no distinct imagination of the outcome of the 
revolution. The excitement of distant Muslim-populated countries was 
deeper than in the nearer countries.
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The prevailing regimes felt unsafe because they had lost their big 
support in the region. Moreover, they thought that the Shah's regime had 
been toppled by the communists and that the revolutionary agents were the 
communists which they had always feared. 
Aside from these things this revolution was against the royal system 
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and the Sheikhdoms possessed a kind of royal system and were surprised 
when they saw that the United States did not sufficiently support its big 
and staunch ally in Iran, and this provoked their suspicion about the 
commitment and allegiance of the United States to their allies upon which 
they had much hope, although to U.S., they were much less important than 
Shah.
109 
As mentioned before, the Shia Muslims in the region were excited with 
the revolution in Iran, especially in Bahrain, east of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. Although similar sentiments were notable in other Sheikhdoms 
who had Shia minority, the boiling fervor in Bahrain and east of Saudi 
Arabia was dangerous, because these Shiites were always discriminated 
and oppressed and from that standpoint they were more prepared to side 
with the Iranian revolution, and Tehran's support could create serious 
problems both in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and other countries.
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It took a long time until the sky cleared up and the conditions became 
clear to the Sheikhdoms. During that period no special social change 
happened in the Sheikhdoms with the exception of the excitement in the 
Shia camp, but the prevailing policy was to understand the nature of the 
unrest and cope with it - either in a positive manner and treating them in a 
friendly manner and by cooperating with them or take negative stance i.e. 
preserving their authority and suppressing them. However, they soon 
understood that they must change the social and cultural realities in 
keeping with their political interests. 
In between another hostile element was actively operating in Iraq. The 
majority of the people in Iraq were Shia Muslims and from 1968 onward 
when the Baath Party had accumulated  power in Baghdad the Shiite 
majority living in very difficult circumstances and the pressure in Shia 
populated towns and Shia seminaries was quite evident.
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Furthermore, from the moment the Baath Party took over the reigns in 
Iraq they spoke of iron fist against the Shia sect, but their hostile stance 
against Shia clerics and Shia religious institutions was reached such 
proportions that they treated Ayatollah Seyyed Mohsen Hakim, their 
greatest religious leader, in the worst possible manner, although contrary 
to many first class religious scholars in Iraq Ayatollah Hakim was not 
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Iranian and was an Arab. 
This severe confrontation with the Shia masses had thrown Iraq into 
crisis and the Shia Muslims and even non-Shia Muslims were looking for 
an opportunity to express their discontent and this became possible with 
the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran. In fact, the victory of revolution 
in Iran provoked their ire and they tried to show their discontent and anger 
by various methods, which provoked severe and ruthless retaliation from 
the government.
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Taking into account all the factors in Iraq it must be added that during 
the first few months after victory of Islamic revolution Iraq was much 
affected than other countries and the people's blood boiled for the Iranian 
revolution, yet social conditions, historical recollections and individual 
psychology in Iraq did not permit the authorities to permit demonstration 
similar to that which had happened in Iran and had put an end to the Shah's 
regime. As a matter of fact civil revolt in Iraq was meaningless and the 
smallest protest was being crushed with most violent response.  
Thus, the regime succeeded to keep the people calm by using iron fist, 
but this was not enough. Therefore, the Iraqi regime decided to cope with 
the Iranian revolution outside Iraq by different methods. One of their first 
goals was to spread the seeds of fear and pessimism against the new 
regime in Tehran in the Sheikhdoms and make the sheikhs understand that 
Baghdad was strong enough to protect them from the new enemy.
113 
 Such repressive steps and false propaganda proved successful to a large 
extent and paved the way for a war which continued for eight years. Surely 
in the absence of such evil propaganda relation between the Sheikdoms 
and Iran would have been otherwise. 
Iraq's policy was to show to the Sheikdoms that they were far 
vulnerable and fragile than they were and instead they zoomed on the 
historical, cultural and religious hostility between Iran and Arabs to prove 
that Tehran was looking for an opportunity to avenge the defeat from 
Arabs in the past. They said Tehran had an expansionist attitude against 
Arabs and Arab interests. In order to prove their theory they resorted to 
every negative element in the course of history to create a volatile 
atmosphere and to make the Arabs understand that they were the Iraq‟s 
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first bastion and defender of Arabs at the eastern border of the Arab world 
and was strong enough to cope with Iranian threats and defend the Arabs 
and the Sheikhdoms, and in fact they succeeded to a large extent in their 
negative propaganda.
114 
Of course, in a chaotic tense atmosphere, void of trust and indecision in 
these years were many other factors that could magnify Iran as a big 
threat. The influential western powers in the region had adopted a policy 
of dual contentment. They controlled Iran and assured their friends and 
allies of their support. The Soviet Union and its agents which treated the 
Iranian revolution as an anti-imperialistic revolution tried to find a 
stronger foothold in the region. The Islamic groups with or without 
political inclinations and Arab progressive factions each showed a 
different attitude and each left their impression in the Sheikhdoms in a 
different manner.
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During this juncture the extremist elements with radical religious 
ideology and culture and Arabic nationalistic slogans were suddenly 
awakened. Among the six Sheikhdoms the religious extremists flourished 
in Saudi Arabia and the cultural and nationalistic aspirations also boiled in 
Kuwait. The other four Sheikhdoms tried, as far as possible, to keep them 
away from such boiling overtures and to rebuild their relations with the 
new Iran on the basis of their traditional fellowship.  
Such an attitude was considered acceptable even in Bahrain where 
majority Shia population was excited with the Iranian revolution. 
Although the enemies of Iran and Iranian revolution in Bahrain tried to 
misrepresent the statement by some Iranian officials to the effect that 
Bahrain has always belonged to Iran to prove that Iran has always wanted 
to occupy Bahrain, Bahrain's policy versus Iran was mostly within its 
traditional framework.
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Even in the most difficult years of Iran's isolation relation between Iran 
and Oman was always stable and steady because of historical and 
sympathetic relations. The authorities in the United Arab Emirates and 
Qatar had descended from a generation who had always had a positive 
opinion about Iran and believed Iran to be a cradle of blessing and 
magnanimity, and despite all the pressure and propaganda against Tehran 
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they tried to rebuild their bilateral ties on the basis of their traditional 
affinity towards Tehran. Moreover, at the end of the seventh century and 
beginning of the eighteenth century they had not stepped into the modern 
world like Kuwait.
117
  
Such volatile atmosphere continued until autumn 1980. Meanwhile the 
sudden rise of oil prices resulting from the Iranian revolution brought lots 
of wealth to the Sheikhdoms. During this short but turbulent period we 
don't see any notable social change except those we have mentioned 
above. 
The biggest and most shocking event during these years was the 
occupation of al-Haram Mosque in Mecca by a group of Wahhabi 
extremists on Muharram 1, 1400 A.H.  The revolt was led by Juhayman 
Al-Utaybi who had been jailed in 70's because of his radical religious 
views and behavior. He was a student of ‛Abd al-‛Aziz Ibn Baz, an 
influential Saudi mufti, who criticized Ibn Baz because of his affiliation to 
the ruling government in Riyadh.
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 Interesting enough he was released 
from jail because of the intercession of the grand mufti. After three 
decades still the reason for the occupation of the above sacred mosque and 
the consequences of the occupation is not clear. Saudi authorities, who 
always try to hide and deny any unpleasant thing happening in their 
country were silent about the occupation, and did not permit the supporters 
of Al-Utaybi faction to identify themselves and explain their mission.
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We will speak in the forthcoming chapters about the ideological 
consequences and the process of the change in the Wahhabi doctrines and 
why Al-Utaybi decided to take such a drastic measure, but where it has to 
deal with the social matters surely such a movement was inspired by the 
religious zeal that the Islamic revolution in Iran had fed into his blood.
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Although the Iranian revolution was a Shia revolution it excited the 
religious sentiments of all the Muslims and warned them not to remain 
indifferent to such attitudes and events which insulted their religion and 
tried to push them out of the scene of action. After the victory of Islamic 
revolution in Iran we can clearly see an ideology and behavior ripe with a 
deep desire to return to the roots of Islam.
121
  
According to rare evidences available al-Utaybi and his faction were 
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trying to promote such zeal and respect for their religion. Of course they 
maintained that true Islam was the Islam that the first Wahhabi clerics had 
preached. Meanwhile they had mixed politics to their religious zeal which 
provoked them to oppose those who tried to solicit help from the West and 
the United States and that sort of hostility had made them political 
minded.
122 
Considering the above factors it is not from reason to believe that they 
had been influenced by the excommunicating attitudes of the Egyptian 
activist during the 70's, but actually what they were seeking was deep 
rooted in the original Wahhabi doctrines. Such thoughts and demands have 
been quoted from al-Utaybi during the 70's and it was exactly for that 
reason that he was jailed.
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The big question in the move to take back the grand mosque in Mecca 
was that the occupiers came from different tribes and many individuals, 
police officers, army officers and the special royal guards belonged to 
these tribes, and in a tribal community like Saudi Arabia they could not 
fight with their brethren who were of their own tribe.
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Thus, a relatively small incident emerged as a big dilemma for the 
Saudi government. Al-Utaybi was resisting and the Saudi officials were 
trying to prevent the news from licking into other countries. It is rumored 
that the Saudi regime succeeded to put an end to the crisis with the help of 
Jordanian and French commando forces. These killed many activists who 
had occupied the al-Haram Mosque in Mecca including Mohammad ibn 
Abdollah Al-Qahtani who thought that he was paving the way for Imam 
Mahdi's resurrection.
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The fact is that this incident didn't leave a big impact even among the 
Saudi inhabitants, but it warned Saudi authorities to reconsider their 
domestic and even foreign policies.  
Before entering this subject we need to refer to other incidents such as 
the unrest in Shia populated regions located in the east of the Saudi 
Arabia.  The unrests had happened during Muharram 1400. But despite the 
unrest the agitation had nothing to do with the occupation of Al-Haram 
Mosque.
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Normally and especially during the first ten days of Muharram, the Shia 
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Muslims mourn the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (A.S.). Such lamentation 
which reaches momentum on Muharram 9 and 10 and the groups of 
mourners marches in the streets and observe special religious rites.  
During the Islamic revolution in Iran, mourning for the martyrdom of 
Imam Hussein and his comrades on Muharram 9 and 10 both in Tehran 
and provincial towns and even villages provoked demonstrations against 
the Shah's regime. During these two days in a nationwide demonstration 
millions of protesters poured into the streets and accelerated the fall of the 
Shah's regime.  
 The Shia population living in the east of Saudi Arabia was fused with 
the nationwide Shia demonstrations in Iran and tried to convert their 
mourning ceremony into demonstrations, but were faced by strong 
resistance by the Saudi police and security forces. During this 
confrontation many people died or more people were wounded or arrested. 
Similar demonstrations and confrontation with the demonstrators 
happened in Bahrain.
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Although, the occupation of the al-Haram Mosque in Mecca and the 
demonstrations taken place in the east of Saudi Arabia happened almost 
simultaneously, the two incidents were wholly unrelated to each other. 
These were two different incidents with different reasons and motives in 
mind. 
This was a big blow to the Saudi regime. The main blow was that which 
al-Utaybi had inflicted and threatened the legitimacy of the regime. The 
most important factor which contributed to the regime's survival and 
stability was its religious legitimacy. Contrary to other Arab regimes the 
Saudis believed to be legitimate sons of Islam and the revolt of Al-Utebi 
was exactly aimed to undermine that legitimacy.
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Although, the unrest in the Shia quarters of the east of Saudi Arabia 
was considered a nuisance it was not considered a threat against the 
government because the unrest had been brewed by a minority group who 
were first of all Shia Muslims and secondly they could blame them as 
Iranian agents and mercenaries and that allegation was enough to condemn 
them. 
In order to confront with the crisis and make the regime immune from 
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attack the Saudi authorities decided to insist that they strictly followed 
Wahhabi canons and doctrines. In other words, first of all they decided to 
enforce the Wahhabi doctrines and jurisprudence strictly, and secondly to 
contribute the expansion of Wahhabi teachings both in quality and 
quantity, educational viewpoints and academic research and during the 
implementation of the canons inside and outside the country. With this 
method they tried to coerce the critics and dissidents to comply with their 
orders and stole from them their tools of resistance.
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The fact is that during these years (the beginning of the 80's) there were 
many activists who were dissatisfied. Some demanded an open Saudi 
community, and modernization and exercise of western ethics. The group 
which had gradually emerged since 60's was gradually finding more 
supporters and had even advocates inside the Saudi family and government 
departments. Fahd, who had seized power in the beginning of the 60's, 
supported such aspirations and was seriously seeking amendments in the 
community and the Saudi governing body.
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Compared to this group there was a small group of leftists. Their 
operation reached momentum during the 50's and 60's when the regime 
was acting by discrimination and iron fist, retained the nation's wealth and 
the masses were living in complete poverty. Meanwhile the Saudi regime 
was being bombarded by the propaganda of the Arab progressive factions 
which blamed Saudi authorities for being tyrants and corrupt, reactionary 
and backward and dependent on the imperialist powers. Under such 
circumstances some people supported the leftist ethnic and traditional 
principles and some supported the Marxist camp. But as we said before the 
1967 Arab defeat changed everything and the half-hearted victory in 1973 
completed the change. As a result the residue of progressive partisans the 
leftist camp lost their power and influence in the 80's. 
The Shia sect was the other opposition. When the Saudi regime decided 
to exercise a more open economic policy and help the people benefit from 
the oil wealth and the living condition of the Shia citizens was improved 
alongside other Saudi nationals, still the Shia population suffered from 
social discrimination. They were treated as second class or at times as 
third class citizens. They were not allowed to the universities or scientific 
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institutes and they were almost banned from being hired in government 
departments.
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Such conditions opened the way for them to listen to opposition 
ideology and voice. Due to many reasons they quickly and with great zeal 
became interested in the Iranian revolution and even tried to start a similar  
uprising. 
Despite all these problems and the large number of dissidents the 
conditions were such that emphasis on Wahhabi teaching could neutralize 
all these dissident groups. At first the main goal of the regime was to 
disarm the extremist groups which fused by a strong religious current 
erupted by the Iranian revolution had become excited and were trying to 
expel and invalidate everything which conflicted with genuine Wahhabi 
doctrines. But such a move practically silenced the other groups in the 
country. 
There were many reasons for such developments which are related to 
the nature of Saudi community and the strong link between Wahhabi 
doctrine and the Saudi identity. In fact, Bin Abd al-Aziz and Abd al-Aziz's 
version of Wahhabi doctrines helped Saudi Arabia to emergence as a 
single country within their present borders and it was the Saudi family that 
gave birth and meaning to Saudi nationalism. It was the same family that 
helped Saudi Arabia to become acquainted with the new world and 
provided welfare, security and pride.
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And above all, it was the same family which had converted “the rough 
Bedouin Wahhabi faith of Abdul Wahhab” and the Ikhwan group into a 
mild, tolerable and enforceable “Abdulaziz Wahhabi faith”, and it was the 
same family that could prevent the extremist measures of the remnant of 
Akhavani partisans and ensure a moderate and healthy community.
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These factors, some of which we discussed above, changed the quality 
of the protests by modern Saudi dissidents and to some extent other 
Sheikhdoms against the authorities. The authorities in Saudi expressed 
their demands by a sort of caution and shyness and in the meantime 
quickly retreated from their demands. In the meantime, they were never 
willing to oppose the masses. It was perhaps for this timidity that their 
difference and discord with the culture of the ordinary people is far less 
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than other Arab countries and those in the Third World.
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As to their treatment of Shia community the process was far easier. The 
ruling government was able to blame them of deviating from the edicts of 
religion and pessimism, and instead of looking inside the boundaries they 
were looking abroad and Iran.  
From that point of view confrontation with the Shia community not 
only did not brew problems but contributed to stronger social and religious 
solidarity, and made the regime more popular.        
Anyhow the policy of insistence on Wahhabi tenets was the 
government's agenda in Saudi Arabia. When Fahd had just accumulated 
power and showed symptoms of opening the Saudi community he was 
silent and secretly subscribed to that reserved policy, although Fahd had 
no record of such a personality, ideology or executive qualities.
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But this was part of the scenario. The Saudi family understood that in 
order to preserve and defend their position and authority they had to adopt 
a far active foreign policy. The nature and the various dimensions of the 
Iranian revolution were such that conflicted in all fields with the Saudi 
Arabia's policies. The Iranian revolution opposed monarchy, dependence 
on great powers, and was anti-traditional and anti-reactionary. In the 
meantime, it was a revolutionary that had flourished on the basis of 
Islamic ideology and had Islamic goals and aspirations in mind. The 
slightest blow from the Islamic revolution was likely to cast doubt over the 
legitimacy of the Islam practiced by Saudi Arabia. From that angle the 
new development in Iran was far dangerous than Nasser's ideology when 
he enjoyed the peak of popularity. The weak point was that it had 
happened in Iran and in a Shia territory.
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This weakness was to serve as a strong lever for Saudi Arabia and the 
best means of achieving such strength was their emphasis of Wahhabi 
tenets in their foreign policy, because Wahhabi was something that the 
Saudi's had inherited to the extent that among the Muslims Saudi regime 
was a manifestation of Wahhabi faith. Secondly, among the various 
branches of Islam the Wahhabi sect was the more opposed and conflicting 
with Shia ideology.
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Thus the consequences of the Islamic revolution in Iran also left its 
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impact both on the Saudi social realities and foreign policy. After that the 
Saudi government transferred huge funds abroad for establishment of 
Wahhabi institutions, such as Wahhabi seminaries, mosques, libraries and 
Wahhabi propaganda and press.  
During the 80's such investment was made mostly in Islamic countries 
especially in Pakistan and its border with Afghanistan. Their first goal was 
to confront with the Islamic revolution and Shia ideology. Thus the 
political struggle between the two countries changed to religious war. If 
Saudis could prove that Shia faith was nothing but deviation from 
orthodox Islam and had nothing to do with Islam at all and was even 
opposed to Islamic tenets, they would emerge victorious in their political 
rivalry with Iran.
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Above all with such mechanism the Saudi regime could blame all the 
Sunni Muslims who were criticizing them for various reasons as 
expounders of sophistry and falsehood and claimed that they were under 
the domination of Shia tenets. Of course their next goal was to introduce 
themselves and their ideology as defendant of the Sunni nation and 
genuine Sunni teachings. If they succeeded in that attempt not only they 
would make themselves immune against the Islamic revolutions hostile 
propaganda and ideology, but put their rival into shame and defenseless 
situation and blame them of blasphemy.
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The situation that we have described above continued during the 80's 
with little ups and downs, and practically the Sheikdoms too were under 
the influence of such policy. With the outbreak of war between Iran and 
Iraq the said policy was pursued with much vigor both inside and outside 
Saudi Arabia. As we can see it left important consequences both inside and 
outside Saudi. The emergence of extremist subversive inclinations and 
radical extremist groups in subsequent years was the fruit of such 
policies.
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Such a situation continued during the 80's. In 1985 the price of oil sank 
below 10 dollars, but despite such slump we do not see any change in 
Saudi religious outside Saudi Arabia. In the same way the same policy 
continued after the war between Iran and Iraq until 1988.  
The next shock was the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in mid 90's. 
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Although Baghdad continuously applied pressure on Saudi Arabia and 
other Sheikhdoms to obtain privileges and more money and the pressure 
continued after the end of the war too, the Sheikhdoms did not believe that 
Iraq would completely occupy Kuwait and threaten Saudi Arabia or resort 
to military measures against them.
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The occupation and threat put the Saudi Arabian regime in a very 
difficult and uncomfortable position. Beside many problems that the 
occupation had caused Saudi Arabia had to suffer a sort of stalemate 
which had its root in their legitimacy and more than any other time before 
the 80's the Islamic nature of the regime was under scrutiny and pressure. 
In fact all decisions and grounds for decisions were based on Islamic 
principles in Riyadh and there was doubt whether the country that claimed 
to be the guardian and protector of Islam in the modern times was 
faithfully following Islamic principles.
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The case was so when they had to deal with the general opinion of the 
Sunni Muslims both inside Saudi Arabia and outside it. A cruel and 
despotic ruler like Saddam, who was in the meantime a Muslim, had 
occupied a sovereign country and had threatened another country. The 
question was this: was it lawful for the sheikhs to ask non-Muslims to help 
them against aggressive Saddam? The other question was whether they 
should allow non-Muslims into the sacred realm of Saudi Arabia?
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These two questions placed Saudi Arabia in an awkward situation and 
they felt that they could not compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw his 
troops by any method except by military method and by any country other 
than the United States and West.  From the beginning of the crisis and 
based on their concept of Iraq's regime they had been thinking about U.S. 
intervention, but in order to convince the world specially the inhabitants of 
Saudi Arabia they tried to resort to other methods of defense both through 
the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Conference as well as 
legitimate Islamic parties and personalities. But none of them were found 
to be effective and useful.
144
  
The only solution was to seek assistance from West, but an intervention 
by the West conflicted with all the doctrines which they had advertised 
earlier. The Saudi authorities were compelled to refer the case to religious 
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scholars. The clerics said that under such circumstances they were 
permitted to ask help from non-Muslim countries and mentioned historical 
examples.
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These steps succeeded to some extent to convince the inhabitants of 
Saudi Arabia about the wisdom of foreign intervention because the people 
were afraid, and the Saudi officials did not mind such intervention 
although, later on, Saudi and non-Saudi clerics criticized the foreign 
intervention and joined those which the U.S. intervention had impelled to 
make radical change about the political role of Islam.  
But when they had to deal with outside Saudi Arabia the problem still 
existed and was even aggravated. The main reason for the censure was 
because of the scale propaganda that the Iraqi regime had launched (saying 
that the U.S. intervention was unlawful) which propaganda corresponded 
with the nature of the propaganda that Saudi Arabia had aired earlier. 
Moreover due to various reasons many Muslims and especially devoted 
Muslims did not like the Saudi regime and their behavior. The majority of 
the critics thought the Saudi authorities were careless, lax, womanizers, 
bon vivant, debauchees and extravagant money squanderers. Moreover, 
they regarded them as reactionary and a servant of imperialist powers 
maintained that the Saudi regime was working for the West and not for the 
interest of the Islamic Ummah.
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The fact is that these critics were practically attached to such institutes 
and organizations which Saudi Arabia had established from 1970 until 
1980, both in Muslim countries or non-Muslim countries. Those who lived 
outside the Muslim world, especially in Europe, were mostly Muslim 
immigrants who had gone there to work and for different reasons and had 
political and Islamic inclinations. They were deeply influenced by the 
regime in Baghdad and supported that regime and opposed Saudi Arabia. 
The widespread efforts of Saudi Arabia and their immense investments 
gave birth to factions and groups the majority of which lined up against 
Saudi Arabia and sided with Iraq. Such atmosphere prevailed until the end 
of war which ended with Baghdad's defeat and gradually their hostile 
attitude towards the Saudi Arabia decreased. Saudi officials too tried to be 
friendly and moderate with such opposition and the two sides gradually 
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forgot the past.
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But this was not the whole scenario. The U.S. intervention in Iraq 
actually turned into one of the most important turning points in the Sunni 
ideology. This event nurtured the ideology of subversive activists who 
revolted against their enemies and even Muslims and laid the foundation 
of radical organizations such as al-Qaeda and Taliban.
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This event left its mark in the Saudi community and in the Sheikhdoms, 
to some extent, and converted these countries into the most important 
bases for radical activities. Above all, a remarkable number of the wealthy 
Arab citizens became advocators of such thoughts. Although they were not 
engaged in such radical activities they offered large sums of money to the 
radical groups and factions. 
Probably nothing like the recent event played such an effective role that 
changed the social, ideological and religious thoughts in Saudi Arabia and 
in other Sheikhdoms, to some extent. In fact the extent of such influence is 
rooted in the Saudi regime's religious and political propaganda. In the 
absence of such ideology the impression would not have been so deep and 
so effective. For example Kuwait was not suffering from such dilemma. 
Like Saudi Arabia Kuwait did not consider itself to be the guardian of 
Islamic Ummah and personification of such principles, and could therefore 
demand foreign countries and the United States and the West to help it 
without being threatened by any problem.
150
   
The occupation of Kuwait for few months and the rapid and widespread 
changes that happened during that critical period and the ensuing war in 
1991 happened at a time that all the Sheikdoms, especially Saudi Arabia, 
had sunk deep in their boundaries. Although Saddam was defeated and 
Iraq had collapsed none of these countries felt victorious. These countries 
suffered a sort of shame, defeat and political isolation. 
The Arab world was divided. Some Arabic regimes sided with Saddam 
and some opposed him. The conditions were such that Saddam's opponents 
were under pressure by their own countrymen and were not willing to 
openly express their hostility. In the same way those who sided with 
Saddam were more popular. In between there were regimes that preferred 
to staying neutral although they could hardly strike such a balance.
151
  
Politics and Social Changes                                                                    99 
 
It took a long time until the divided Arab countries solved their dispute 
and become friendly. Even there was talk of common Arab descent, 
common Arab destiny and common Arab tradition, but most of the time 
Kuwait objected with such slogans. Under the circumstances the 
Sheikdoms were the more confused. Much abuse had been thrown against 
them during the months that Kuwait was occupied by Iraq by the Iraqi 
regime and other countries, a great part of which was true, especially about 
the behavior of the Sheikhdoms, and such passive and undecided attitude 
was alive among the people.
152
  
 The Saudis, the Kuwaiti citizens and to some extent the other 
Sheikhdoms felt that their help was fattening their enemy instead of 
courting their friendship. Meanwhile Baghdad's hostile stance had 
confused the Sheikhdoms and had made them reserved.
153
  
Aside from the above factors, the eastern bloc had collapsed and a 
completely new atmosphere was now dominating the world, and it was 
necessary for the Sheikhdoms to adopt policies which adapted to the new 
realities. But it seemed as if they were not interested in any change. They 
had lost their previous stream and willingness to take parts in such 
operations. Previously they had always volunteered to help each other in 
matters related to Arab dignity.
154 
In the course of the new history, the foreign policy of Kuwait was far 
stronger than other Sheikhdoms and more than the other Sheikdoms they 
welcomed international and regional changes, but in the present dilemma 
they were unable to decide. The shock they had received from the 
occupation or as they said the unmanly attitude of former friends who had 
always received their help still continued.
155
  
Under such circumstances the Sheikhdoms, especially Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, were pushed to solitude and isolation for a while. Among them 
that which mattered most was the reserved attitude of Saudi Arabia. This 
reserved policy contributed to their traditional and religious behavior, but 
not for political or security reasons. The conditions were such that during 
this juncture we can see religious inclinations and consolidation of 
Wahhabi institutes and their institution of 'al-amr bil-ma‛ruf wal-nahy ‛an 
al-munkar.' In these circumstances such countries are the least inclined to 
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reform or to turn to West. It was as if from 1940 until 1945 the country 
had lost its social and religious stability.
156 
Because of the fall of oil prices from the beginning of the 90's and the 
heavy cost of war and inflammable economy the  living condition of the 
people was not well, and this made the community more reserved, 
introverted and traditional. Under such circumstances there were those 
who for the first time in the Saudi history were criticizing the United 
States and the West. They were mostly religious scholars and followers of 
Wahhabism. In the forthcoming chapter we will explain the change of 
Wahhabi ideology in Saudi Arabia that how it conflicted completely with 
the doctrines of the West and any leftist ideology. The Saudi inhabitants 
welcomed the United States and the West and they tolerated their presence 
in the most critical conditions and the Wahhabi clerics never criticized 
them.
157
    
Such censure was a turning point in the Saudi history. The criticism 
continued and gathered force. The developments during the 90‟s when 
dealing with Muslims and their fate caused the growth of such aspirations. 
The hardships the Muslims suffered in Bosnia and their massacre, the war 
in Chechen and the other calamities which were the continuation of the 
sufferings of Muslims during the past decades added fuel to the flame.
158
  
Despite economical hardships the overseas activities of the Wahhabi 
sect and the Saudi religious policies and doctrines continued as before. 
There were many reasons for such traditional zeal and propaganda. In the 
first place new grounds had been found. With the fall of the Eastern Bloc 
and disintegration of Soviet Union many Muslim countries had been born. 
Due to the conditions in which they were facing the masses in the newly 
liberated countries fell in love with Islam and everything related to Islam. 
Moreover, the Muslims in the former Eastern Bloc who were living in 
non-Muslim countries including Russia and Muslims in Caucasus, Ukraine 
and other countries in the former Soviet Union were also burning with the 
same fire. 
Alongside these developments there was Pakistan and Afghanistan 
whose thirst for fundamental Islam was never quenched. A combination of 
economical, social, cultural and religious conditions had given birth to 
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such ardent love for Islam. The fall of the Eastern Bloc and the victory of 
the mujahids against Najibullah on its turn was adding fire to this flame, 
and of course similar conditions prevailed more or less in other Muslim-
populated regions.   
Here contrary to the 80's the Saudi was pushed into the scene and the 
Saudi's themselves entered these regions and tried to expand their 
ideology. This helped such propaganda stronger attachment to religion in 
Saudi Arabia and consolidation of religious and Wahhabi institutions. No 
doubt the Saudi community in the 90's was far more religious compared to 
the 80's and 70's. During the 90's a number of wealthy people volunteered 
to help the Wahhabi organizations and propaganda outside Saudi Arabia.  
As mentioned before the shock that the Sheikhdoms had suffered during 
the 1991 war had stagnated and stalled the foreign policy of all the 
Sheikdoms. The only thing which was active was the religious policy 
which was not in the hands of the authorities in these countries. The 
individuals and institutions who were voluntarily engaged in religious 
propaganda had been controlling a greater part of such activities. Such a 
scenario was not only true in Saudi Arabia but other Sheikhdoms too. This 
meant that the community was changing and boiling from inside, 
particularly because their propaganda at that time has become political. 
Their anti-western ideology was gathering force gradually and was 
becoming deeper.
159 
 Such developments continued to such a stage that because of 
quartering the Americans soldiers in the so-called sacred Arab soil it was 
facing opposition censure. Before that Saudi Arabia had neither suffered 
such censure nor such censure had any meaning, and it was because of the 
changes that happened in the heart of the Saudi population and was 
notable less ardent in the other Sheikhdoms, especially Kuwait.
160 
Under such trying circumstances Saudi Arabia and the other 
Sheikhdoms stepped into the twentieth century, or the age of 
modernization. Aside from the changes which boiled from inside their 
countries the Sheikdoms were exposed to imported ideas and thoughts. 
Within the framework of Wahhabi and old tradition it was the first time 
that such a thing was happening. The birthplace of such ideology was 
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Saudi Arabia itself, and it was the Saudis who impressed the others. But in 
those years they had been influenced by the ideas that were expressed 
outside their borders.
161 
The most important and inspiring factor were the Taliban and their 
Arab allies who had been living in Afghanistan since 1980. A combination 
of a sophisticated mesh of political elements and doctrines with the 
addition of the experience of the period of their battle with the Red Army 
and the results of the 1991 war had led them to arrive at new 
religious/political conclusions which we will speak in detail at a later 
stage. What mattered was that more than every other country the Saudis 
themselves were influenced by such results of al-Qaeda ideology. Most 
probably more than any other ideology such a doctrine had impressed the 
various classes in Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms to a lesser extent.
162
    
This was continuing until the blast of the twin towers in New York on 
September 11. The quality and magnitude of the catastrophe was such that 
not only the blow had shocked the United States but the whole world. The 
main culprit in this suicide operation was al-Qaeda. After that all the Arab 
leaders and the majority of the Saudi officials were also blamed and of 
course as an ally of al-Qaeda were also accused as their accomplice.  
The other problem was that during those years the neo-conservatives 
held the power in the White House. They had their own ideology and 
policy and tried to make the best possible use from this incident to attain 
their goals. The question was the policy they had adopted completely 
conflicted with the pride and rich legacy of Arabs and impelled them to 
react. It was the masses that reacted to such accusation and not the Saudi 
regime. Such a reaction revolutionized social, religious and political 
realities of the Arab communities.
163
  
In the meantime we must refer to another subject i.e. the developments 
during the first decade of the present century. The developments in that 
decade were the reaction of Arabs and Saudi Arabia against the 
humiliating and insulting manner that the United States had shown against 
them after the September 11 incident. This reaction reflected its own 
mental, social and ideology the path of which had been paved as a 
consequence of developments after the 1991 war.
164
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Alongside this actions and reactions which was between the Arabs and 
Washington's insulted policies that had offended the dignity of Arabs, the 
Arab masses, the Arab regimes and on top of them Saudi Arabia, Riyadh 
had fallen into a sort of disillusion and shame. The Saudi regime and its 
internal, political and educational policies and as a while all the Arab 
regimes were criticized, or better to say, were attacked by angry 
Washington. To add salt to the wound some members of the Saudi family 
had been blamed to have cooperated with al-Qaeda and had been involved 
in the September 11 incident.
165
  
Apart from Saudi Arabia Washington criticized the other Sheikhdoms 
too. Since the western analysis attributed the problem to radical extremism 
and traditional religious, cultural and social tenets which sought to return 
to the old codes, the edge of the criticism was aimed against such regimes 
which followed such traditions, among which the Arab Sheikhdoms were 
on the top. According to the western observers these regimes were guiltier 
because the gulf was deep in their antiquated political and social systems 
compared to western democracy. For example the quality of the criticism 
against Tunisia and even Libya and Egypt was far softer than against the 
traditional regimes in the Sheikhdoms and such censure contributed to the 
reserved and isolated status of Saudi Arabia and the other Sheikhdoms.
166
    
One of the most effective ways to escape such a shame and isolation 
was to join hands with the faction which under the banner of fighting war 
and terrorism and exertion towards creation of a great Middle East. These 
two terms had its own peculiar meanings and at the same time called for a 
series of action.
167
  
But such a policy could not be easily enforced. Although the majority 
of Arab states suffered from a sort of half-modern or traditional 
dictatorship, but their regimes were not able to take any risk contrary to 
the wish and inclination of the masses and such an assumption is more 
appropriate with regard to Saudi Arabia and Sheikhdoms. For example the 
change of religious teaching system in these countries was far more 
difficult than the countries in North Africa.
168
  
The insistence of the United States and some European countries for 
introduction of fundamental changes to prevent from formation and spread 
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of fanatic and extremist ideology in these countries had the reverse effect. 
Such a trend influenced both the relation of the people and their 
governments and the people's opinion about the West.  Such sophisticated 
actions and counteractions which continued until the end of the first 
decade of the twenty first century benefited religious extremism and al-
Qaeda doctrines.  
For example conditions were such that few people expressed their joy 
when the Taliban regime collapsed, although the fall of Taliban meant the 
destruction of a big network of radical Arabs who had penetrated their 
respective countries and threatened their governments under different 
pretexts.  
In between we must analyze the second war between the United States 
and Iraq which led to the fall of the Baath regime in Baghdad. The second 
war was waged in an atmosphere completely different compared to the 
first war. During the first war Saddam appeared as a hero fighting against 
corruption, reactionary regimes, dependence on foreign powers and one 
who promised a better, far glorious and hopeful future. At least, one can 
say Arab masses had such an opinion about Saddam Hussein. He was a 
symbol of Arab heroism against the imperial West.
169 
But the case was not so during the second Iraq war. The Arab regimes 
were more afraid of their citizens than the war itself because they could 
not anticipate the consequences of the war, but they knew it was 
dangerous. Saddam had lost his former charm and it was not only because 
of his different position compared to the first war but because that the 
various developments as long with the unsuccessful nature of the first war 
prevented the spark of fire that had kindled the heart of Arabs in the 
previous war with Iran. 
Noteworthy, during the second war the number of factions which 
protested the war in developed countries were not less than the Arab 
Muslim masses. It was as if in less than 12 years everything had changed.  
Anyhow, the war broke out without any consensus like the first war and 
without any other country including Arabic states having participated in it, 
and was ended relatively in a short period by using modern weapons. But 
the quality of the war and the fact that Iraq was occupied by the United 
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States and United Kingdom, which had been the propagators of war, paved 
the way again to the benefit of extremist-subversive groups.
170
  
In other words, Iraq replaced Afghanistan. Before the fall of Taliban 
Afghanistan was the hub of such extremist ideas, and Iraq too became like 
Afghanistan after the fall of Saddam, but here Iraq was a scene of action 
and a place to stimulate extremist and subversive elements. Aside from 
that the position of Baghdad versus the Washington was like the position 
of Kabul against the Russian occupation.  
The same group of young Arab students of Al-Utaybi faction which had 
hurried to Afghanistan to save the country from Soviet occupation 
hastened to Iraq to save Iraq from Americans. Although the scenario in the 
two cases was completely different, it looked the same to the eager Arab 
youth who were imbued deeply with radical Wahhabi inclinations.
171 
According to these young followers of al-Utaybi school, the United 
States had replaced the ex-Soviet Union; the replacement had not been 
done easily. As we said earlier according to the traditional Arab and 
Wahhabi tradition up to 1990 there was no big difference between the 
Arabs and the West and the United States. These traditionalists along with 
the regime in the Saudi Arabia were reserved and sided with the Saudi 
regime and its allies, whereas the Soviet troops were regarded as 
manifestation of vice, corruption, irreligion or devils. It was with their 
belief on Al-Utaybi Islamic principles that the Arab youth (or Afghan-
Arab youth) hastened to help the Afghans and fought with the Red Army 
in 80's.
172 
A change was supposed to happen and the Arab radical youth regarded 
the Americans in the same way they regarded the Russians. Such 
developments had happened two decades before the September 11 incident 
and this incident and the subsequent U.S. foreign policy and propaganda 
had worsened the hate against the Americans to its highest degree. During 
the occupation of Iraq by the United States, the Arab radical youth had the 
same opinion about them as they had entered against the Soviet Union in 
the 80's and before that.
173 
These things not only influenced the Muslim populated regions but the 
countries which had given shelter to Muslim immigrants. No doubt where 
106                                                               Change and Stability in GCC 
the problem had to do with the Muslim immigrants it had other reasons 
and dimensions. Nevertheless it was the first time in the modern history 
that the Muslim immigrants had been affected with such ideas.
174 
The fact is that after the blast of the twin towers in the United States the 
Arab world and especially the Sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf region and 
Arabian Peninsula had a very hard time. Political pressure for change and 
open society was heavy and often unbearable. The general opinion of the 
non-Muslim world and especially in the West was against the Sheikhdoms 
and they were offended, humiliated, blamed and hurt by different 
methods.
175 
In the first place they pressured Arab regimes to give more political and 
factional freedom and observe the human rights charter. Countries like 
Egypt, that had political parties, maintained that such pressure would end 
up with the domination of Islamic factions and Muslim fundamental and 
terrorists groups, but the evidences show that the six Sheikhdoms kept 
silent against such rhetoric only because they felt they could not explain 
their legitimacy which was acceptable to their peculiar system of 
governance that had emerged on the basis of their clannish and traditional 
beliefs. In fact, with the exception of Kuwait and Bahrain to some extent 
they had no political parties or parliaments. Above in the absence of 
foreign pressure and propaganda all the inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms 
were happy with their regimes.
176 
Of course, such foreign pressures led to a series of reforms and changes 
in these countries  and the reforms particularly with regard to the women's 
rights was remarkable, but as we mentioned earlier, the nature of U.S. 
pressure was such that provoked the people against their regimes. As a 
consequence those who took arms against their regimes whether extremist 
subversive elements or pro-western and freedom seeking parties were 
nearly isolated.
177 
After the second Gulf war wherein huge extremist subversive elements 
stepped into the field at a large scale we saw terrorist and sabotage attacks 
in Saudi Arabia and other Sheikdoms except in the UAE. Such subversive 
operation started simultaneously with other operations in other places such 
as Indonesia, London and Madrid. Their goal in such subversive tactics 
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was to prove that they were as dangerous to the other countries as to the 
Muslim countries, and this was a good tool to lift the blame again the 
Arabs for secretly supporting the terrorists.
178 
In the meantime, they tried to change the mentality of their citizens 
against the radical groups. For example they tried to change the opinion of 
clerics and religious institutions which, for various reasons, sided with the 
radicals, and to do that it was necessary once again to insist upon their 
traditional approach to religion within their countries, because such an 
attitude could isolate non-conformists and anti-religious thinkers and incite 
their citizens to support their governments which were under heavy 
pressure from the West.
179 
Such a trend continued until 2001.  The re-election of Bush struck a 
balance in U.S. foreign policy. Earlier there was serious doubt about the 
policy that Bush had adopted, and the former fervor for change of 
everything based on American style that had faltered away. Actually 
Washington had confronted by a series of limitations which the analysts 
had explained. But the White House had refused to accept or was 
unwilling to accept the explanations.
180 
Such a revision diffused the pressure on Arabs and the Sheikdoms were 
relieved. Their political tie with the West improved and, after a long 
interval of deadlock and impasse they tried to adopt a more active foreign 
policy. The problem resulting from the occupation of Iraq and the 
continual loss of American popularity in various countries in the world and 
the changes in the international arena, paved the way for the Sheikhdoms 
for more active presence in the world. But their main target from entering 
the international scene was their regional policies. If the Sheikdoms could 
exercise far successful regional policies in the region particularly in Iraq, 
Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan they would be welcomed by all 
countries which faced such problems. In the same way their domestic 
stability to some extent depended on far vigorous policies in these 
fields.
181
  
Such an attempt was beyond the capacity of the Sheikdoms except 
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia possessed the necessary tools and capacity and 
the others could do so in case they were more united, and this was the 
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biggest factor which impelled them to move closer to each other and even 
accepting Saudi leadership after 2005, whereas in earlier years there was a 
lot of difference and skirmishes between them.  
But the question was that Iran was the most influential country in the 
problems related to the region. After the fall of Saddam and the 33-day 
war in Lebanon with Israel Tehran's role was the more remarkable. The 
Arabs could not adopt active regional policies in the region without taking 
Iran into account.
182
  
This was the beginning of severe political and ideological rivalry 
between the Sheikhdoms and Iran. Because of the significance of the 
subject one must examine the history of the Iranian influence in the region. 
The Middle East representing the Islamic world is divided into two big 
religious faiths, the Shiites and the Sunnis. Although these faiths have 
many common points from the point of view of principles of belief and 
practical commandments, they differ in other fields. Meanwhile this 
difference of opinion covers various historical, social, and psychological 
philosophies. The fact that the Shiites are the minority and often the very 
hostile stance of the Sunnis has caused the two faiths to inherit two 
different historical legacies.
183 
 After the Shia faith became the official creed in Iran the attitude of the 
two faiths versus each other and especially that of Sunnis against the 
Shiites was deeply influenced by that difference. One important reason for 
this hostility was that the Iranians and Arabs had many historical 
recollections about their past, full of positive and negative factors. The 
most important factor that had given birth to such bitter recollection was 
the collapse of the Sassanid Empire by the Muslim Arabs, their rough 
treatment of the Iranians, the consequences of the crash, and Iran's 
immense contribution to Islamic sciences, art, culture and civilization.
184
  
These factors including religious and ideological difference along with 
the unending historical recollections dating back to even pre-Islamic era 
gave a chance to the Sunni Arabs to sketch different images about Iran and 
Shia Muslims under the prevailing circumstances by benefiting from the 
difference of attitudes and creeds.
185 
But despite all these differences during the contemporary history of the 
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region we have seldom seen the Arabs to resort to the levers. The 
difference between the Shiites and Sunni faith occurs often during 
religious and rhetorical debates, but seldom enters the social and political 
scenes, and has no ground to emerge. 
The thoughts and political inclinations which prevailed at the end of the 
nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century was not such to 
allow a clash between religious sects. Moreover the political and regional 
rivalry was seldom related to religion.  
Arab nationalism, Nasirite ideology, communist and leftist ideas and 
anti-imperialistic and anti-reactionary inclinations, Islamic factions 
seeking caliphate for the Islamic world and conformity of religions that 
was active decades after the World War II, paid less attention to religious 
and anti-Shia matters, although some of these groups entertained anti-
Iranian or anti-Shia opinions.
186 
For example, the Arab nationalism at times would become anti-Iranian, 
especially when they embraced socialistic, leftist or anti-imperialistic 
tendency. For example, some contemporary Islamic groups seeking to 
return to the so-called orthodox or established Islamic cannons would 
sometimes betray anti-Shia sentiments.
187
  
But such cases were rare and such sentiment was used for political 
ends. No doubt the question of Shia and Sunni differences was being 
discussed during this period, but mostly as a domestic subject and not a 
foreign political issue. For example in countries such as Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq or Lebanon the clash of Sunni and Shia faiths has always 
occurred, but as we said earlier the dispute was always treated as a 
domestic matter and nothing else. 
Moreover, one of the goals of religious movements and even political 
reformists both in the Shia and Sunni camps was to emphasis on Islamic 
unity avoiding religious differences, conflict and mendacious hostility in 
political and social scenes. 
But things changed after the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran. After 
the revolution the tribal question became the ruling agenda. Based on the 
revolution's religious incentives, nature, message and goals naturally the 
Islamic revolution stood against various regimes in the region. As to the 
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six Sheikdoms the clash was mostly with Saudi Arabia because of various 
reasons. Saudi Arabia claimed to be the guardian of Islam. Aside from that 
it was an ally of the United States and West in the region. Above all and 
contrary to the other Sheikhdoms, Saudi Arabia was severely oppressing 
and tyrannizing its citizens during these years.
188
  
We can see the same attitude during the bloom of Nasirite Arab 
nationalism. The biggest clash in the Middle East was between Nasser and 
Saudi Arabia. This was not what Nasser wanted but because of the nature 
of the regime in Saudi Arabia.
189 
As mentioned earlier the Islamic revolution brewed problems for Saudi 
Arabia both on domestic and foreign level. The biggest doubt that the 
Islamic revolution had cast against Saudi Arabia was that Riyadh which 
claimed to be guardian of the Muslims was not adhering to Islamic 
commandments. They were not behaving their citizens justly and were 
vassals of foreign powers and worked for foreign interests.
190 
Surely, the revolt of al-Utaybi and his compatriots at the end of 
Muharram 1400 A.H. was the result of such thoughts and inclinations. Al-
Utaybi was a fanatic traditionalist and Wahhabi. He not only condemned 
the regime in Saudi Arabia but the prevailing Wahhabi codes. The 
ideology which had given him such revolutionary thoughts were definitely 
Wahhabi and traditional doctrine, but one cannot ignore the fact that the 
excitement caused by the Islamic revolution had provoked him to revolt.
191 
Where he was talking about regime's lack of commitment to Islamic 
principles and Wahhabi scholars in their description of true religious codes 
or speaking about the friendly ties between the Saudi authorities with the 
infidels and enemies of Islam, such rhetoric indirectly stemmed from 
Islamic revolution and its slogans.
192 
In order to cope such threat the Saudi officials blamed the Shia nature 
of Islamic revolution and then they criticized the Shia faith, saying that the 
Shiites are not Muslims and moved so far in their ire that said that the Shia 
faith  had been invented by Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians and Iranians in 
general to destroy Islam. After such false allegations they drew a distorted 
image about the Iranian hostile stance against Arabs and Islam and 
maintained that Iran was always looking for an opportunity to avenge its 
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historical defeat from Arabs, because the Muslim Arabs had destroyed 
their great empire and glory.
193 
Thus, confronting the Shiite sect by different methods entered the Saudi 
politics both in domestic and external scenes. In the country the object of 
the regime was to isolate the Shia Muslims and to provoke the people to 
resist their demonstrations and demands, and blame Sunni individual or 
Wahhabi group who intended to protest against the government as bad 
Muslims influenced by the Shia minority. Outside Saudi Arabia too their 
objective was to neutralize the influence of Islamic revolution insisting 
that the revolution's creed has deviated from the true Islamic tenets is 
solely represented by Sunni Muslims, as they assume.  
Due to these reasons the Saudi officials were the inventors, propagators, 
and financers of such policies. Of course, all the regimes who felt 
threatened by the Iranian Revolution welcomed such innovative stance and 
helped their propagators. Thus a new strong political factor emerged in the 
region which practically changed the political blocks and opened a new 
ground for change in the region under the sphere of the Arab and even the 
Islamic world.
194 
The developments in the past three decades has deeply influenced by 
such propaganda. Often such a policy was followed far vigorously. For 
example after the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq and especially 
after the takeover of Khorramshahr by the Iranian soldiers and Iran's 
willingness to continue the war, such a policy reached to momentum. After 
the occupation of Kuwait and the 1991 war this policy petered out, but 
during the 90's it continued with ebbs and downs and reached momentum 
after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Of course, now it was not only Saudi 
Arabia who led the operation. All the countries who thought the influence 
of Iraq threatened them such as Jordan and Egypt had a role in it, although 
the role of these countries was political propaganda and not the religious-
political.
195 
The main reason that intensified or blunted such propaganda was the 
feeling of fear by Saudi Arabia. Moreover, they considered any increase of 
Iranian influence in Iraq as a source of threat. Surely general conditions 
play a big role in the continuation of such negative policy. As a result they 
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are tried to pave the ground for their propaganda by various methods 
including satellites which are manned and managed by them.  
As we said other regimes too benefited from such negative rhetoric and 
added fuel to the fire. But aside this there are groups who because of 
different reasons including religious ends oppose the Shiites and spread of 
Shiite faith. They take steps that although is dictated by Sunni regimes but 
actually follows the above-mentioned policy. Surely a regime like Saudi 
welcomes such measures and helps their propagators, although there are 
puppet independent groups which have been created and supported by 
Saudi Arabia to spread the seeds of discord. 
One of the most influential groups among them is al-Qaeda in general 
and the al-Qaeda branch in Iraq, in particular. The method and 
organization of al-Qaeda after fall of Saddam was to shape the general 
opinion of the Muslims and Arabs, specially the youth, versus the Shia 
faith has played an important role. Moreover, one must not forget the 
significance of this role in the creation of new frontiers and blocs in the 
region.
196 
Anyhow Saudi Arabia announced its new religious policy for Iran after 
the victory of Islamic revolution and was welcomed by certain regimes 
such as Kuwait, Iraq, Egypt and Jordon. Along with other factors such an 
ideology succeeded to mobilize the sentiment of many Arab countries 
against Iran and in Saddam's favor during the 8-year Iran-Iraq war, but this 
did not lead to any new sectarian division. After the occupation of Iraq this 
ideology was completely destroyed and until the fall of Baath regime the 
same matter continued. 
The 2003 War began at a time when all the Arab countries were 
dissatisfied with the occupation. This dissatisfaction was not because of 
their support to Saddam. The real reason for their dissatisfaction was the 
fear about the consequences of occupation which was not quite clear to 
them. But they felt that the results for these countries and the Arab world 
would be unpleasant.
197 
Such an indecision and anxiety continued until Saddam and his Baath 
party collapsed. The Shia Muslims held the majority in Iraq and were 
naturally supposed to play the first role in the country's politics, and this 
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was not acceptable to Saudi regime because it opened the way for stronger 
Iranian influence in Iraq and secondly, the Shia Muslims in the region 
would move closer to each other. There was the danger that under the 
leadership of Iran the Shia Muslims who had gathered more power could 
form a giant and formidable bloc.  
For this reason and other reasons they tried to oppose the new regime in 
Iraq and the Arab League practically boycotted Baghdad. Moreover, the 
Iraqi insurgents and even terrorists that bombed civilian districts on a large 
scale were supported morally, financially, and militarily under the pretext 
of fighting the occupation forces, whereas their prime goal was massacre 
of Shia Muslims on large scale in order to take vengeance for practicing 
bad faith. Besides they wanted to spread terror and insecurity and 
instability.
198 
The continuation of such policies and deeds paved the way for 
introduction of clannish traditions, factions and policies. The question in 
the old times and modern times was not which one was Arab and which 
country was anti-imperialistic or whether they were progressive and which 
country was conservative or inclined to the right faction. All these criteria 
had been obliterated. Who was Shia and who was Sunni was the leading 
question. The new lineup was created in this manner and the Arabs looked 
at modern Iraq from that angle. 
This faction-building created its own culture. One symbol of this 
rhetoric was to call the Iraqi Shia Muslims as ajams (non-Arab) or 
Iranians. It was a term which was attributed to the Bahraini and Saudi 
Shiite citizens during the Arab Spring. Thus the question of faith first of 
all overshadowed political realities and gave birth to new camps.
199
  
The active presence of Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms after the 
September 11 blasts contrary to their past inert and passive attitude 
happened under such circumstances – circumstances which the Saudis and 
their Arabs friends had created and had pointed at Iran as the leader of the 
new Shia camp. 
It is another issue whether Iran desired for such a role or not.  Iran's 
wish in this regard was of far less importance than the wish of Arabs to 
label Tehran with such intentions, it were the Saudi regimes and their 
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partisans that had given Iran that role and tried to define their relation with 
Tehran under such false accusations.  
Such division to several camps was intensified to the extent that non-
Shia Arabs who were politically inclined to Iran were labeled as traitors. 
According to the Saudi authorities Syria is now within Iran's camp; not 
merely due to politics but for sectarian reasons.
200 
With the arrival of the waves of Arab Spring tribal division was 
intensified. Such grouping and division is such that completely changes 
and manipulates the demands for freedom, and protests against despotism, 
corruption and blames the protestors for clannish inclinations, rivalries and 
hostilities. Surprising enough these false allegations give more strength 
and courage to the regimes and some opposition groups to stand firmly 
against their opponents defending their ground and blaming the other party 
as illegitimate and foreign vassal. 
Right now the region is encountered with very sophisticated social 
developments. Such developments have left its classic background and 
have gathered new dimensions and features, and their relation with politics 
has changed. As long as it related to the six Sheikhdoms the relationship 
between social changes and politics firstly depends on the fate of unrest in 
Bahrain. Although other foreign elements are interfering in this unrest, 
their influence is proportional to their influence in the relation between 
dissident Shia citizens in Bahrain with the Sunni regime and how much 
these two camps are influenced by foreign factors. 
4 
Transitional Period: Religion and Culture 
We have allocated a separate chapter to religion and culture because 
these two subjects have a decisive role in the calm and almost tension-free 
transition of the Sheikhdoms into the modern world. Their social and 
political stability during the period of transition is deeply dependent on 
their religious beliefs and culture.  
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As we said in the previous chapters from historical perspective the 
Sheikhdoms were a formed of series of tribes whose motherland was Saudi 
Arabia, but due to natural hardships and difficult living conditions during 
the past two or three decades, they migrated to regions which are now 
called sheikhdom.  Such a verdict is even true about Bahrain and Oman 
that possess history and civilization. In other words, some tribes or clans 
came to these two countries and sought shelter during these years. This 
means that at least, part of the inhabitants of Bahrain and Oman were from 
amongst the migrant tribes.
1 
Under such circumstances naturally the prevailing or better to say the 
dominating culture was ethnic culture. This culture is still alive in the 
Sheikhdoms and plays a big role in stabilizing them during the period of 
transition from ancient times to modern times. In this chapter we aim to 
examine their religious and cultural role.
2 
Islam is inseparable from tribal culture, but this Islam is a tribal Islam 
and conforms to tribal rites. Such Islam is a combination of instructions 
for prayer and behavior. It is explicit and simple and is free from 
philosophical, oratorical and jurisprudential complexity – which we see in 
Iran.
3
  
In the Sheikhdoms, we see Islamic clannish customs and rites but it is 
difficult to say that these people have followed a true Islamic culture and 
civilization. A materialistic example of such civilization in the 
Sheikhdoms either doesn‟t exist or is very simple and rudimental. One can 
seldom point to art or architecture in the Sheikhdoms and still the case is 
same. Despite many changes which contributed to the modernization and 
wealth of the Sheikhdoms still their religious architecture is not native 
architecture and are designed and built by foreign nationals. As we said 
before Oman and Bahrain are exception from that rule compared to other 
Sheikhdoms. We will examine these countries later on.
4 
The compact environment and lack of ideological and cultural dialogue 
with others in their culture called for such customs and rites. Moreover, 
because of the conditions in which the inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms have 
flourished they had no wish for cultural communication with other 
communities. According to this secluded people Islam is the only true 
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religion and their inference from Islam was that is was an absolute truth. 
Their social and cultural standards, their customs, lifestyle and their beliefs 
were the best and they all were unanimous in such a belief. Thus there was 
no place to doubt about their religion or debate or exchange opinions with 
others. Probably, the only important change which they had seen was the 
emergence of Wahhabi faith during the time of Bin Abdul Wahhab which 
directly or indirectly influenced all these regions. Wahhabi faith helped 
them to become more introvert and reserved because the Wahhabi faith 
was nothing but fanatic belief on rigid and dry codes which even 
conflicted with human instincts.
5
   
And this was the story of their religion and culture when they face the 
modern time. Contrary to all Muslim countries who had to suffer many 
problems to transit from traditional community into modern community 
the inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms transited to modern times simply or at 
least with the least inconveniences. Now let's see how they experienced 
the changes to modern time.
6 
The fact is that the way Saudi Arabia approached the modern world was 
to some extent differed with the other Sheikhdoms. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine the transition process first in Saudi Arabia and then 
in other Sheikhdoms.   
The entry of the new civilization into Saudi Arabia happened at the end 
of nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century. During these 
years the Saudi Peninsula was being governed by the Ottoman Empire. 
The most important thing in the desert country was Mecca and Medina, 
which Sharif Hossein was governing on behalf of the Ottoman sultan.
7
  
Personally Sharif Hossein welcomed and loved the new civilization. 
The same is true with his children too. His ambition to set up an Arabic 
caliphate in the holy towns was a sort of modernization, but the fact was 
that first of all his sphere of influence was limited to Mecca and Medina 
only and to some extent to Jeddah at those times and not to the vast 
Arabian Peninsula. Secondly, due to their Bedouin and clannish nature the 
inhabitants of these towns didn't welcome such a change. As a 
consequence, Sharif Hossein failed to introduce the Arab masses with the 
modern civilization and the nation continued to live in its traditional 
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boundary.
8
  
Conditions were such until Abd al-Aziz took over the helm and Sharif 
Hossein and his children left Saudi Arabia. Abd al-Aziz eventually 
succeeded to make all the Arabian Peninsula obey his command and for 
the first time he laid out the foundation of a single country known as Saudi 
Arabia.  
The reason for his success during this process was his Wahhabi 
ideology. His soldiers were the Wahhabi volunteers who under the pretext 
of spreading their faith and combat with those, who deviated from their 
tenets or practiced evil codes, forced them to obey them. As long as Abd 
al-Aziz was fighting with his opponents who, according to his Wahhabi 
cohorts, were his ideological opponents he faced no problem, but problems 
surfaced when he united the country and tried to govern it.
9 
Abd al-Aziz had understood that without resorting to modern 
equipment and methods he could not manage the vast desert country. He 
therefore, tried to benefit from modern equipment with caution and on a 
limited scale, but some of his soldiers, who claimed to be true and 
committed Wahhabi Muslims, could not tolerate his modernization 
process. According to their opinion about Islamic tenets using modern 
equipment and methods was unlawful and Abd al-Aziz should not embrace 
such innovations.
10
  
He and his supporting clerics tried to convince the opposition to agree 
with the changes and much debate was held between the king and his 
supporters and the opposition among whom there were clerics. Some 
opponents were agreed to Abd al-Aziz's argument and some chose to 
remain silent, but there was another group that continued to oppose him.
11 
Abd al-Aziz began to fight them. He killed a number of his opponents 
and cut the noses and ears of many opponents and managed to curb the 
riot. The elimination of the enemies was not an important achievement in 
this struggle. The biggest gain was that the Wahhabi sect accepted that 
what the king was doing was right and whatever he did was religiously 
acceptable and no one must oppose him.
12 
Of course, this is part of the scenario. The other problem was the 
governor himself who always tried to modernize his country and the circle 
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of clerics in an acceptable framework. Still the same tradition is being 
observed by the rulers in that country.
13
  
This helped the traditional and religious community in Saudi Arabia to 
stop resisting the innovative acts of the regime for the modernization of 
the nation from the view of quality and quantity, and this was one of the 
important factors which stabilized the Saudi community in their 
confrontation with the modern civilization. But the case was not so in the 
other Sheikhdoms. They neither had such a strong leader, nor a 
government-prescribed and dominated ideology and neither such a rare 
experience. Now let us see how their condition was? 
Before entering this topic it is necessary to say that in their first 
encounter with the modern civilization all the Muslims faced many 
problems and difficulties. Some of these problems were practical and was 
related to religion, some were related to belief and rhetoric, while some 
were personal and some were social problems.
14
  
The question was that the native and traditional culture emanating from 
Islam had dominated all Islamic countries until the time they were entering 
the modern history. They suddenly confronted with a culture which 
wanted to dominate all their private and public customs starting from 
individual behavior up to legal and social matters and method of 
governance of the community as well as their educational, industrial, 
economical and scientific growth.   
Naturally, the Muslims faced with big problems and crises. At this 
juncture, lack of uniformity in the country was an added bottleneck. In a 
plural community with different and opposing beliefs and ideas every 
individual and group had its own interpretation of the modern culture and 
the way they were supposed to adopt it. Above all the question of 
accepting or rejecting the new civilization led to domestic rivalry. In other 
words their position against the modern civilization was dictated by their 
rivals and opponents. They neither understood it nor accepted nor rejected 
it deep in their hearts. In other words the modern civilization became an 
instrument and pretext for domestic maneuvers and rivalry.
15 
Due to the above reasons, as well as many others, the majority of the 
Islamic countries suffered the transition period with much pain and loss, 
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but this was not the case in the Sheikhdoms. The most important reason 
was that the societies were homogenous and simple.
16
  
The inhabitants of the Sheikhdoms understood the new subjects in the 
same manner. Moreover, they had no sophisticated community having 
internal struggle and rivalry to allow various factions to benefit from the 
new circumstances to their benefit and for destruction of their rivals. 
Above all the Sheikhdoms faced the modern civilization at a time that the 
other Muslims had already transited that stage and had left behind the 
dangerous and precarious stage of their clash with the modern civilization 
at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth 
century. Moreover, the experience of scholars and clerics in other 
countries for the new civilization greatly helped both the Sheikhdoms and 
Saudi Arabia. As we shall see after accumulating oil wealth they invited 
many clerics to manage their religious and educational affairs, and the 
presence of these clerics during the calm process of transition proved very 
important and effective.
17
  
One cannot even briefly describe the various types of difficulties that 
the Muslim countries suffered during their modernization process. 
According to some observers the problems were related to Islam itself. 
They maintained that Islam was the main factor or the main factor that 
kept Muslims backward. In addition there were those who said that 
religion was a source for backwardness and tension and it was necessary to 
fight with it.
18 
The other problem was the different interpretations of Islam especially 
when they wanted to compare it with the modern civilization. The 
comparison gave birth to more difficult problems. Alongside these topics 
there was the question of discourse, divine and philosophical subjects in 
Islam. There were a series of questions. Does God exist? Can Islam prove 
His existence? How the world, the living creatures and man were created? 
Many philosophical and scientific theories had penetrated the Islamic 
countries and were often not well understood by their native propagators.  
These propagators actually pointed to their deduction of such theories.
19
  
The other problem was the import of foreign products. What was 
Islam's commandment about foreign products? Was it permissible to build 
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new facilities and factories in a Muslim country? What was Quran's 
verdict about it? For example for a long time there was a debate whether 
water pipelines were permissible and lawful in Muslim countries. Above 
everything there was the question of management of the community and 
legislation. Were parliament and political parties and institutions lawful? 
Then how the leader of the country must manage things? What sort of 
administrative system, army, taxation and budget policies were to be 
used?
20 
These were some of the problems that all Muslim populated countries 
had faced at the beginning of their confrontation with the modern 
civilization. The literature of that period was deeply affected by such 
matters and a lot of the time and energy of theologians and clerics was 
spent to respond to doubtful questions or to respond to matters related to 
jurisprudence (fiqh) and theological discourse (Kalam).
21 
In fact, such matters did not attract the entire attention of religious 
scholars. The modernization process had entered the Muslim countries 
especially in big cities and had impressed the youth more than any other 
class in the community. All educational institutions including universities 
and even high schools were engaged in such debates and incited various 
sorts of social and political tensions.
22 
Before the arrival of the modern civilization the majority of the Islamic 
states did not suffer from conflict between old and new generations. They 
were all living in a common and historical culture and there was no deep 
cultural difference between generations, but with the beginning of the new 
era such problems agitated Muslim countries.  
The reasons of the conflict between different generations have already 
been mentioned. It was not social or economical changes that had led to 
such difference of opinion. The main difference was often about 
ideological, cultural or religious matters. It took a long time for the 
community to understand and digest such conflicting subjects and to cope 
with them.  During these years the Muslim writers and clerics and others 
who had their own views and theories and claimed to be reformers played 
a big role in such debates.
23
  
But such problems did not bother the Sheikhdoms at all. They 
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encountered the modern culture at a time that the culture had ceased to be 
on the offensive and most of Islamic countries had left behind the primary 
tensions and disputes about modern civilization. Meanwhile, there were a 
large number of theologians and Muslim scholars who had conducted 
extensive studies and had gathered important experience about the modern 
civilizations and the Sheikdoms could benefit from their knowledge, 
experience and ingenuity.
24 
Above all, thanks to their immense wealth they had enough money to 
hire religious scholars. In addition, many such scholars because of political 
turmoil in their countries were willing or compelled to leave their 
countries and the Sheikhdoms welcomed them.
25
  
In short from the beginning of the twenty first century the emirs of 
Bahrain and Kuwait tried to import new educational systems. Naturally the 
new system they were trying to introduce in their schools was a mixture of 
traditional and modern teaching methods, but due to the poverty of the 
masses such a step was not welcomed in the beginning.
26
  
As we explained in the previous chapter that how the authorities in 
these Sheikhdoms tried to hire teachers from other advanced Arab 
countries. The teachers and professors were hired, but the arrival of the 
teachers and professors caused many problems. These teachers were 
influenced by their nationalistic, political and anti-imperialistic 
environment and transferred the same feelings to the students in the 
Sheikdoms. Such talks provoked tension and made both the emirs and the 
British uncomfortable.
27 
Many steps were taken and extensive studies were conducted to solve 
this problem often by the British officials, but these schools cannot be 
regarded as the source of changes in the education system of the 
Sheikhdoms even in Kuwait, because only a limited number of students 
were being taught and they could not influence the masses. Meanwhile the 
emir of Kuwait was pessimistic about the schools. The emir has been 
quoted as saying, "We only need accountants and oil technicians. 
Therefore the schools must only teach such subjects and not other 
subjects." The reason for such verdict was that other subjects such as 
history were troublesome.
28
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Such developments and debates continued in Kuwait until the 
beginning of inflow of huge wealth from oil. After that everything was 
changed. There was a sparsely populated country which lacked necessary 
substructures and the majority of the inhabitants were illiterate, and it was 
necessary to build everything as quickly as possible. Luckily there were 
many people, especially in Arab countries, who were willing to work in 
Kuwait.
29
  
Taking into account all the domestic and foreign conditions one of the 
first steps of the authorities in Kuwait was to invite theologians and 
religious scholars and set up colleges for Islamic sciences. Such a step was 
natural because all Kuwaiti citizens were Muslims and thanks to their 
geographical position that they had been in contact with foreign nationals 
such as Indians, Iranians, British, Europeans and other Arab nationals from 
the end of nineteenth century. Such communication had offered a sort of 
awakening about their Islamic heritage. They had understood that they 
were Muslims. But Islam for a Kuwaiti citizen was his identity and of 
course Islam adapted to their tribal culture.
30
  
Communication with foreigners had made the Kuwaiti citizens sensitive 
and proud of their religion. As a consequence, it was natural for them to 
hire religious teachers first and they try to set up religious institutions and 
seminaries.
31
  
Such measures contributed to their stability far beyond their 
expectations and helped them to transit to modern civilization. Kuwait 
quickly opened its doors to the outside world and welcomed every 
innovative measures that led to modernization, all these things happened 
without bitter social disputes. 
In between other factors that helped the Sheikhdoms in their transition 
process. The Sheikhdoms opened their doors to the new world at a time 
that the era of clash of cultures and religions, which had annoyed other 
Muslim countries at the beginning of the twentieth century, was over. 
Contrary to many other Muslims one reason for their positive approach to 
the new civilizations was that they did not suffer the pains that other 
Muslims had suffered when they had encountered the new civilization.
32 
Anyhow it was under such circumstances and within the framework of 
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their native, ethnic and Islamic culture that the new culture and civilization 
entered the country. Therefore, no one objected the new culture and the 
various branches of the society welcomed it. The modern civilization 
neither met opposition nor led to class difference or social tension in the 
Sheikhdoms. 
The other Sheikdoms and even Saudi Arabia experienced the same 
things which Kuwait had experienced. These Sheikhdoms too followed the 
same path that Kuwait had trodden. Their first steps in that direction was 
to employ religious scholars and establish religious institutions and 
centers.
33
  
The big exception among them was Bahrain and Oman because they 
had different history, culture and society compared to other Sheikhdoms. 
Meanwhile, Oman opened its doors to the foreigners later than the other 
Sheikhdoms. 
The majority of the citizens in Bahrain were Shia Muslims, the majority 
of whom were either farmers or pearl hunters. Besides that due to their 
Shia faith and historical domination of Iran until the arrival of British 
colonial adventurers the Bahraini citizens often migrated to Iran or the 
Iranian people immigrated to Bahrain. Such a close intercourse helped the 
Bahrain's art, industry, architecture and even customs and folklore to be 
deeply affected by Iran.
34
  
Moreover, in the past two centuries when the Sunni family immigrated 
to Bahrain from Saudi Arabia because of poverty and famine the Shia 
population had always suffered the rule of Sunni minority who governed 
them by tyranny and discrimination, and such maltreatment had caused 
their culture and politics to differ with other Sheikhdoms.
35
  
The cultural and religious developments in the Shia populated regions 
in Bahrain are quite different compared with other Sheikhdoms. These 
Shia Muslims had inherited a rich culture and many great jurisprudents, 
lawgivers and clerics had emerged among them. The culture of the Shia 
population was alive and creative until the contemporary times and was 
continually in touch with religious seminaries in Iran and Iraq. As a 
consequence, the Shia majority maintained and preserved its own 
philosophy and culture and was less affected by the ruling system.
36 
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We have said about Bahrain that its condition was somehow applicable 
to Oman too. The majority of the people in Oman are of Abadhiyahd sect 
which is one of the branches of Islam. The Omani inhabitants also enjoy a 
rich and creative culture which has remained alive until today. Besides that 
due to various reasons the inhabitants of Oman were introverted and shut 
to the outside world. Therefore, their religion and culture differs with other 
Sheikhdoms and they are mostly influenced by their own culture.
37
  
But besides the things mentioned earlier which are mostly related to the 
religion of the Sheikhdoms there are other things among which the most 
important one is Arab nationalism that we will examine here. 
Arab nationalism was born at the end of the nineteenth century in the 
Arabic part of the Middle East of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. Many 
factors contributed to Arab nationalism, but it was a question of identity. 
The objective of Arab nationalism was to explain and introduce Arab 
identity.
38
  
This identity was based on a history and legacy which was deemed to 
be Arabic, whereas, in fact, it was Islamic legacy that Muslims had 
inherited, but since their religious and cultural sources were mostly written 
in Arabic language the culture had become know as Arabic culture.  
Here the question is not of its being an Islamic or Arabic identity. 
Rather, Arabs thought that this culture and religion was Arabic and it was 
an important legacy and cause of pride for them. For Arabs, who are 
instinctively sensitive and proud of it was an unexpected blessing that they 
acquired and were proud of that legacy.
39 
This greatly helped to this conviction that was studied by the Western 
and Arab scholars about the Arabs.  Their research that had started from 
the sixteenth century was progressive. The more important studies were 
conducted during the second part of the nineteenth century. During the 
nineteenth century they had collected very good information about Islamic 
history, civilization and sciences. They wrote many books about these 
subjects and often looked at the history with admiration and applause.
40
  
These oriental scholars and researchers of history, philosophy and 
modern Arabic civilization discovered that they had inherited Islamic 
sciences and civilization and realized that many Greek philosophical books 
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were the translation of Arabic works. Above all, almost, all scholars called 
it Arabic civilization, although some referred it as an Islamic civilization.
41 
For those Arabs who acquainted with such research and study at the end 
of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century such 
information was welcomed, because at one hand they were being 
humiliated and insulted for their backwardness and on the other hand, they 
thought the masters of the new civilization were indebted to their past 
civilization. They maintained that the ancient Arab civilization was one of 
the biggest and glorious human civilizations in the world.
42 
Under these circumstances, it was natural for all the Arab masses, 
whether Christian or Muslims, religious scholars, irreligious ones or even 
atheists to quickly absorb such information about their golden past.  All 
those who regarded themselves as Arabs needed such an identity and 
accepted and subscribed to it with much enthusiasm and wrote books 
about their golden heritage.
43 
As mentioned before in those times such information for people who 
lived in such atmosphere was understandable. The Arabs in other regions 
were ignorant about their past civilization. They gradually became 
acquainted with their past, but from the moment they became aware of it 
they welcomed it with much ardor.
44 
It is because they believed whoever spoke Arabic was an Arab whether 
at the shores of the Atlantic Ocean or the shores of Red Sea or the Sea of 
Oman. More than being a tribal or religious heritage Arabic language 
represented their Arabic identity. Of course, because of political reasons 
such definition was advertised by those who believed in Arab nationalism 
and Arab solidarity. They wanted to build an Arab empire and were trying 
to expand Arab domain as far as possible. That language represented their 
identity more than anything else and permitted them to expand their 
domain.
45 
Such definition was practically accepted by the Arabs because it 
benefited all Arabs. Even those who from historical or cultural viewpoint, 
were of purer Arab stock welcomed such definition because it gave them 
weight and dignity. In the same way that definition was welcomed by 
those who for historical reasons had joined the new Arab camp and were 
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not Arabs at all.
46
  
Anyhow the idea of Arab nation was born and it grew under such 
atmosphere. The first turning point goes back to years before the start of 
First World War. United Kingdom which was trying to disintegrate the 
Ottoman Empire provoked Sharif Hossein, the governor of Mecca and the 
representative of the Ottoman Empire, to declare himself an independent 
ruler to separate himself from the Ottoman government and provoke Arabs 
in Syria to revolt.  Instead, they promised Sharif Hossein to help him set 
up an Arab empire and place him at the head of that empire.
47
  
Of course, other Arabs especially Syrians where the Ottoman young 
Turks had been oppressing them entertained such aspirations, but there is 
no doubt that the British provocation played a big role in the revolt. After 
the end of World War I, Sharif Hossein was left alone to fight ambitious 
Abd al-Aziz and was defeated and expelled to Cypress and the eastern 
territory of the Ottoman Empire that was divided between the British and 
French.
48 
Thus, the first Arab nationalistic aspiration was defeated, but they never 
forget how badly they had been cheated, and this was the beginning of 
Arab anti-imperialistic aspirations.
49
  
The main ground for Arab nationalism at those times was Egypt and 
Arabic Middle East and the territories which had been captured by the 
British and the French. Their slogan about their glorious history and 
heritage made it difficult for them to accept the domination of colonial 
powers. Thus Arab ethnicity and pride became the most important 
stimulus for Arabs to resist imperialism.
50
  
Alongside such developments caused another incident that strengthened 
their anti-imperialistic stance and left a long time impression among the 
Arabs. During the second decade of the twentieth century large number of 
Jews began immigrating to Palestine. The immigration had begun a long 
time ago but it suddenly gathered force. After the mass immigration of 
Jews to Palestine a series of skirmishes happened between the original 
residents of Palestine and the Jewish immigrants which caught the 
attention of the Arabs in the region and raised their suspicion.  
Such events contributed greatly to the formation of Arab ethnicity and 
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their anti-imperialistic and anti-colonial feelings to the extent that the idea, 
even after the independence of these countries, was still boiling in their 
blood. The teachers who had been invited by Kuwait to teach in Kuwaiti 
schools before World War II and their presence had led to a series of 
problems that had been raised with such nationalistic aspirations. The 
problem began when under the influence of the invited teachers began 
demonstrating and resorted to anti-imperialistic and anti-British 
activities.
51 
Arab identity and blood continued to boil. The establishment of the 
state of Israel and the defeat of Arab states from that country in 1948 
boiled their blood again until Nasser seized power in Egypt and dedicated 
himself to the Arab origin and cause. This was a tactic which benefited 
him and added to his popularity and contributed to the expansion of Arab 
sphere of influence
52
. During the nationalization of Suez Canal and the 
side events, Nasser emerged as an Arab hero or legend, and the process 
contributed to Arab nationalism. After Egypt adopted socialist policies and 
approached the communist bloc the Arabism was mixed with socialist, 
progressive and revolutionary aspirations.
53 
This meant that Arabism was anti-imperialistic, anti-reactionary, 
revolutionary and leftist and this could prove dangerous to all traditional 
regimes and rightist regimes and those who were allied to the western 
imperialistic powers including Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms. It was 
exactly for this reason that during the peak of attacks by Radio of Cairo, 
when Nasser was very popular they blamed the Sheikhdoms to be traitors 
to the Arab identity and aspirations.
54
  
Taking such points into mind, it must be added that Arabism was 
regarded as a serious threat against the six Sheikhdoms and really 
threatened them. During the 60's only Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain 
could be the target of this kind of propaganda. Of course, it was Saudi 
Arabia that was the main target. The propaganda caused a series of 
problems for them. The other three Sheikhdoms; namely, Qatar, Oman, 
and the UAE, had not reached such a level that such evil propaganda could 
leave remarkable impact on their situation.
55 
Among these three countries only Kuwait had the strength to resist the 
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propaganda. This was because of their bitter experience with the threats 
and territorial claims of Abdolkarim Qassem. The Iraqi threats reminded 
Kuwait that they were Kuwaiti citizens and Arab ethnicity could be used 
as a weapon against them. They learnt to preserve Kuwaiti nationalism 
beside Arab nationalism and when necessary to give preference to the 
former. But Saudi Arabia and Bahrain had not such an experience and 
faced problems which their regimes that they solved by suppressing the 
people.
56
  
The defeat of Egypt in 1967 was in fact the defeat of Nasser's Arab 
nationalism. Since then, Arab identity (Al-Qoumia al-Arabia) was 
separated from Nasser's progressive, socialistic and revolutionary 
aspirations and situation was welcomed by the Sheikhdoms.
57 
In fact, they needed Arab ethnicity. This ideology gave them identity 
and history. It offered them pride and glory and converted them into a 
respectable country. Moreover, it connected them with a vast 
commonwealth of Arab world which had their weight in international and 
regional scenes. 
Before 1967 neither the Sheikdoms could accept such an ideology nor 
the ideology was desired to accept them, but after the Arab defeat the 
problem subsided and the two sides who were willing to have closer ties 
with each other. The Sheikdoms were quite lucky because the moment 
they needed such an identity in its broad sense the identity gave up its 
political aspirations and was under their service. Surely, if the separation 
from political ambition had happened later they would face many 
problems.
58 
Since then these two served each other, but of course, it benefited the 
Sheikhdoms most. All the countries which had achieved independence 
tried to invent a history, a legacy and identify for themselves so that they 
could offer independent culture to their citizens and meanwhile, convince 
others that they had history and civilization. This was a necessity which 
always existed and will exist. As we said Arab nationalism was responding 
to such need because it relied on Arab/Islamic culture, civilization and 
history and claimed that these things belonged to all Arabs, whereas, 
instead of belong to Arabs such a civilization belonged to Islamic nations. 
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Secondly, all the Arabs had no equal share in the creation and perfection 
of such civilization. In fact, the inhabitants of the Saudi Peninsula which 
covered Saudi Arabia and all the Sheikhdoms had very little role in the 
shaping of such civilization and Islamic civilization is not visible in this 
region.
59 
Besides, the Arabs in the Sheikhdoms needed such a legacy and 
accepted it because Arab identity had lost such elements and gave them 
problems and was unfavorable to them, and all of this happened at a time 
when they needed to actively step into the new world and the Arab world 
and international political scene.
60 
It is true that the oil in many Arab countries was discovered earlier than 
1967, but with the exception of Kuwait the oil wealth had not helped the 
other Sheikhdoms. Moreover, massive oil exploitation began in the 60's in 
these Sheikhdoms. It was during that decade that the wealth accumulated 
from oil flowed to the people outside the regime authorities and enriched 
the community.
61 
Alongside, these realities due to various reasons was more important 
that the center of political-gravity of the Arab world was shifted to the 
Sheikhdoms and the former center of political-gravity of Egypt lost its 
former glory, and with this new dignity it was necessary for the 
Sheikhdoms to adopt a far vigorous Arabic and international policy.  In its 
new definition Arab identity was a very important instrument to help them 
enter the international and regional arena.
62
  
The other side of the story was that the various supporters of that 
ideology in the vast Arab world, who before 1967, because of the policies 
of the Sheikhdoms‟ leaders were dissatisfied and expressed their 
discontent in various forms, began to feel calm after 1967. They felt that 
the rulers of the Sheikhdoms, which they had opposed earlier, were in their 
service now. Besides, such a feeling of fellowship disarmed the opposition 
factions, which lived in the Sheikhdoms, and which had blamed their 
governments for having betraying their nation and Arab identity.
63
  
The next point is that such an ideology succeeded to satisfy the feeling 
for change and idealism of a generation which was being nurtured in an 
atmosphere of increased wealth and saturated their pride, aspiration for 
Transitional Period: Religion and Culture                                              131 
 
change and adventurism and prevented them from turning to other 
doctrines and ideologies which would destabilize their countries.
64
  
Thus, the domestic and foreign policies of these countries were under 
the influence of the new ideology. In some Sheikhdoms, like Kuwait the 
development was faster and far vigorous while the people were less 
interested in the religious side of the matter. In a country like Saudi Arabia 
changing happens slowly and with caution the desire for change was less 
vigorous. Instead the regime put emphasis on its Wahhabi faith especially 
in their foreign policies.
65
   
Such a trend continued until 1973. UAE too found its independence in 
1973. These Sheikhdoms gradually become richer and their people grew 
more modern. Those who had criticized the Sheikhdoms before 1967 and 
blamed them to have betrayed the Arab nation and Arab aspirations, now 
started to praise them and sought their help. Part of the Arab or perhaps all 
the Arab world was looking at the Sheikhdoms for help.
66 
The inhabitants of the so-called countries including the masses, the 
intelligentsia, the elite and the regimes, welcomed such a change, and all 
of this led to their social solidarity and helped the Sheikhdoms to be 
involved in the developments in the Arab world and the region. Thanks to 
such a dignity they found universal honor and fame. These changes 
prepared the Sheikhdoms for a big leap after 1973.
67
   
Then the 1973 war happened and the Arab gained half a victory. But 
such half-hearted victory for those who had been humiliated in the worse 
manner in 1967 was considered a triumph. This was another indication of 
uselessness of Arab nationalism which Nasser had preached and which had 
ended up with the 1967 defeat and the success of an Arab world which 
favored Islam and Faysal‟s Saudi Arabia tried to represent it. The result 
was a stronger wish to shift the center of the Arab world to the Persian 
Gulf region. The Arab world felt that it needed the help of these countries 
not only for their wealth but because of their strategic position. Even 
extremist nationalists and leftists stopped to blame them to be a cause for 
shame for the Arabs. Instead, they treated them as a part of the dignity and 
universal credit of Arab world.
68
  
These developments have many reasons. The 1973 war led to the 
132                                                               Change and Stability in GCC 
boycott of the West and friends of Israel. The hero of that boycott was 
Faysal and other Sheikhdoms. Although other Arab oil producing 
countries had joined the boycott since the main producers were among the 
Sheikhdoms they were regarded as the creators and heroes of the boycott 
by Western observers.
69
    
This embargo not only worried governments but also the ordinary 
people, especially in the West. Although giant oil companies, governments 
and the media played a big role but without paying attention to that factor 
the world at large looked at the Arabs and specially to Saudi Arabia and 
the other Sheikhdoms as the propagators of such crisis.
70
  
But there was another factor which contributed to this scenario, and that 
was the new dignity that the Sheikhdoms had found. They were thought to 
be the masters of the new world. The West had to approach them and try to 
satisfy them in order to secure the smooth flow of oil. It was within that 
scope that we see a heated competition among industrialist oil-importing 
countries to move closer to the Sheikhdoms and conclude oil contracts 
with them.
71 
Other things also happened alongside these events. Although the 
Europeans and other industrial countries had a historical picture about 
Arabs the main elements of such opinion was their new assessments of the 
Arabs which was shaped in these years i.e. from the moment that the 
Arabs and their oil was treated as an important element in people's daily 
life.
72
   
Since such picture was wholly influenced by their estimation of the six 
Sheikhdoms they had the same opinion about all the Arabs. In other words 
they looked at the Arabs from the scope of their view of the Sheikhdoms 
and this showed the dignity that the Sheikdoms had acquired after the 
1973 war. In the first few years after the war such an opinion was 
expressed mostly by industrialized countries. Later on under the 
impression of the observers around the world resulting from the 
propaganda of industrialized states such an opinion and approach become 
universal.   
What makes the Arabs distinct is the picture about the Sheikhdoms that 
represent enormous wealth and spend extravagantly. Barrel, oil dyke, 
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ankle-long white garment (dishdasha), headdress and cord around 
headdress, camel, palm tree and desert are symbols of Arab dress. Whether 
assessed positively or negatively these things represent the significance of 
the Sheikhdoms in the public opinion and international politics.
73 
Surely such things change the opinion of the inhabitants of the 
Sheikhdoms about themselves and the Arabs for them and such opinion 
about the Sheikhdoms gives them the idea that they represent the Arab 
world. 
That which augmented their chance of being the center of political-
gravity of the Arab world that was their generous donations to 
Islamic/Arabic institutes in the Arab world which is very extensive. These 
religious institutes have either been set up by the Sheikhdoms or all the 
budget was paid by the emirs.
74 
To attend to all the subjects that surfaced after the 1973 war calls for 
further explanation and is beyond the scope of the present chapter. What 
matters is that religion and culture during the process of transit of these 
Sheikhdoms to their present social and political status has played an 
essential role to the extent that one might say that despite their rapid 
modernization the stability of these Sheikhdoms owes to their religion and 
culture.
75 
After the 1973 war and the jump of oil prices four times before the war 
and due to the developments which were mentioned above the Sheikhdoms 
opened their doors to the outside world including the Arabs. The 
accumulation of massive wealth , the need to build necessary substructure 
facilities, the need for rapid urban development and town building, the 
need to attain a suitable rank in the world and among the Arabs, lack of 
fear from Arab regimes and Arab progressive and nationalist parties, 
adopting religious, cultural and Arabic policies commensurate to domestic 
and foreign conditions, social solidarity and optimism about future and 
Arab pride and their readiness to struggle for such pride, called for such 
measures.
76 
In the meantime, the emergence of Arabs with strong religious and 
nationalistic inclinations was more impressive. Those who had religious 
inclinations or had been attracted to religious institutes or religious 
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training institutes were engaged in economic activities. The others who 
had nationalistic and progressive aspirations became attracted to 
magazines and newspapers and media, radio and television and publication 
agencies or universities or schools and cultural centers.
77 
Of course, the case was not so in Saudi Arabia. From the beginning of 
the 60's, Saudi Arabia decided to set up religious and propaganda bases. At 
those times, they lacked necessary personnel and were compelled to hire 
professors and experts from abroad. Moreover, at that time they did not 
insist on Wahhabi and tradition which they started to emphasis later on. In 
the beginning they did not insist to promote Wahhabi principles or 
traditions because they neither needed such propaganda nor those who 
volunteered to join them accepted such methods.
78 
Simultaneously with such demand and the opening of doors to the 
world a series of changes happened in some Arab countries which 
compelled many clerics and religious teachers to migrate or escape from 
their countries. The Saudi regime welcomed these teachers and scholars 
who had started to arrive since the 50's. Meanwhile, they had understood 
that the Indian Subcontinent and particularly Pakistan was an unbounded 
source of people who were easily satisfied, were fond of religion and were 
pious. They understood that they could easily hire both clerics and experts 
in other branches or either ordinary people who could be used for utility 
services.
79
  
Such a process gathered force in the 70's because of various reasons. 
First of all it was related to all the developments which were mentioned 
before. This called for the Saudi Arabia to quickly modernize itself and 
start to deal with the Arab world, Muslims and the world on a larger scale. 
In this process, the biggest share of contribution flowed to religious and 
Arabism but within its religious framework. 
The ground was paved for such operation. Sacred Mecca and Medina 
were located in Saudi Arabia and always the number of Hajj pilgrims was 
on the increase. Due to Nasser's nationalistic policies and poverty of Egypt 
al-Azhar University, which was once the most important Sunni institution, 
had weakened. Other Islamic/historical centers such as Fas, Zeituneh, 
Qeiravan, Qarawiyyin, Timbuktu, Damascus, Baghdad, Aleppo and 
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Lucknow, Samarkand, Lahore and other religious towns in Africa and far 
east had lost their funds or under the pressure of the ruling regimes or the 
new civilization were unable to respond to the need of the Muslims.
80
  
Beside that there was no money shortage in the Saudi Arabia and all the 
needed money was being spent in keeping with the regime's policy both 
for domestic and outside uses. But contrary to the 50's and 60's the 
religious policy of the Saudi Arabia was more inclined to Wahhabi faith. 
Wahhabi faith could serve the regime in its best condition and it was 
employed so, although other factors were also involved.
81 
Anyhow the bliss that Saudi Arabia enjoyed after the 1973 war differed 
with countries such as Kuwait and other Sheikhdoms. Of course, there 
were a lot of similarities, but Saudi Arabia and the other Sheikhdoms 
followed different policies. For example in the Saudi Arabia a large 
number of Arabs and Muslims who had arrived for religious reasons 
turned to economic development activities and became rich. Later on, 
some of these migrants in Saudi Arabia and other Sheikhdoms 
accumulated enough wealth to feed the religious crusaders and subversive 
factions and contributed greatly to the spread of Salafi ideology.
82 
This ample wealth led to important consequences. A country like 
Kuwait which before World War II was scared of a few imported teachers 
with Arab nationalistic aspirations, had employed philosophers and 
defenders of such ideology in its religious institutions and media. In other 
words the regime had both changed to ethnic Arabic and wanted to 
propagate such culture among the people.
83
  
Of course, such wealth in all the six Sheikhdoms operated differently. 
The arrival of new philosophers and thoughts and the mixture of the 
imported ideology with the beliefs of the local inhabitants and moderately 
free advertisement of such thoughts had given birth to a modern society 
whether such ideology was religious, political or nationalistic. Moreover, 
in many cases, the ideas found a chance to absorb supporters and become 
firmly established.  One good example of such ideological pattern was the 
strong inclination of the press and part of Kuwaiti intelligentsia to 
Arabism. Their analyses, definitions and position especially during the 
80's were influenced by this ideology. Interesting enough, Kuwait 
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represented the most extremist Arab nationalism before it was occupied by 
Iraq.
84 
The significance of the developments in these countries during the 70's 
was because they had paved the way which shaped the future 
developments and changes. One can say the period of transit from 
traditional community to modern community in all these countries nearly 
ended in the 70's and become a platform for developments and changes in 
future époques.
85
  
The point is that religion and culture succeeded to help these 
excessively introverted and closed communities to bear calmly these rapid, 
pressing and fragile changes.  
The Islamic revolution happened in Iran during the closing years of 
80's. Despite their former anxiety the Sheikhdoms thought the revolution 
was a domestic matter in Iran and they tried to remain neutral, but due to 
the nature of the revolution and its reaction to the outside world it was no 
more possible for the Sheikhdoms to continue their neutral policy.
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As we said in the previous chapter Iran's biggest problem was with 
Saudi Arabia. The revolution embodied a great portion of Arab 
progressive nationalism and was opposed to monarchy, conservative and 
rightist regimes. The most important ingredient of the Iranian revolution 
was its emphasis on an Islam which conflicted with the version of Islam 
which the Saudi regime was advertising. When the revolution broke out in 
Iran the Saudi regime was not as secluded and introverted than in the 30's 
40's and 50's. It was present in the scene and was playing its role. The 
Saudi role was because of its religious status and credit and could not 
remain indifferent to countries which undermined its religious prestige.
87 
Interesting enough, one of the goals of Islamic revolution was 
propagation of true Islam and combat with metamorphosed Islam used by 
despotic and reactionary rulers. Therefore, the struggle between Iran and 
the Saudi regime was natural and the Saudi regime resisted such overtures 
by Tehran. We have discussed this subject in detail in the previous 
chapter. 
But the case was not so with the other Sheikhdoms. The leading 
incentive among the Sheikhdoms, especially in Kuwait, was Arab 
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nationalism. It was exactly for this reason that the extent of their hostility 
against Islamic revolution was proportional to the extent of commitment to 
Arab ethnicity. Countries like UAE and Oman understood and assimilated 
the Islamic revolution far calmly than Kuwait.
88
  
With the start of war between Iran and Iraq the position of the 
Sheikhdoms against Iran become more hostile, but what we mentioned 
about the attitude of the Sheikdoms against Iran is true. The quality of 
Saudi resistance was often religious and by relying on their Arabic and 
ethnic identity. The extent of interference of religion and Arabism was 
proportional to their share of each sheikhdom in their foreign policy. The 
case was quite different with regard to Kuwait. Kuwait was nationalist and 
lived within the framework of Arab ethnicity although Kuwait's reaction 
was echoed by their press, cultural institutions or intelligentsia instead of 
their formal foreign policy. The foreign policy of Bahrain was quite 
different especially for Iran. The Bahraini citizens were deeply affected by 
the conflict between the Shia and Sunni communities, although as a 
member of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, Bahrain obeyed the general 
policies of the Sheikhdoms.
89 
But UAE, Qatar and Oman had nearly similar stance. This similar 
position was because they had similar assessment of Arabic identity and 
the role of such ideology in their countries and their foreign policy, 
although, due to their very memory of Iran's assistance in Oman, because 
Iran had helped to quell the Zofar uprising, had convinced their politicians 
to harbor a far opinion about Tehran.
90 
But this chapter does not intend to analyze the method of reaction of the 
Sheikhdoms for Islamic revolution and war between Iran and Iraq. What 
we want to prove is that during the 80's these Sheikhdoms had discovered 
their identity with the help of religion and culture and they had a definite 
interpretation of their community and their interests and how to defend 
their values. 
This means that only religion and culture was not the main factor for 
their stability during their transition to modern civilization; rather it could 
help them to manage their affairs after the transition and offer a suitable 
definition suited to their domestic and foreign policies in the Arab world 
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and in the international arena and to shape their domestic and foreign 
policies according to such values.
91 
The chaotic periods of the 80's ended in the Sheikhdoms in this manner. 
Their problem was not merely Iran and the 8-year war. The Persian Gulf 
was deeply agitated at that time. The big powers were present in the region 
and were competing with each other. There was the war of oil tankers, 
extensive presence of foreign warships, the question of formation of raid 
reactionary troops for occupation of oil wells and keeping the Hormoz 
Strait open. This was a subject which was being talked at the closing years 
of 70's. There was also talk about the consequences of occupation of 
Afghanistan by USSR and the rivalry of the two superpowers in the 
region, which added fuel to the tension.
92
   
Surely, these Sheikhdoms owed their stability and peace to the explicit 
field support of the United States and its allies and the indirect support of 
the Soviet Union. There is no question about that, but this was not a factor 
that could lead to their consolidation, especially because all these countries 
lacked the history of an independent state. Surely religion and culture had 
filled that vacuum and played a leading role in their development process 
and in shaping their identity and policies. 
Kuwait was occupied by Iraq suddenly in the course of few hours in 
August 1990, and Baghdad threatened Saudi Arabia. This was a big shock. 
The sudden and unexpected invasion unsettled everything and the world 
and especially the Arab world and other countries in the region were 
placed in a very difficult position. The role of religion and culture was 
more complicated.
93 
Religion and culture was an antidote for the six Sheikhdoms which 
could only be used only against a country like Iran which was not Arab, 
followed Shia faith and had bitter and sweet memories of historical 
encounters with the Arabs. But this antidote could not be used against a 
country like Iraq which the sheikhs believed to be the leader and hero that 
had defended their Arabic and Islamic (Sunni) identity and which had 
received the biggest aid from the Sheikhdoms. Under the new 
circumstances the religion/culture antidote changed to position against 
them because all the propaganda by Baghdad of protecting the Arabs and 
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Sunni faith and benefited the Saddam's regime.
94
   
This was the first difficult experience of the Arab ethnicity which the 
Sheikhdoms had accepted both from religious and nationalistic 
standpoints. The experience was so bitter that raised several doubts about 
the authenticity of their ideology, to the extent that they said what really 
existed were countries which spoke Arabic and there was no other motive 
to unite them and define common interests for them. This meant that 
neither they needed Arab ethnicity nor were committed to that cause.
95
  
Such an opinion reached momentum in Kuwait. Interesting enough, 
more than other Sheikdoms had always resorted to its Arab ethnicity and 
had struggled toward that identity. But the Iraqi invasion had cast doubts 
in the other Sheikhdoms too.
96 
As we said before the modernization of Saudi religion and culture 
differed with the other Sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf. Religion was 
given further wait in Saudi Arabia, but in the other Sheikhdoms Arab 
nationalism mingled with a sort of Gulf or local nationalism prevailed, 
although both nationalism and religion prevailed in Saudi Arabia's foreign 
policy and religion also prevailed in other Sheikhdoms.  
This blow the Sheikhdoms suffered during the occupation of Kuwait 
was not merely a military threat. The invasion had challenged the 
Sheikhdoms' identify and defined policies. For example when Iraq 
attacked Iran it never placed Iran into a similar crisis. In the same way 
Iran's reaction and liberation of its occupation territories and the presence 
of Iranian troops in Iraq during the war did not expose Iraq with such 
crisis. But the Sheikdoms experienced the identity crisis.
97 
And the crisis was related to Iraq's propaganda and the pretexts they 
had found to attack Kuwait. Such reasoning in the non-Arab and non-
Muslims countries was not comprehensible, but it had many adherents in 
the Arab world which more than Iraqi citizens were backing Saddam 
Hussein. This meant that their religious and cultural modernization 
relating to their identity and foreign policy could not defend their interests 
at least in the Arab world. Although due to nearly different policies in 
Saudi Arabia and other Sheikhdoms, these two suffered from two different 
crises.
98 
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The Saudi regime succeeded to solve their problem by stressing on their 
official Wahhabi faith which had in fact found a nationalistic and Saudi 
form and served the interests of the Saudi regime. In the next chapters we 
will explain how the regime in Saudi Arabia created a sort of Saudi 
nationalism which covered all the Saudi citizens. This nationalism 
embodied their peculiar culture, pride, feelings and suspicions. These were 
features that covered even the opponents of the regime.
99 
With the help of this nationalism which comprised of being Saudi 
citizenship and to be proud of being Saudi national against those who were 
trying to plunder their wealth or envied them, the Saudis were very 
suspicious of others. The regime succeeded to preserve its stability. For 
such people a nationalistic picture of Wahhabi faith was acceptable and 
satisfactory. 
But in the meantime, this incident led to a big revolution in their Salafi 
and Wahhabi faiths and segregated these too from each other. This meant 
the birth and perfection of the ideology of anti-traditional and subversive 
theories which we will explain later on. 
During the months that Kuwait was under Iraqi occupation the other 
Sheikhdoms experienced a very difficult time, especially after the Gulf 
War. Many doubts were raised and some intellectuals and famous 
politicians commented about them, but practically there was no other 
policy to replace the former one. They couldn't escape from the fact that 
they were Arabs. They could look with suspicion to all Arabs and seek 
their security by seeking friendship with the West and the United States as 
their true allies. Nevertheless all the Arabs including the West considered 
them as Arabs.
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In addition, the factor which helped them to be present in the region and 
the world was their Arabic descent. Even if observers believe that a 
country like Kuwait is not an Arab state that country cannot adopt an 
active foreign policy because it lacks the minimum capacity as a sovereign 
state, but the sheikdom has the chance to better maneuver if it is 
considered as part of the Arab world.  
The only result of the blow was to make the Sheikhdoms more realistic 
and to some extent isolated. It did not make a big change in their model of 
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cultural modernization where it was related to their policy and identity, 
and their idea of reconsideration of policies years immediately after 
occupation gradually petered out. Once again these countries fell into the 
bosom of the Arab world. Those regimes, parties and individuals which 
had supported Saddam Hussein during the invasion of Kuwait apologized 
for Kuwait, and the Sheikhdoms followed their former culture and 
identity– a model which satisfied the citizens and helped them to transit 
from the 90's with an acceptable level of calmness.  
As far as it was related to their social stability a series of skirmished 
happened in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The problem in Bahrain was 
because of the pressure that the Sunni regime was applying to the Shia 
citizens, and this subject must be examined within the framework of 
historical protest of the Shia Muslims and the discriminating attitude of the 
ruling regime, and it has little to do with the subjects we are treading.  
But the case was different in Saudi Arabia. We see signs of religious 
discontent during the 90's in that country. The root of this discontent was 
in their Wahhabi faith which was the consequences of the 1990 war.  The 
dissidents protested to Saudi authorities for having given quarter to 
western forces and permitting them to remain in the country after the war 
ended. Above all their attitude for West and the United States had 
changed. According to the Saudi version of Wahhabi faith it was 
unprecedented for the Saudi people to criticize the West and the United 
States especially because the Institution of Ifta in Saudi Arabia and Ibn 
Baz, its influential head, did not have such opinion. The protest also meant 
that a gap had occurred in the religious unity of the Saudi citizens which 
had always prevailed.
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Almost, all the protestors were theologians who expressed their opinion 
in mosques during Friday prayer sermons, and this was unprecedented in 
the Saudi history. Of course the regime which, at that time, was in weak 
position at the time overlooked such protests, whereas in the past it reacted 
to such talk.
104 
The 90's ended in this manner in the Sheikhdoms. The most restless 
country during this decade among the Sheikhdoms was Saudi Arabia. The 
Saudi regime tried as they had done during the 80's to send abroad 
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dissident religious citizens, most of which were young and were fanatic 
Muslims. In other words the regime didn't prevent them from moving to 
countries such as Sudan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Caucasus and Central Asia, 
and indirectly encouraged the dissidents to leave the country. This exodus 
contributed greatly to the stability of the country.
105
  
A similar case happened in some other Sheikhdoms, although in a 
limited scale. There were volunteers in these Sheikhdoms who like the 
Saudi youth had gone to the above mentioned countries and some of them 
had become theoretical and operational leaders, but contrary to Saudi 
Arabia in the other Sheikhdoms did not indirectly facilitate such exit. 
Religious zeal and ardor had incited the dissidents and they voluntarily 
traveled to these countries to fight.
106
  
There was another point too. Due to internal and external reasons 
during the 90's the Saudi Arabia was cautious to move close to the West 
and the United States
107
. The presence of foreign troops in the country was 
creating problems. One reason that impelled the theologians to protest 
during this period was the presence of foreign troops. Besides the natural 
dignity and religious credit of that country which housed the holy shrines 
was in danger among the Muslims, and this made the regime more 
reserved and isolated. This led to misunderstanding and tension between 
the United Stated and Saudi Arabia which compelled the U.S. troops to 
leave the country in the end.
108
  
But the other Sheikhdoms were not cautious about this subject. 
Moreover, they remembered the bitter experience of occupation of Kuwait 
and there were almost no Arab observer who would censure their close tie 
with the United States and the West. The inhabitants, the intelligentsia and 
the leaders of the Sheikhdoms had understood that they needed western 
support and this impelled them to adopt a more open policy, because the 
Soviet Union had collapsed and there was no dangerous rivalry between 
superpowers.
109 
Of course, the Sheikhdoms opened their doors in economical and 
political fronts and they seldom were open in their culture and behavior. 
The strong ethnic identity along with Arab pride and glory in which Islam 
was the main ingredient and was a sort of return to Islam and Islamic 
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identity in the Arab and Islamic word prevented them from open their 
culture widely. But they fearlessly resorted to far open policy and far pro-
western policies. And they did the same thing with regard to their 
economy. They decided to try an open economy.
110 
Qatar and UAE were the two Sheikhdoms that had adopted such policy. 
After the present leader of Qatar deposed replaced him Qatar moved out of 
seclusion and entered the regional and international scenes ardently and 
boldly and built many institutions and facilities which was necessary to 
adopt such open policy starting with Aljazeera TV Network to the Qatar 
Airways. The United Arab Emirates too started to change its policy and 
converted itself as the most important commercial zone in the region. The 
conditions in Iran and Iraq and the various sanctions which had been 
imposed against them, and the endless thirst for Central Asian states and 
even Russia to buy western and Asian products, paved the way for the 
rapid growth of UAE. The UAE built necessary facilities to embark upon 
active trade as a big dealer between producers/exporters hand and 
consumers. But in these dealings too they were cautious in exchange of 
culture and behaved cautiously with the foreigners.
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The fact is that this general feature of the Sheikhdoms during the 90's 
i.e. cautious behavior and ethics played an important role in their social 
stability. One might say that this is the general feature of the Arab world, 
but observing ethics in these rich countries, which are undergoing big and 
rapid changes, was a far important matter.
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The 90's ended in this manner in the Sheikhdoms until the September 
11 incident. This incident surprised the world. Shortly after that the Arab 
world and specially Saudi Arabia and other Sheikhdoms were put under 
heaviest pressure. The pressure was increased after the defeat of Taliban 
and discovery of some secrets about the plans of Al-Qaeda. 
According to the Americans and the West, the political, social, cultural, 
religious and educational systems in these countries were blamed for 
giving birth to Al-Qaeda and of course they had many reasons to 
substantiate their argument. As a consequence the pressure for change on 
the Arab states for changed was increased and it confused the Arab 
regimes in the Sheikhdoms.
113
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During the 90's, the Sheikhdoms had voluntarily turned to West and 
owed their stability and security to Western support and did all within their 
power to approach the West, but suddenly they faced with severe and 
poisonous censure from the West. The bigger problem was that they had 
no convincing answer to such allegations and this made them weak and 
defensive.
114
   
Here, we mean the religious and cultural model which the Sheikhdoms 
had adopted two decades before the end of the twentieth century, and what 
reaction that model made after September 11 and what they achieved. 
In this connection like other critical moments, the Saudi regime quickly 
resorted to their Wahhabi ideology, but the Wahhabi religious network and 
Saudi inhabitants reacted so violently that, in many cases, the Saudi 
regime tried to control or deny such violent reaction.
115 
Perhaps it was the first time that the reaction of the Saudi inhabitants 
against foreign criticism and threat was far serious than the regime's 
reaction. It was because the Saud citizens believed that not only their 
regime but themselves, their identity and religion was being insulted, 
humiliated and blamed.  Such public discontent increased the reputation of 
Ben Laden and Al-Qaeda, and hatred of the United States reached its peak. 
This reaction was beyond the regime's expectation and the regime was 
compelled to control it. The religious organizations and figures and even 
officials in touch with the regime also reacted in the same manner.
116
  
The reason for such severe reaction against the West was not the sharp 
criticism of the West after September 11 catastrophe. Criticism against the 
United States and hostility towards West and complaint against the 
regime's close ties with the United States had begun in 90's. Without such 
background the reaction of the Saudi inhabitants would have not been so 
severe and harsh. The reaction to protect their religion and identity and 
Arabic and national pride consolidated the people and incited the religious 
institutions to back the regime. Such support strengthened the regime's 
religious position. Thanks to such strong support the regime succeeded to 
suppress the subversive figures in the country some of which had bombed 
several districts in Riyadh. Surely without such strong support the regime 
would face serious problems.
117 
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Before these blasts Al-Qaeda was very popular and influential among 
the people and those attached to religious institutions. Even Taliban 
partisans were popular and influential among the Saudi nationals during 
the 90's Saudi Arabia was one of the countries that offered monetary 
assistance because of the nature of their faith and ideology. And the Saudi 
regime could not resist their influence.
118 
No doubt, these organizations committed big mistakes by bombing 
residential quarters and the Saudi regime made maximum benefit from 
their abortive acts, but aside from this mistake a sort of closeness and 
harmony started between the Saudi regime, citizens and the religious 
community, which was the main reason behind the isolation of Al-Qaeda. 
Thus, the religious policy of the Saudi regime once more rescued them 
from a dangerous crisis. It also made the Wahhabi sect more stable and 
balanced and prevented the sect from turning to extremist measures to old 
tradition.
119 
Other Sheikhdoms too were facing similar problems. The pressure on 
them also was unbearable, but they had not the strength and capacity of the 
Saudi regime to solve their problems. The western pressure actually aimed 
to topple the regimes in the Sheikhdoms and free the inhabitants from their 
traditional culture and allow the inhabitants (men and women) to join the 
global community and adopt western culture, values, and standards. 
From that standpoint the pressure was not only against the regimes. The 
West had no problem with the regimes because it had protected western 
interests. The problem was that the regimes protected an ancient culture, 
value and tradition and they thought that they had to change the regimes 
because the regimes in the Sheikhdoms did not want to respect their 
culture and values.
120 
The regimes, the intellectuals, the educated class and the masses in the 
Sheikhdoms had understood this western attitude. Meanwhile the tone 
used by Washington and the West was so harsh that the inhabitants of the 
Sheikhdoms felt their identity, religion, tradition, and national and Arab 
pride was being ridiculed, and they could not suffer such insult. 
All these things impelled the Sheikhdoms to react but their reaction was 
milder as compared to Saudi Arabia because Saudi Arabian citizens were 
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more proud and sensitive to such criticism. As a result the little 
Sheikhdoms had to bear the brunt of the attack and for this reason they 
lessened their support of Al-Qaeda. 
Such public reaction against the West contributed to their social 
solidarity and impelled them to back their regimes. Of course, the regimes 
tried to make a series of reforms without changing their cultural model and 
offered more freedom to women, and since the reform adapted to their 
culture they succeeded in that field. Thus the liberal model succeeded to 
rescue the Sheikhdoms from a dangerous whirlpool. 
121 
The next important incident was the second war between the United 
States and Iraq. This war started under circumstances completely different 
as compared to the first war. Moreover, the consequences of September 11 
blasts had made the six Sheikhdoms so firm that the war did not cause 
much problem for them.  
Interesting enough, for various reasons, protest against the war in 
industrialized countries was not less vehement than in Arab countries and 
the six Sheikhdoms. What was important that the war ended the in peace 
and little reaction. That which mattered was the consequences of the war 
and not the war itself. 
122 
That which provoked Washington to war with Saddam Hussein contrary 
to widespread opposition in the world was that with the fall of Saddam a 
new page would turn in the history of the Middle East and after the 
collapse of the regime they could build a regime in Iraq which would adapt 
their model and standards. After that the new state would serve a model 
for the Middle East to become democratic and pro-Western, free from 
fanatic religious tendencies and fundamentalism and all the factors that 
had Al-Qaeda's ideology.  
The U.S. started the war with this intention and naturally after the 
victory Washington was trying to enforce its goals. Therefore, they started 
to pressure the Arab states and the six Sheikhdoms once again for reform. 
They wanted to rebuild these countries in every field and demanded the 
regimes to introduce a series of quick reforms according to their 
recommendations. Naturally the Arab regimes resisted such demands.
123 
The biggest resistance against the West came from Egypt and Saudi 
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Arabia. Saudi Arabia was actually resisting on its behalf and on behalf of 
the other Sheikhdoms. Despite such resistance, the Saudi regime made a 
series of reforms. Many meetings were held and various groups were 
invited to these meetings under the instruction of King Abdullah. Many 
subjects were discussed in these meetings and a series of privileges were 
granted to Shia and Zeidi minorities.
124
  
Such innovative measures were taken in Saudi Arabia and not in other 
Sheikhdoms because with the exception of Bahrain the others Sheikhdoms 
did not suffer the problems which the Saudi regime was suffering. 
Although the government in Bahrain was clannish and traditional, it was 
acceptable to the citizens and the dissident groups were not as large as in 
Saudi Arabia.  
Of course, conditions were different in Bahrain. The majority of the 
citizens were Shia Muslims, who, from the very begging, had been 
oppressed and discriminated by the Sunni rulers. The regime knew that 
any freedom allowed to the Shia community would disturb the balance in 
the country and they would loose their power of controlling the dissidents. 
They therefore, continued their iron-fist rule and such a treatment of the 
Shia sect was ignored by the United States perhaps by Saudi pressure.
125
  
The fact is that the innovative steps taken by Saudi regime pacified the 
United States and the West. It gave the Saudi inhabitants more vigor and 
more hope to dissidents and a series of reforms were made, of course 
within the framework of people's capacity and proportional to the demands 
of the dissidents who were living in a framework of traditional and 
reserved community.
126
  
And this is an important point. The demands of dissident groups and 
individuals both in Saudi Arabia and other Sheikhdoms are deeply 
influenced by their communities and their native culture. These demands, 
in its radical form, are completely different compared to the demands of 
dissidents in other third world countries and even Arab states. These 
demands are the most important factors for stability of these countries. 
Therefore the reforms in Saudi Arabia did not disturb their social stability 
and balance. Even one can say that the reform made King Abdullah more 
popular and the people thought he was the best man to make the 
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reforms.
127 
Alongside these actions and reactions other incidents happened which 
was related to the U.S. war in Iraq. As we said the Sheikdoms had no 
definite position for the war and even the Arab world had such a neutral 
position. But after the fall of the Baath regime in Baghdad both the people 
and government reacted to the change. 
According to the Arabs, Iraq had been occupied. The things that the 
U.S. said confirmed such an image and the hatred of Arabs against U.S. 
behavior which had started after September 11 spread everywhere. Under 
such circumstances Al-Qaeda and its ideology was greatly favored, and the 
atmosphere of ill feeling, after occupation of Afghanistan, by the Soviet 
Union in the 80's was rekindled with one difference. Now there was an 
extremist organization like Al-Qaeda which resorted to subversive deeds 
and tried to return to traditional Islam and the supporters of the 
organization chanted their slogans in domestic and satellite TV channels or 
recorded in the Internet.
128
  
Iraq was a new scene to combat with those so-called modern crusaders. 
This feeling was common to the Arabs from Mauritania and Morocco and 
the shores of Sea of Oman, and many young Arab hotheads hurried to Iraq 
and participated in different types of destructive and subversive 
operations. In the beginning they were fighting the U.S. troops and the 
U.S. allies, but soon the war spread among the civilians and against the 
Shia. Al-Qaeda's pretext was that the domestic war would lead to 
insecurity and prevent the Americans to achieve their end.
129 
But this was part of the scenario. Part of the excitement of the war had 
spread into Iraq, but a great part of the flame had spread into the Arab and 
Islamic world and even outside the Arab world and had incited them to stet 
up guerrilla organizations. These guerrilla organizations were either Al-
Qaeda branches or pursued by al-Qaeda ideology which consisting of 
bombing or suicide operations. This led to the formation of various camps 
in the modern world which had a big role in subsequent operations.
130 
Such ideology boiled the blood of volunteers in Saudi Arabia and the 
Sheikhdoms. Although the Saudi regime and its religious organizations  
and even official organizations favored the ideology and operation they 
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did not want them to go so far that would make them fight with the regime 
itself, because their idea was such that would allow them to reverse their 
stance and attack the Saudi regime. They therefore, tried to calm the 
atmosphere and send the extremist partisans to Iraq.
131 
In between, there were the rich people and scholars who, fearlessly, 
helped such extremist organizations and fed the Al-Qaeda operatives and 
all other subversive partisans in Iraq. There were other clerics who 
provoked and encouraged the Sunni youth to fight the Shia Muslims and 
Shia institutions, but the Saudi regime did not react to such operation. 
Such ideas were sponsored in other Sheikhdoms also but on a lesser 
scale.
132 
Such was the general public in the Arab world and among the 
Sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf region. The Sheikhdoms favored such 
operation but did not express their joy openly. For various reasons they did 
not want the U.S. to form a new government in Iraq and did not officially 
recognize the new regime under the pretext that their citizens and press 
objected to such system.
133 
Here, we are talking about the six Sheikhdoms. The Sheikhdoms did 
not like to see a popular regime and parliament elected by the people in 
Iraq. It was not because the idea would stretch to the Sheikhdoms. It was 
because of the Shia Majority in Iraq.  They feared that the Shia majority 
would seize power in Iraq. It was the first time in the history of Iraq that 
the Shia Muslims were seizing power and such a government would upset 
the religious/political balance in the region. Moreover, they were afraid 
that the Shia government in Iraq would embolden Shia Muslims in Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain to rise against their governments.
134
    
Another problem was expansion of Iranian influence in Iraq. They 
thought that once the Shia majority seized power in Iraq it would increase 
Iran's influence and the consequences would be dangerous. According to 
the Sheikhdoms, it will remain stable only if there would be a balance of 
power between Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. And a disturbance that balance 
would make the region insecure and the unrest would spread to all 
Sheikhdoms. Moreover, they were afraid that under Iran's leadership the 
Shia Muslims would wholly change the scales in the region.
135 
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Of course, there was a latent reason which neither the Sheikhdoms nor 
other Arabs would speak about it. Deep in their hearts, the Arabs and even 
those allied to the United States did not want Washington to achieve 
victory in Iraq because first of all the defeat would lessen U.S. pressure on 
Arab regimes for reform and secondly would discourage Washington and 
the U.S. would loose hope of making changes in the Middle East.
136 
As mentioned before immediately after the victory of Islamic revolution 
the Saudi regime began criticizing the Shia faith for various reasons. They 
maintained that the Shia sect was unrelated to Islam and was in fact the 
enemy of Islam, and they continued such propaganda during the 80's and 
90's. They were only launching propaganda against the Shia Muslims and 
were trying to defame and isolate Iran, and if they censured other Shia 
Muslims it was because they thought they were affiliated to Iran.
137
  
Besides Iran and Saudi Arabia had other rivals some of which were 
dangerous including Iraq, although it was an Arab country and had a Sunni 
government during Saddam's time.  But in their new ethnic ideology it was 
their hostile position against the Shia sect that matter - whether they seized 
power in Iraq or emerged as a big majority, or political parties or 
figures.
138 
Such a hostile policy against the Shia reflected the social, religious and 
historical facts in Saudi Arabia. Their policy had not been formed in a 
vacuum and had its reasons. The political and non-political developments 
in the recent years especially after the fall of Saddam had made the Saudis 
more hostile. Of course the Saudi religious branch was more active and the 
Sunni clerics and religious organizations were adding fire to the flame.
139
 
Although the new policy annoyed and further isolated the big Shia 
minority in Saudi Arabia, it was favored by the people and especially by 
the orthodox people and such a support contributed to the stability of the 
regime to the extent that the regime's expression of inclination towards 
Iran and the Shia Muslims was interpreted by the people and Saudi clerics 
as a sort of political tactic and that deep in their hearts, the Saudi 
authorities were hostile against all Shia Muslims and Iran.
141 
Despite the U.S. pressure on Riyadh to maintain active diplomatic tie 
with Baghdad as an important neighbor the policy of Saudi Arabia for Iraq 
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was influenced by its sectarian policy. For a regime like Saudi Arabia 
which owned its security to the United States after Second World War 
occupation of Iraq by the U.S. was not a case to worry about. In fact, Saudi 
Arabia was satisfied with the occupation because Iraq would pose no 
danger to them.
141 
Therefore, the reason for reluctance of Riyadh to have formal 
diplomatic ties with Iraq was not because of the reasons mentioned above, 
especially after the fall of Saddam when Riyadh had established close ties 
with Sunni institutes, groups and personalities in Iraq and granted much 
money to them, although during Saddam's rule and during the first and 
second war with the U.S. Baghdad had severely criticized the Sunni Iraqis 
for being traitors to the Islamic and Arab nation.  
The real reason for their reluctance was because of their sectarian 
policies which they had intensified and was the determined factor in their 
regional policy upon which they had based their policies including taking a 
position towards Bahrain, towards military intervention therein and their 
hostile stance against Syria.
 
Now let's see what was the position of the other Sheikhdoms about the 
fall of Saddam Hussein? As a whole the Sheikhdoms had not united 
position for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Kuwait wholeheartedly supported 
Washington and was ready to offer all sorts of assistance to Washington 
and its allies. But the other Sheikhdoms were worried about the 
consequences of the war although when the war started the sheikhs 
secretly offered military assistance to the U.S. troops.
 
Contrary to Kuwait neither the people nor the regimes in the other 
Sheikhdoms welcomed the fall of Saddam Hussein. The influence of 
Arabism in recent decades and the humiliating method of treatment of 
Saddam Hussein by Washington and Saddam's supporters had insulted 
their Arab pride like other Arab states, although they were cautious 
enough not to betray their ill feeling and criticize Washington.
 
Kuwait welcomed the new conditions, the constitution and the elections 
in Iraq, but the other Sheikhdoms looked at such development with 
suspicion. Even Qatar which had adopted open politics (which pleased 
Washington) was averse to the changes in Iraq. In fact the reaction of the 
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Sheikhdoms resembled that of Saudi Arabia. The only difference was that 
Riyadh was looking at the matter from religious and strategic points of 
view but the other Sheikhdoms were looking at the matter from sectarian 
and strategic position. 
All the Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan were worried like Saudi 
Arabia. These countries were all worried from the same reason and since 
they did not possess Saudi Arabia's wealth they were even more worried. 
They were afraid that Saudi Arabia or the other Sheikhdoms would not be 
able to help them and were looking for a solution for their anxiety. 
Their biggest headache was Iran and they think that Iran has an 
expansionist policy. Among them Bahrain was an exception; its policy was 
affected by social, religious, and historical division. Qatar was trying to 
improve its ties with Iran despite the fact that Saudi Arabia and other 
Sheikhdoms did not approve such overtures. Oman had historical and 
intimate ties with Tehran and had no problem with its Shia minority. The 
country's small Shia population had always intimate ties with the regime 
and Oman tried to operate as a medium between Tehran and the six 
Sheikhdoms. The UAE too was trying to exercise a more practical foreign 
policy in keeping with modern requirements. 
But despite difference of attitude towards Iran, the Sheikhdoms had 
common points as well. All the Sheikhdoms except Kuwait and to some 
extent Bahrain like other Arabs hated U.S. occupation of Iraq and looked 
at Washington as aggressor and believed that the government installed in 
Baghdad after elections was unlawful and they supported the subversive 
operation of Al-Qaeda and other subversive organizations in Iraq and even 
offered financial aid to some of these organizations.
 
The policy of the Arab governments for the new conditions in Iraq 
reflected their culture and Arab identity that was hostile.  
Such an attitude continued until a series of subversive steps were taken 
by Al-Qaeda in Qatar and Oman. This was a warning sign for the 
Sheikhdoms because they were too weak to cope with such threats if it was 
continued on a larger scale. As a result both the people and the press in the 
six Sheikhdoms immediately withdrew their support from al- Qaeda, but 
their anxiety continued as before.
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Of course, the consequence of such decision was more perilous in the 
small Sheikhdoms than in Saudi Arabia. There was Shia minority in all 
these Sheikhdoms and there was a Shia majority in Bahrain. Therefore, 
they could not insist on their sectarian policy because such a policy was 
likely to destabilize them.
 
Although such sectarian policy in the Sheikhdoms satisfied the Sunni 
majority and encouraged them to back their regimes, it annoyed the big 
and small Shia minorities. In fact, the minorities existed and were part of 
the people in these countries and the Shia Muslims in Bahrain held the 
majority. Probably, it was the first time that their cultural and Arab 
sectarian model was undermining their stability and dividing their 
inhabitants. 
The problem of division of faiths exists and has been aggravated during 
the Arab Spring. The problem is related to their model of government and 
not to side issues. Each sheikhdom is trying to solve the problem one way 
or other. Probably Kuwait has been the most successful among the 
Sheikhdoms because of its system of government and the fact that Kuwait 
possesses a big Shia minority. But the final solution for such social 
division depends on a change in the above mentioned model and the things 
which will happen during the ongoing Arab Spring.
 
Besides these problems, other problems were surfacing in the 
international and regional level which worried the Sheikhdoms. The 
impact of presence of the United States and its allies in Iraq was beyond 
their expectation and they had understood that they could not change the 
conditions in Baghdad in keeping with their models and standards. 
Although, George Bush was reelected in 2004 he had changed his 
policy to Iraq and the Arab world. During the contemporary history of the 
United States President Bush was in unpopular stream and the Arabs 
treated him as their enemy.  Besides domestic and foreign reasons and the 
change of U.S. policy had other ends in view. Washington had decided to 
display a positive image of its presence in the region especially to the 
people in the Middle East. 
This called for a milder attitude towards the Arab regimes. Saudi 
Arabia and the other Sheikdoms were now relieved, but Washington did 
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not forget its drive for reform. Now they pushed their reform plan in the 
form of sympathy and moderation and did not apply too much pressure to 
Arabs to expedite the reforms.
 
The anxiety of the former years had subsided. On the other hand by 
resorting to a series of terrorist operations in Europe and Muslim countries 
Al-Qaeda had lost its former prestige to some extent among the people. 
The steps taken by Saudi Arabia and its religious propaganda against Al-
Qaeda contributed to this lack of support. In different TV programs the 
Saudi clerics said that the steps taken by Al-Qaeda were against Islamic 
teachings and Wahhabi principles and their tactics proved very successful.
 
In between, conditions were ripe for Iran to become more active in the 
region. Iran had emerged as the most influential country in the region. 
According to the Arab regimes and the Sheikhdoms Iran was considered as 
a danger. These things happened during the second part of the first decade 
of the 21
st
 century. At that time, many Arabs did not consider Iran as a 
threat but their regimes and the Wahhabi religious organizations and Salafi 
faith were launching anti-Iranian propaganda.
 
Meanwhile, during these years the United State, Israel and several 
European powers were continually threatening Tehran and it was natural 
for Tehran to react to such threats and adopt a far stronger defense policy. 
The military buildup in Iran was annoying and frightening the countries in 
the region, but they were unable to do anything important against Iran. 
Iran was resisting foreign pressure by all means and nuclear technology 
was at the top of its programs 
The balance of power in the region which had always been fragile was 
changing. According to the Arabs, Iran was playing the leading role to 
destabilize the region. But Iran's role was not only political or military. 
The Arabs felt that Tehran was seeking to expand the Shia faith which 
could pave the way for political expansion. As a result they gradually 
began to resist against Iran's expansionist attitude with religious means but 
often with political ends in mind.
 
This meant that the question of Shia-Sunni had been changed from 
religious dispute and had become political dispute and rivalry. It was 
under such tense atmosphere that Hezbollah began its 33-day war against 
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Israel. In fact Hezbollah had started the war and such boldness by a militia 
group surprised and angered many observers. 
Saudi Arabia openly and sharply criticized Hezbollah. The Saudi 
regime believed it was a childish adventure and was frightened of the 
consequences of the war. Nearly all the other Arab regimes showed a 
similar reaction although the Sheikhdoms showed a far milder stance.
 
No one believed that Hezbollah could resist Israeli retaliation and 
emerge victorious, but they emerged victorious. Many TV stations 
including Aljazeera gave full coverage to the 33-day Hezbollah resistance 
which had surprised all observers. In all the former encounters between the 
Arabs and Israel including the four previous wars and side skirmishes it 
was Tel Aviv that had emerged as absolute winner, but the 33-day war was 
quite different. 
The tough resistance and victory had many religious consequences. The 
Arab world and specially the Arab youth celebrated the victory and 
Hezbollah enjoyed its peak of popularity. The Hezbollah was a Shia 
military organization and was allied to Tehran and had received inspiration 
from the Islamic Revolution and such a victory was unbearable to 
Wahhabi and Salafi faiths and the whole Arab regimes. The 33-day war 
added fuel to the religious and political rivalry between the Sunni and Shia 
camps and made things more complicated. 
As to religious rivalry Saudi authorities were the main players and they 
had a stronger role in political rivalry. The religious and political rivalry 
had affected the Arab world and the Persian Gulf littoral states especially 
their media. The main figures were the religious scholars, students, 
religious institutions, political elites, and the intelligentsia. Then the 
rivalry spread to the youth and the masses.
 
Such an ebb and flow deepened the gap between the rival sectarian 
camps in the Arab world and especially in the six Sheikhdoms – something 
which had started a long time ago. The tone of the press and media 
changed according to the conditions of the time. Such a propaganda 
gradually gathered force until the eruption of the Arab Spring when the 
crisis in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and even Syria was analyzed within Arab 
ethnic framework. 
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The religious and cultural model of Saudi Arabia was capable to 
stabilize the Sheikhdoms before the eruption of unrest that throughout the 
Arab world. Of course these two changed drastically, but the attitude 
remained as it was.
 
The biggest headache for the Sheikhdoms is that the demand of the Shia 
population in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is similar to the demand in other 
Arab countries. The movement for freedom and justice which has started 
throughout the Arab world continues in the Sheikhdoms like former years. 
This is not a case protest. It is a widespread and Arabic protest within the 
Arab world and the protestors are part of that Arab world. They are 
protesting with the same ideology and goals and often with the same 
methods. Therefore, blaming the dissidents like before is neither 
understandable nor possible, although the regimes are launching such 
propaganda.
 
Although after fall of Saddam Hussein and the seizing of power by the 
Shia majority in Iraq, there were people who used to say that real Muslim 
were Sunni Arabs and the Shia Arabs are not true Arabs and have Iranian 
root, such  claims conflicted with historical realities. The Shia Arabs in 
Iraq are the most genuine Arabs who emerged in the heart of Saudi Arabia 
and migrated to Iraq at the beginning of Islam and during subsequent 
centuries. 
Despite so many supporters of such idea who contributed to the existing 
Saudi ethnic ideology they have always insisted on their mistaken and 
invalid views and whenever their Shia populated regions have revolted 
they have threatened to expel them to Iraq. 
As we mentioned before after the Arab spring and unrest in some Shia-
populated regions the religious and Arabic ethnic model of the six 
Sheikhdoms is facing a big challenge. Now, the Sheikhdoms have the 
wealth, capability and propaganda machine to control the unrest, but it is 
very unlikely for them to control the situation in the future in the same 
way that they controlled in the past.  
Of course, one cannot ignore the fact that contrary to Tunis, Egypt and 
Libya the unrest in these Sheikhdoms cannot stretch to other regions. As a 
result, although, the Shia protest will disrupt the social solidarity in these 
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countries, it will encourage the Sunni population to give more support to 
their regimes. Instead, the regimes are trying to offer more privileges to 
the Shia inhabitants and are shaping their social, economical, military and 
security policies in a manner that might impel the inhabitants to rely on 
their Sunni allies.
 
5 
From Conservatism to Extremism: 
Wahhabism and Saudi Foreign Policy 
Many factors contributed to the creation and finalization of different 
Islamic-revolutionary ideologies. Starting from international and political 
factors up to social, economical and industrial growth, educational and 
youth issues, to individual liberties, human dignity, despotism, tyranny 
and corrupt regimes that were supported by the great powers.
1
 
These factors as well as matters related to culture, civilization and 
identity and humiliation and threat of other cultures by foreign 
intervention, occupation, propaganda of the glory of ancient Arab 
civilization and the inglorious contemporary history of the Arabs have all 
contributed to the birth of such ideologies. But we must not forget the 
influence of religion and religious concept in this regard.
2 
Subversive and devastating ideology has been born from Salafi and 
Hanbali faiths which are instinctively very conservative. During the 
contemporary history the Wahhabi ideology has been the true 
representative of Salafi and Hanbali doctrines, although in modern times 
all Salafi and Hanbali followers have not been Wahhabi Muslims. 
However, as is explained below more than other faiths the Wahhabi faith 
represents Salafi and Hanbali doctrines.
3 
In addition, the Wahhabi faith became the ideology of the regime in 
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Saudi Arabia from the moment it was established. Therefore, one cannot 
study the developments in that faith without taking into account Saudi 
domestic and foreign policies. In fact due to this reason and many other 
reasons we must understand the political developments in Saudi Arabia to 
better understand why this ideology was born.
4
  
Considering the above points perhaps in order to better understand the 
method of creation and growth of subversive ideology we must examine 
the subject within the framework of Wahhabi faith and its interaction with 
the Saudi regime.
5 
Here, we do not want to evaluate the meaning and features of Wahhabi 
doctrine from a theological point of view. Wahhabi faith is the 
continuation of a tendency that existed in the history of Islam. The 
problem with this faith is that its followers have had a hard understanding 
of Islam and they chose for the literal meanings of the holy texts. In many 
cases, as the Hanbali Muslims have tried to carefully and completely 
follow the religious teachings and instructions, it made them acknowledge 
the religion with caution and hardness. The natural result of these premises 
was non-provability of the intellect and even suspension of reason. Even 
when the Qur'an insists on the provability of reason and ask to apply it, the 
Hanbali scholars misinterpret all these verses to justify their inclination.
6
 
Such attitude made the Hanbalis exceedingly cautious in their beliefs 
and behavior because they were afraid lest they would fail to discharge 
their religious duties correctly. In fact we can see the same behavior in 
other religions when we know that jurisprudence has many 
commandments and there are enough religious books to substantiate 
them.
7 
Ibn Hanbal who laid the foundation of the Hanbali faith is a strong 
adherent of Salafi tenets. He was likewise very cautious in the 
enforcement of religious instructions. He was a God-fearing hermit, 
cautious and an anchorite. Many Hanbali scholars were like this; they nd 
were very cautious and recluse. But there was another fact. Their 
commitment to religious edicts impelled some of them to react to anything 
which was thought to be a heresy (bid‛ah) and contrary to Islamic code 
(shari‛ah), and this attitude provoked them to take violent steps and 
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harshly punish the sinners or nonconformists. Of course in such cases 
politics was the main mechanism and they served the politicians 
knowingly and unknowingly.
8
   
Another point for consideration is that the energy accumulated from 
religious zeal made them ready to blindly accept every risk. Practically, 
they could not distinguish right from wrong and would be easily employed 
by malicious politicians for evil purposes. When an authority proved them 
that he was committed to Hanbali and Salafi codes (even on the surface) 
the people blindly obeyed and served him. This is something which has 
always happened in the course of history and still continues. The only 
thing the malicious leader needed was to know how to incite the feeling of 
religious leaders. After that they blindly obeyed his commands.
9 
The same is true with all Salafi, Hanbali and Wahhabi faiths. In their 
definition of Islam, reason and logic cannot help them comprehend the 
religion but is a preventive factor even. In the same way, they give no 
weight to spirituality and mystic understanding of the religion. According 
to the Hanbali faith, religion is reduced to a series of rigid and dry codes 
which one must accept and enforce without consulting reason. Of course, 
such system of teaching religious codes impairs one's faculty of 
understanding and changes his mentality, and often the convert becomes 
fanatic and unbearable, although sometimes the rigid commandments 
make the believer cautious, ascetic and isolated.
10 
As to which of these features is the dominating factor to depend upon 
social conditions or better to say fear of religious threat. Fanaticism, 
violence, cautiousness and seclusion occur together. These conditions are 
imposed from outside and makes the believer to either incline to 
fanaticism or seclusion.
11
 
For the first time in history, Wahhabism was preached by Mohammad 
ibn Abdul Wahhab in Najd region. Abdul Wahhab angered the theologians 
of the region, including his father and brother. These clerics protested to 
his teachings and wrote articles in this regard. Such reaction continued 
until Abdul Wahhab met Bin Saud, the emir of Dariya, and invited him to 
his faith. Bin Saud accepted Abdul Wahhab's teachings and the two 
concluded an agreement to the effect that the emir should propagate the 
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Wahhabi faith and Abdul Wahhab should support the emir under all 
circumstances. In this manner, Wahhabi faith became the official faith of 
the Bin Saud, the emir of Dariya.
12
  
But the question was far important than official acceptance of Wahhabi 
faith in a small region like Najd. The question was that those who did not 
follow the new faith and did not believe or act according to Wahhabi 
teachings were considered infidels; therefore, the Wahhabi converts had to 
fight with them. The Wahhabis had the right to fight the heathens, kill 
them, confiscate their property and enslave their women and children. This 
was the main tool that helped Bin Saud and his new faith to spread.
13
  
Najd was an arid waste. The entire Saudi Arabia is arid but Najd has the 
worst climate and is far dry than Hijaz Province which houses the holy 
shrines. Moreover, the two holy shrines brought much wealth and blessing 
to its people. Meanwhile the inhabitants of Hijaz were always in touch 
with other people in Saudi Peninsula for the sake of Hajj pilgrimage.
14
  
But Najd was not so prosperous. The people in Najd were hungry, 
rough, barbarians, and uncivilized. Endless skirmishes between clans in 
that region had destroyed their security. The inhabitants of Najd were 
living in unbearable conditions and knew that the people in other regions 
(especially in Hijaz) were leading a comfortable life. This encouraged 
them to attack their wealthy neighbors, but their conquest was temporary 
and brief because they had not enough fighters to control the conquered 
regions.
15
  
Wahhabi ideology was introduced under such circumstances. The rigid 
and dull teachings suited the mentality of rough Bedouin tribesman and 
served as an ideology to them to strike war with others, even if Muslims. 
Under the pretext of imposing Wahhabi tenets they plundered the property 
of their enemies, enslaved their women and children and committed all 
sorts of atrocities.
16
  
This was the real reason for the success of the Wahhabi faith in the 
beginning. The new ideology helped the Najd clans to unite under Bin 
Saud and the fanatic, cruel and hungry fighters attacked the rich 
neighboring regions under the pretext that they did not follow the true 
Islamic canons and were heathens. They said it was their duty to convey 
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the message of monotheism and to embark upon a ceaseless war against 
the nonconformists.
17
  
Such attacks which were carried out in the most violent manner and it 
enriched the Najd citizens and encouraged them to continue their 
devastative wars to accumulate wealth they attacked all the neighboring 
regions and even caravans of Hajj pilgrims. These regions were dominated 
by the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman Sultan was compelled to interfere 
when they complained to him
18
. He ordered Mohammad Ali Pasha, the 
governor of Egypt, to put an end to the revolt. Mohammad Ali Pasha sent 
Ismail Pasha, his son, to Arabian Peninsula. The Wahhabi converts were 
beaten and routed and Bin Saud was arrested, sent to Istanbul and was 
executed.
19 
The Wahhabi revolt was curbed in this manner and the Wahhabi 
converts remained silent and scattered for a century because they had no 
incentive (or an efficient leader) to resurrect. The defeat was so severe that 
for a long time no Wahhabi convert dared to speak about the new faith.
20
  
In the beginning of the twentieth century, Abd al-Aziz, a descendent of 
Bin Saud clan decided to return to Najd and avenge his father's blood from 
the neighboring tribes. Bin Saud, who was born in Kuwait, returned to 
Najd and discovered that the best way to assemble a well organized army 
was to resurrect the Wahhabi faith. In this way, Abd al-Aziz became an 
advocate and patron of Wahhabi tenets. He gathered the Wahhabi scholars 
and built an army.
21
  
This time Wahhabi faith had a different mission in mind. Abd al-Aziz's 
goal was to conquer Najd and no other region. Hijaz was affiliated to the 
Ottoman Empire and Sharif Hossein was governing that province on 
behalf of the sultan of the Empire. The wealthy regions around Najd which 
had been attacked during the first Wahhabi uprising was now under the 
British influence and London was not indifferent to the developments in 
the region.
22
  
Abd al-Aziz who was born in Kuwait was familiar with the British 
mentality and knew that they would not tolerate his attacks. As a 
consequence Wahhabi faith remained limited to Najd region, but a series 
of incidents happened which helped him to make a better maneuver.
23 
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At the beginning of the First World War the United Kingdom provoked 
the Arabs in the Ottoman dominions to separate themselves from Ottoman 
rule, but since the majority of the Arabs in the region were Muslims the 
provocation did not prove as successful as the regions east of Ottoman 
Empire. The solution was to provoke them to set up an Arabic empire and 
the best candidate for that post was Sharif Hossein, the governor of Mecca 
and Medina. They incited him to separate himself from the Ottoman 
Empire, declare independence and incite other regions under Ottoman rule 
to join the Arab empire. Instead they promised to make him the emperor of 
that empire.
24
  
This policy proved successful and Sharif Hossein incited a big revolt in 
all these regions. He hoped to set up an Arab empire at the end of the war 
and help Arabs enjoy their former glory and pride. But at the end of the 
World War I these dominions were colonized by the British and French 
imperialists.
25 
The British and French could not colonize the Arabian Peninsula and 
the holy shrines which were governed by Sharif Hossein. These were two 
sacred towns of Islam and the British officials, who knew the region well, 
did not want to colonize the region or to offer it to the French. They were 
compelled to eliminate Sharif Hossein who was dreaming about an Arab 
empire.
26 
The best way to sack Sharif Hossein was to provoke Abd al-Aziz to 
attack and conquer Mecca and Medina and they gave him necessary arms. 
Abd al-Aziz, who always wanted to conquer the holy towns, welcomed the 
British suggestion. His army and supporters too were eager to capture 
these towns. The ideal goal was to conquer the two holy towns. By 
conquering the holy towns they could better propagate their faith and the 
capture of these towns would give them the highest dignity in the Islamic 
world.
27 
After a series of skirmishes and partisan operations the Wahhabi 
converts conquered Mecca and Medina. Sharif Hossein was compelled to 
leave the Arabian Peninsula. He was exiled to Cypress and died in that 
island. Of course the people resisted Abd al-Aziz's advance and attacks 
and much debate was held between non-Wahhabi clerics and Wahhabi 
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clerics. The subject of these debates, however, is out of the scope of this 
treatise.
28
   
After the conquest of the holy towns, Abd al-Aziz stretched the 
frontiers of Saudi Arabia to the present borders. He did not expand the 
country farther. He only wanted to govern the newly born country - an arid 
and barren land with feudal clans which were rivals and enemies. In the 
meantime the country was housing sacred Mecca and Medina which were 
respected and loved by all Muslims and every year hundreds of thousands 
pilgrims flocked to these towns. Abd al-Aziz was supposed to ensure the 
safety and welfare of these pilgrims who were gradually increasing, and 
this was beyond the power of the Saudi Arabia at that time. 
29 
Although earlier Abd al-Aziz had battled with many tribes and had slain 
many influential figures and tribal chiefs he now stopped his incursions 
and tried to govern the vast, hungry and poor country in an efficient 
manner. His first step was to declare ceasefire with his neighbors and 
recognize their independence and their borders. After that he planned to 
build necessary structures for management of the country.
30
  
In the beginning, he faced with tough resistance. Some of his 
supporters, who were pure Wahhabi converts, wanted to spread the canons 
of the original Wahhabi faith, founded by Bin Abdul Wahhab, and they 
didn't recognize any border. Moreover, they could not tolerate the Shia 
minority in the new Saudi Arabia. They believed that either the Shia 
Muslims must convert to Wahhabi faith or be expelled from the country. 
Moreover, they opposed the modern steps which Abd al-Aziz wanted to 
take in order to govern the country. They maintained that modern 
inventions such as telegraph, cars and taxation were unlawful according to 
Wahhabi codes because such things did not exist during the Prophet's 
time.
31
  
At first, Abd al-Aziz tried to calm them with the help of clerics who 
sympathized with him. Much debate was held and both sides had their own 
arguments. The dialogue convinced some fanatic Wahhabi converts and 
clerics to stop opposing Abd al-Aziz, but deep in their hearts they did not 
approve such innovations. Another group continued to oppose Abd al-
Aziz. At last Abd al-Aziz fought with his opponents. He slew many of 
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them, cut their noses and ears and suppressed the revolt.
32 
What is notable here is the change of Wahhabi attitude. After final 
victory Abd al-Aziz felt that he could not govern the country on the basis 
of severe and rigid teachings of Bin Abdul Wahhab and was compelled to 
soften some of the codes. Although the moderation was very cautious and 
he took every precaution and thus, this ideology now in use and the pure 
original Wahhabi teachings differed with each other. He gave the Wahhabi 
faith the same role which Lenin had played for the Marxists. He was in 
fact, the Lenin of the Wahhabi sect.
33
  
After the amendments only Abd al-Aziz's version of Wahhabi faith was 
exercised in Saudi Arabia and Bin Abdul Wahhab's version was forgotten. 
Thus, the Wahhabi faith became the official faith of the regime and 
inhabitants of Saudi Arabia. In other words, the governing faith had 
understood the need for change and was prepared to moderate itself to 
serve as a practical ideology for a big country like Saudi Arabia.
34
  
Of course, one must not deny that the Saudi population is inherently 
introverted reserved. Its regime is also reserved and has limited 
expectations. The new version of Wahhabism did not make things difficult 
for the government and the nation; and they lived in harmony and they still 
do the same thing.
35
  
The original Wahhabism maintained that those outside this faith were 
enemies and had to be combated, even if they were Muslims. But the new 
Saudi Wahhabi version tolerated other faiths although believed that some 
of their codes or rites were non-Islamic. The principle of old Wahhabism 
was infidelity (shirk), but for the new one, it was heresy (bid‛ah). The old 
faith maintained that use of new tools and methods in the modern 
civilization was unlawful, but after some alterations the new ideology 
tolerated and accepted all of these things with adjustment.
36
 
The formation of Saudi Arabia owes to this new version of Wahhabism. 
We will explain later how this faith underwent a series of changes to suit 
the requirements of the age and politics but we must remember that the 
changes were dictated by Abd al-Aziz.
37
  
Abd al-Aziz who knew his people well and was an intelligent and 
competent man succeeded to build a safe and tension-free country. In 
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order to achieve that end he benefited from all the customs and values of 
tribal life and by marrying with the daughters of chiefs of important Arab 
clans he formed family connections. Thanks to his innovative measures, 
lack of ambition and realistic approach to things Saudi Arabia found 
peace. Of course, severe punishment of opponents and dissidents played a 
big role in the country's stability. Meanwhile, Islamic instructions were in 
force and the al-amr bil-ma‛ruf wal-nahy ‛an al-munkar (enjoining good 
and forbidding wrong) ensured the sound enforcement of religious codes 
and good morals in the country.
38 
Under such circumstances there was no chance for revolt or religious 
upheaval. Gradually Wahhabism functioned on the basis of Salafi 
conservative tenets. The real mission of a Saudi Wahhabi Muslim was to 
cautiously and carefully exercise the religious codes and accept the verdict 
of the ruler (sultan) and live the way Bin Hanbal had lived and preached. 
The only thing which angered a Wahhabi Muslim was the unacceptable 
behavior of Hajj pilgrims who came from other countries. They considered 
their behavior unlawful, and resisted such unlawful behavior. Enjoining 
good and forbidding evil to non-Saudi citizens was enough and they were 
content that they were discharging their religious duties.
39 
Such behavior pleased the regime. The government wanted to put aside 
the Wahhabi codes and manage the affairs of the states as it wished 
without allowing anyone to object them, and they encouraged such docile 
attitude. The best way to consolidate the new version of Wahhabi faith was 
to make the surface of things look Islamic in appearance. In fact, the 
Wahhabi Muslims were happy to exercise the superficial form of Islam 
and they gradually became more isolated and reserved. Of course, the 
authorities knew that the religious scholars were angry with the 
nonconformists and tried not to provoke their wrath. 
40 
This was the state of the relationship between Wahhabi faith, Saudi 
community and the Saudi regime as long as Abd al-Aziz was alive. 
Although vast oil resources had been discovered and Saudi Arabia had 
become a most important strategic ally of the United States, the wealth 
failed to break the tall wall of seclusion that the Wahhabis had built 
around themselves and they continued to remain secluded and reserved.
41 
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After Abd al-Aziz Bin Saud's death, his son seized power, but Bin Saud 
did not have the wisdom, efficiency and skill of his father and behaved 
like a tribal chieftain. Incidentally such Bedouin behavior pleased the 
Wahhabis at the time and they loved the sultan. During his eleven year 
rule, the Wahhabi tenets were enforced as before.
42 
This was happening at a time that thanks to vast oil resources Saudi 
Arabia was becoming richer and richer and thanks to widespread of 
modern transportation the number of pilgrims was increasing. The 
immense wealth changed the attitude of the Saudi emirs and lords because 
they treated the country's wealth like their private property and spent it 
extravagantly in a Bedouin manner. But the change of attitude did not 
change the Wahhabi faith and its relationship with the people. 
43 
Such an attitude continued until Faysal seized power. If we are to 
consider Abd al-Aziz as the founder of Saudi Arabia, no doubt Faysal was 
the architect of the modern state. It was Faysal who modernized a 
backward tribal country which lacked many facilities for the management 
of such a big country. He reformed the country's treasury and set up 
ministries and departments and benefited from the oil wealth for the 
development and reconstruction of the country.
44
  
Faysal was clever enough to understand that he should benefit from 
religion in order to rebuild the country and he welcomed Wahhabi 
teachings. He resurrected the Wahhabi faith and tried to benefit from the 
faith for his domestic and foreign ends. Huge oil revenues, the Arabic 
origin of the inhabitants and Islam helped the sultan to achieve his ends.
45
   
From the moment Faysal seized power until the 1967 war Arab-Israeli 
war Saudi Arabia suffered a most difficult period. The Soviet Union and 
its leftist allies and Nasser and his Arabic nationalism were all very 
popular. All these camps regarded Saudi Arabia as their enemy and of 
course, each country assessed Riyadh according to its interest.
46 
Of course, during those years Saudi Arabia suffered very much from 
class difference. The royal family circle and those affiliated to the court 
enjoyed legendary wealth and opulence and lived the fabulous life of 
princes in the One thousand and One Night legend, whereas the masses 
suffered in absolute poverty and ignorance. It was fear of Saudi brutal 
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police and security forces that silenced the nation.
47 
Conditions changed after the 1967 war. The great danger from Arab 
nationalism and socialism had blown over and these radical states were 
powerless against a wealthy Saudi Arabia.  Faysal was aware of all these 
things and decided to resort to his modified version of Wahhabi faith in 
order to rebuild the country because it was impossible to modernize a 
traditional country without a moderate religion.
48
    
This was the beginning of renovation of Wahhabi faith by Faysal. 
Contrary to all other Muslim countries in which religious reform and 
modernization begins and progresses by religious scholars and institutes, it 
was the regime in Riyadh which modified and softened the Wahhabi 
principles.
49 
At first the regime set up new summaries, religious colleges and 
religious propaganda institutions. The first goal of the regime was to train 
theologians, orators and imams for the mosques, but because of shortage 
of scholars in the country they invited theologians and experts from 
Islamic countries especially from Arab ones. At the beginning the religious 
institutions did not lay much emphasis on Wahhabi tenets. Neither the 
government insisted on Wahhabism, nor the latter comprehended the new 
situation, nor all the teachers were Wahhabists.
50 
But gradually Wahhabism grew stronger. The regime wanted this and 
also Wahhabism became active. They selected the teachers and the 
teachers were compelled to lecture according to the Wahhabi tenets in the 
universities. Such a trend was followed in all religious institutions. It 
means that Wahhabism becomes more nationalistic and more Sauditist.
51 
It would be correct to say that during Faysal‟s reign Saudi Arabia 
gradually emerged as a unified country. The pride of being a Saudi citizen 
was intensified because of the events that happened in the region and the 
world. The war between Arabs and Israel in 1973 left its deepest impact on 
Saudi politics. It was after this war that the Wahhabi teachings were 
employed by the regime in their foreign dealings.
52 
Although from the beginning of the establishment of Saudi Arabia, 
Wahhabism had served the regime, for the first time Faysal was using it as 
a tool in his foreign policy in this extension. Before Faysal, the Saudi 
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regime seldom benefited from Wahhabi ideology in its foreign policy. 
However, after that time and especially after the defeat of Nasser and 
Nasirists, using of Wahhabism became institutionalized in foreign 
relations.
53 
What helped this policy was the increase of oil wealth. Moreover, 
religious centers and religious educational and propagandist centers in the 
Muslim and Arab world were gradually becoming weak. Instead, Saudi 
Arabia was building and spreading more and more religious institutes. 
Faysal‟s policy and the attraction of Islamic professors from different 
countries refreshed the religious construction. Meanwhile, after the defeat 
of Arab nationalism, attracting to Islam become more prevalent and more 
public, and the pressure on religious parties and institutions became 
gradually less.
54 
In this way, Wahhabism entered to the field of foreign policies, yet in 
two different forms. The policy of Wahhabism in Islamic countries was 
different from non-Islamic countries, and especially western ones. At first, 
the difference was not obvious, but gradually it became more and more 
conspicuous and concrete.
55 
In Islamic states, especially in poor countries like Pakistan, the object 
of the Saudi regime was to build mosques and seminaries. These 
institutions in fact served as platforms for the lecturers to propagate 
Wahhabism. Of course, it had its evil consequences, because it conflicted 
with other faiths. The Wahhabi principles conflicted with the general 
beliefs and rites of all Muslims and the same conflict which had happened 
in the course of history between the Hanbali sect and followers of religious 
tradition (ahl al-hadith) and others, including the Asha'reh, Mo'tazaleh and 
other Sunni sects as was well Shia, was repeated again.
56
  
This conflict was a warning sign for many Islamic and especially Arab 
states to resist the Wahhabi propaganda and they hardly permitted the 
Wahhabi preachers to set up Wahhabi mosques and seminaries in their 
countries. But in a country like Pakistan which lacked a strong central 
government to control the religious affairs the Wahhabi teachers could 
make many Pakistani Muslims convert to their faith. It was these same 
Wahhabi converts in Pakistan who began their subversive operations later 
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on.
57 
Meanwhile, there were countries which allowed the Wahhabi 
organizations and clerics to operate in order to fight with leftist and radical 
ideas.
58 
The object of the Wahhabi preachers was to advertise Wahhabi faith 
which naturally boosted the Wahhabi faith in Saudi Arabia and increase 
the country's prestige and influence. Of course, this was part of their goal. 
Before taking such steps the Wahhabi preachers had attracted many young 
volunteers who were willing and ready to accept the faith - whether they 
graduated from Wahhabi seminaries or were working in Wahhabi religious 
institutes. All the immigrants who live and work in Mecca and Medina and 
those who are working in religious institutes and mosques throughout 
Saudi Arabia are trained in Wahhabi seminaries.
59
  
In non-Muslim and Western countries the object of the Wahhabi 
preachers was to build mosques and Islamic institutes. Such measures gave 
prestige to Saudi Arabia and helped it to emerge as the center of Muslim 
and Arab world. Meanwhile, non-Muslim and western countries welcomed 
such initiatives until the end of 1980‟s. They thought the building of 
mosques in their countries represent their democracy and is a symbol of 
conscious freedom. They were glad that Saudi Arabia was pleased with 
their tolerance and they needed to satisfy the Saudi authorities for various 
reasons. Saudi Arabia was the biggest producer and exporter of oil and 
besides its big market, it needed a big variety of technical and engineering 
services.
60 
What mattered to Saudi officials was that they had two territories to 
operate: Islamic lands and non-Islamic ones. They preached two sorts of 
Wahhabi faith in these two territories and gradually the difference 
deepened. The first type of Wahhabism, which is to be applied in Islamic 
lands, was conservative and religiously cautious and strict, which did not 
exist in Saudi Arabia in that time, because it had been modernized to adapt 
to the new conditions in Saudi Arabia. But a modern and soft Wahhabi 
faith had no attraction in a traditional society like Pakistan. Consequently, 
that very conservative and stern Wahhabism prevailed. By elapse of time, 
it became even more conservative and closed. This is the Wahhabism that 
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gave birth to Pakistani‟s Taliban and the other social-religious groups with 
the same idea in that region.
61
 
But in non-Muslim countries the object of Wahhabi preachers was to 
gain dignity and credit for Saudi Arabia, and the faith had to be introduced 
in a modern manner. They tried to introduce a modern version of the faith 
representing a country which wanted to look far modern than it really was, 
and even more modernized than the belief of its leaders. The best and most 
fashionable solution to them was to define Wahhabism as an Islamic 
Protestant faith designed as a reformist tendency.
62 
During these years there were many non-Muslims and western citizens 
who were willing to convert to Islam because of various reasons. Some of 
them were really interested in Islam and thought that it was an ideal 
religion, but there were others who were looking for jobs in Saudi Arabia 
and better living and wanted Saudi authorities to trust them. There was 
another group who embraced Islam in order to work in the rich 
Sheikhdoms and many Muslim girls. The Wahhabi faith was introduced to 
them with these benefits and some of them were converted to Wahhabi 
faith after embracing Islam.
63
  
Wahhabi preachers stepped into the seventies with these goals in mind. 
Another turning point for the faith was the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the 
political, international and financial consequences of the war which greatly 
boosted the faith.
64 
After the 1973 War Saudi Arabia changed. Now it was necessary for 
them to follow a different foreign policy and the Wahhabi faith was one of 
the most effective machines in the new policy. The Wahhabi teachers 
intensified their preaching both in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 
They needed a far active religion and the condition in the other countries 
was ripe for more propaganda.
65 
During the interval between 1973 until 1980 Saudi religious institutions 
were expanded. The Saudi citizens who had graduated from Saudi 
religious institutions began serving the Wahhabi preachers, but Wahhabi 
propagandists needed more volunteers. They hired a large number of 
experts in human and Islamic sciences from Muslim countries and the 
hired scholars started to serve the Wahhabi institutes.
66
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Both in Islamic and non-Islamic countries the Wahhabi centers added to 
their activities and built more mosques and educational institutes. Many 
people in Muslim countries were converted to Wahhabi faith, and often the 
new converts were more faithful to Wahhabi principles than the Saudi 
citizens who according to Al-Utaybi had been corrupted by wealth and 
opulence.
67 
One important reason to resort to severe and extremist Wahhabi codes 
was Mecca and Medina, the two sacred towns in Saudi Arabia. According 
to the majority of the Muslims whatever was imported from Saudi Arabia 
was correct and sacred and they accepted them without question. Such 
opinion echoed more potently in countries which had poorer Islamic 
culture and science.
68
  
Thanks to such wealth, non-Muslim and western countries regarded 
Saudi Arabia as the leader of the Islamic world. The Saudi regime was 
enjoying its peak of prestige and part of that prestige owed to Wahhabi 
faith and institutes, although the faith was not faithfully followed in Saudi 
Arabia because the oil wealth was corrupting the inhabitants. And such 
irreligion was annoying the faithful and fanatic Wahhabis.
69 
The Wahhabis who, because of the acceptable and perhaps ideal 
Wahhabi principles, had become conservative and reserved after Abd al-
Aziz had seized power in the country gradually showed signs of 
discontent. The faithful Wahhabis could not tolerate the corruption in the 
community, but their belief was so deep that they accepted the edicts of 
the sultan and believed that anything done against Abd al-Aziz was 
unlawful. They thought they were not allowed to openly protest against the 
government - although a series of protests occurred and some were 
arrested and jailed.
70 
The Islamic Revolution triumphed under such circumstances and 
shocked both the Saudi regime and the Wahhabi institution. As we briefly 
mentioned in previous chapters after some reflection the Saudi regime and 
Wahhabi followers reacted to the Iranian revolution.
71
  
The Wahhabi preachers began a widespread anti-Shia and even anti-
Iranian propaganda in Muslim countries. Their main argument was that the 
Shia sect was not a true Islamic sect or was the enemy of Islam. Another 
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step taken by Wahhabi preachers was to preach a popular Islam, which 
suited the ordinary and illiterate masses. Their object was to attract more 
converts and to prove that compared to other Islamic faiths they were more 
faithful and committed to Islam. This paved the way for further radicalism. 
The fanatic Wahhabis rejected reason and could not tolerate others. They 
claimed to be the true and absolute representative of Islam and maintained 
that all other Islamic sects were infidels. This gradually made them more 
and more radical and fanatic.
72 
But things were different in non-Muslim countries. In those years the 
main accusation against the Iranian Islamic revolution was that it was 
fundamental, totalitarian and fanatic. The things which Saudi officials 
were saying in non-Muslim countries against Iran and the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran were not understood. In these countries the Wahhabi 
Saudi officials tried to pretend they were moderate, progressive, modern 
and even rational Muslims. In fact, what Wahhabi propagators preached in 
non-Muslim countries was contrary to that they preached in Islamic 
countries.
73
 
This was the object of the Saudi foreign policy and the official 
Wahhabism. They were trying to preach such a code in the Islamic 
institutes in non-Muslim countries, but they were faced by restrictions. 
The most remarkable objection came from the young Muslims, who, for 
political reasons or for the sake of finding jobs, had immigrated to western 
countries. These young Muslims had their own opinions and political 
approaches, especially those who were living in the open society and they 
were aside from security and traditional restrictions. It was not possible for 
them to preach as they desired; and the result of their propaganda could 
not be as it was expected.
74 
The West welcomed the new Wahhabi anti-Iranian propaganda because 
it weakened the Islamic revolution and reduced its influence. Above all, it 
had an anti-communist dimension and (as we will explain later) they were 
very sensitive to the occupation of Afghanistan and supported the anti-
resistance fighters in that country.
75 
The Saudi authorities and Wahhabi clerics were the most severe enemy 
of communists in the Arab world, but in no time in history their hostility 
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had pleased Washington so much than in the eighties. Reagan's main 
foreign strategy was to fight the Soviet Union and the Eastern Communist 
Bloc and naturally more than any other time he welcomed Saudi Arabia's 
anti-communist approach.
76 
During the eighties many mosques and religious institutions had been 
built in Europe and the United States – most all of them by Saudis. As we 
mentioned before such institutes were suitable places for the congregation 
of migratory young Muslims, especially the Arabs, whose number was 
gradually increasing. It was easy to move to Europe and the United States 
at that time and the Muslim youth migrated to these regions for various 
reasons. Some escaped from their despotic countries and sought political 
asylum. Conditions in countries which exported their dissent youth were 
ripe with political or radical activity, but due to sophisticated reasons most 
of these hostile factions were Islamic groups. The reason that impelled the 
youth to return to pure Islamic teachings Islamic revolutionary activity 
was the preaching of the Wahhabi clerics in the mosques and seminaries 
which Saudi Arabia had built in western countries. As to the migrating 
youth their religious feelings never agreed with Saudi authorities. We will 
explain later how such a feeling suddenly showed its true color during the 
occupation of Kuwait when all these religious institutes became bases for 
supporters of Saddam Hussein.
77
    
Another important thing which happened at that time and greatly 
affected the Wahhabi faith and the political views of the Sunni sect was 
the occupation of Afghanistan by former Soviet Union. The communist 
revolution preached by Abdullah al-Tariqi was limited to Afghanistan only 
and did not stretch to other Islamic countries in the region. Even before the 
victory of Islamic revolution the Shah in Iran, who was committed to fight 
communism, did not react seriously to the advance of communists in 
Afghanistan because he was facing trouble and unrest in the country.
78 
The problems brewed by the communist regime in a deeply religious 
and traditional country and the government's impotence to suppress the 
enemies encouraged the Soviet Union to occupy Afghanistan. The 
invasion infuriated the United States. Washington said Moscow was trying 
to reach the warm waters in the Persian Gulf and the United States was 
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committed to stop the advance of the Red Army. But the Shah had been 
expelled and the new regime in Iran was deeply anti-American. The 
geopolitical balance of the region had been disturbed and political order 
had not yet been established.
79
  
The best choice for the U.S. was to incite Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to 
fight the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia was willing to interfere because 
inherently they were anti-communists and their anti-communist hostility 
contributed to their internal stability and Wahhabi faith. Pakistan also was 
eager to take anti-communist stance and receive military and non-military 
assistance from Washington because the U.S. military aid could strengthen 
it against rival India. Moreover, the presence of Soviet Union, an ally of 
India in Afghanistan, was unbearable for Pakistan. Islamabad felt insecure 
and unhappy. All these factors helped them to move closer to Saudi 
Arabia. Meanwhile thanks to its past activities in Pakistan, building of 
many mosques and seminaries, Saudi Arabia had gathered many 
supporters in that country.
80 
Here, our main intention is to examine the effect of the developments in 
Afghanistan for Wahhabism. Although, the Soviet Union was the first 
country which had established diplomatic ties with Abd al-Aziz's regime 
in Saudi Arabia; the Saudi policy mentality completely differed with the 
communists because the Saudis were hostile against the approach of 
modern civilization. Moreover, they had bitter experience with the mass of 
migrants who had escaped to Saudi Arabia from Central Asia after the 
October Revolution and the leftist propaganda chanted by Moscow. 
Likewise, they had very bitter experience with Arab leftist activists who 
were supported by Moscow and had brewed many problems in Saudi 
Arabia after the Second World War.
81 
All these factors had provided a very negative image of Soviet Union to 
the Saudi regime. According to Saudi authorities, the communists were 
heathens who had occupied a Muslim country like Afghanistan, and it was 
their duty to fight the infidels. The Saudi regime believed that it was a real 
religious war and they mobilized fighters to combat the Red Army.
82
  
The fact is that because of the rise of religious feelings the conditions in 
the eighties were such that Saudi officials needed a pretext to benefit from 
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that religious ardor to their advantage. South Yemen, a neighbor of Saudi 
Arabia, was a communist regime and the Russian agents were present in 
that country, but Riyadh had tolerated their presence up to then. 
Meanwhile, when the sultan of Oman had requested Riyadh to suppress 
the Zofar communist insurgents the Saudi authorities had refused to help 
him. Now Afghanistan was a good pretext for Riyadh to control and 
manage the tumultuous religious fervor and of course Wahhabism which 
was in crisis welcomed such an initiative.
83
  
Thus, Wahhabis were the first volunteers to help Afghanistan and the 
Saudi regime supported them. Many young men from Saudi Arabia 
volunteered to fight in Afghanistan. After a while volunteers from other 
Arab countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Yemen and even several 
Sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf announced their readiness to fight in 
Afghanistan. These youth were sent to Afghanistan with direct or indirect 
help from Saudi Arabia. In the meantime the Arab regimes were eager to 
get rid of them. In other words they expelled their dissident Muslim 
activists which were a headache for them.
84 
Their first meeting place was Pakistan. Hundred millions of dollars 
flowed into that poor country
85
. Usama bin Laden, who was supported and 
trusted by Riyadh, was among those who personally directed military 
operation. Religious seminaries and schools were quickly built at the 
border points between Pakistan and Afghanistan and thousands of ardent 
religious students flocked to these schools. The teachers of these schools 
were those who during the sixties had been trained in Wahhabi schools in 
Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's Zia ul-Haq who favored the Salafi faith was 
backing the Wahhabi activists.
86
  
In a short time conditions in Pakistan and especially in its border with 
Afghanistan changed. Religious zeal was boiling specially among 
Wahhabis and Salafis. The region looked like Najd Province when Bin 
Saud and Abd al-Aziz waged his religious wars. The difference was that 
many devoted volunteers had assembled in Pakistan to help their Afghan 
brethren to battle aggressive Soviet Union which had occupied 
Afghanistan.
87 
Gradually, the atmosphere in the region grew more radical. The region 
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boiled with Salafi Wahhabi fervor. No one from outside or inside Pakistan 
tried to control such extremist religious passion, especially because 
Wahhabism has the capacity to become radical.
88
  
The problem was that the volunteers who had gathered in Pakistan were 
not homogenous. There were many Arab youth who had come from 
different countries and had different educational, ideological and political 
ends. As is related to our discussion, the question is that they had different 
political and politico-religious experiences. 
89 
Gradually the Saudi youth became interested in the pure Wahhabi 
teachings of Mohammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab like those who were headed 
by Juhayman ibn Muhammad Al-Utaybi had occupied the Al-Haram 
Mosque “Mecca” in November 1979. Inspired by Seyyed Qutb's ideology 
that divide the world into Islamic and non-Islamic (jahiliyyah), the 
Egyptian and Algerian youth as well as non-Saudi Arabs almost were 
inclined to the same ideology that the jihadists in Egypt had followed 
during the 1970‟s, the most eminent group of them was 'Al-Takfir wa Al-
Hijra' (Excommunication and Exodus).
90 
The fact is that the political beliefs of Seyyed Qutb differ with Wahhabi 
beliefs. They have started from two completely different angles and have 
reached a conclusion which, to some extent, is similar. Fed up with  
Muslims who were often neutral and soft against modern civilization and 
the impotence of officials who tried to moderate and reform Islamic tenets, 
Qutb thought that the only way to introduce true Islam was to train deeply 
committed volunteers and to invite people to practice true Islam and purify 
the community. He said a true Muslim practices and behaves like a pious 
Muslim, otherwise not only the community will not be Islamic but jahili, 
even if they were Muslims on the surface. He believed that true Muslims 
must fight such infields and make them pure Muslims.
91
  
But the Wahhabi faith which was born among desert Bedouin Arabs 
had a different definition of monotheism and polytheism. They believed 
that those who didn't believe in monotheism like them and acted otherwise 
were heathen even if they pretended to be Muslims. They said it was their 
duty to invite them to their true faith and to kill them if they refused to 
embrace it. In other words, they maintained that whoever did not follow 
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their creed was their enemy and they had to fight with them.
92
   
During the turbulent years of the eighties these two ideologies prevailed 
and were favored by the Arabs who had immigrated to Afghanistan and 
were later on called “Arab Afghans”. Aside from domestic factors foreign 
factors also confirmed and encouraged such ideologies. What was 
important for the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was to fight the 
Red Army in Afghanistan by any possible means.
93 
Naturally these two ideologies affected each other and in the end the 
combination of these ideologies gave birth to the al-Qaeda ideology, which 
we will explain later on. What we are concerned with is the reciprocal 
impact of these two different ideologies against each other.
94 
Wahhabi faith which was not anti-western or anti-American gradually 
came under the influence of the abovementioned ideologies. Even the 
original Wahhabi faith was not hostile against non-Muslims. Its mission 
was to fight those Muslims whom they considered infidels.  Many letters 
had been exchanged between Abd al-Aziz and the British agents in the 
Persian Gulf in which he had emphasized that the mission of the Wahhabi 
faith is to fight nonconformist Muslims and not the British officials or 
non-Muslims. He had even gave back to the British officials the properties 
which his followers had plundered. Mir-Mohanna, his other ally in the 
region, also too acted in the same manner.
95 
During its history the Wahhabis had never shown anti-western 
sentiments. Abd al-Aziz had seized power in Saudi Arabia with the help of 
British weapons and after that London had always supported him. Such a 
strong support promoted Abd al-Aziz to become Washington's strategic 
ally at the end of Second World War. This was not merely a political 
tactic. Actually the Wahhabi faith did not show signs of anti-western 
hostility although some conservative Wahhabis did not like the western 
culture.
96 
The fact it was Qutb's ideas that had provoked anti-western feeling 
among Arab Afghan Wahhabis. His book entitled, 'Ma'alem fi al-Tariq', 
“landmarks of the path”, while describing the principles of an Islam which 
suited to the illiterate masses expressly criticizes the western and 
communist cultures, especially those who tried to interpret Islamic canons 
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through western and communist standards. It is Seyyed Qutb's journey to 
the United States had a great effect to antagonize him against western 
culture. In other words, he had formed his hostile ideology when he was in 
United States. But the founders of Wahhabi faith had no direct contact 
with the West.
97 
In addition, Qutb believed that the world is divided between the 
heathens and the true Muslims and that if the Muslims fail to comply with 
Islamic commandments they must be treated as heathens. The Arab 
Afghan Wahhabis and their Pakistani and non-Arab sympathizers had 
embraced such ideology because the theory was more adaptable to realities 
in Pakistan (and Afghanistan). The Wahhabi theory was a Bedouin and 
tribal theory and could not be acceptable in other regions.
98 
Meanwhile, Salafi and Wahhabi teachings served as the foundation of 
their ideology. What they needed was not only a political ideology: they 
needed a perfect religion. They wished to accept Islam in its entirety – an 
Islam which could respond to their daily needs, teach them how to fight, 
propose policies and help them distinguish their friends from their 
enemies.
99 
In fact, their needs were not just a political and revolutionary ideology, 
but it was Islamic-politics ideology. The best branch amongst Sunni 
doctrine were Salafi, Hanbali and Wahhabi faiths. The other branches 
could not play that role, because of jurisprudential, theological and 
historical reasons. Of course, one cannot deny the importance of the Saudi-
made initiatives in this regard. They had made preliminary arrangements 
for dispatch of young Arab volunteers to Pakistan and Afghanistan; they 
had invested billions of dollars and had built hundreds of religious schools 
in these two countries, and the Saudi clerics were encouraging people and 
the youth to fight against the communists. All these people were Hanbali 
and Wahhabi, and it was natural that this branch became the 
jurisprudential, theological, and moral source for them.
100
  
Because of these reasons, Qutb's ideology alone could not be helpful, as 
it could not be helpful for the Egyptian jihadist groups during the 1970‟s. 
In Egypt, Qutb had provoked his supporters to launch a limited operation 
which lacked the energy to continue. Of course, one must not forget the 
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fact that Qutb's ideology had left a very big impact among the Sunnis 
although the majority of Sunni and official Wahhabi clerics were against 
his ideology.
101
  
Thus, the Arab Afghan and their non-Arab sympathizers began to build 
and develop a new ideology which was unprecedented in the history of 
Sunni thought and political jurisprudence, which means a revolutionary 
and extremely subversive ideology. It is surprising this ideology came out 
from a west-loving and anti-radical Wahhabism of the second half of the 
twentieth century.
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The story continued after the exit of the Soviet forces from 
Afghanistan. After the exit of the Red Army Afghanistan was governed by 
Afghan communists who were supported by the Russians, but the 
mujahids continued to fight the government. Actually the revolutionary 
youth were in a condition that they needed to fight and enjoyed it. 
Meanwhile, the new ideology disintegrated the Pakistani and Afghani 
community from a religious and political aspect. This separation combined 
the tribal realities in the region and shaped different militant (mujahid) 
groups, which were a big headache for Afghanistan. 
The new al-Qaeda ideology quickly spread to chaotic regions in Islamic 
countries and even to Islamic institutes in the West. As we have mentioned 
before the religious institutes had been built by Saudi Arabia and they had 
helped the Wahhabi ideology to spread. In fact, part of the official 
Wahhabi faith inside and outside Saudi Arabia was under the influence of 
this new wave. Of course, those days the Saudi regime and the official 
Wahhabism did not fear any danger from the new ideology.
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The decisive blow came with the occupation of Kuwait. What we mean 
by the blow is the ideological impact and consequences of the occupation 
of Kuwait on the Arab Afghans and their sympathizers. Although because 
of their hatred towards the Sheikhdoms many of these young partisans 
were happy with the occupation of Kuwait and this had important 
consequences. The revolutionary figures were angry because Saudi Arabia 
had appealed to the United States and Europe for help and had given 
quarter to their troops in the sacred land – an insult which was not 
acceptable at all.
104 
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Such a violent reaction is conceivable because of the boiling religious 
and revolutionary feelings that had erupted during the eighties. After 
World War Two the U.S. troops settled in Saudi Arabia and built military 
bases. At that time, no one in the country had protested to the U.S. 
presence because there was no such hostile feeling among the people. But 
things changed from after the nineties. Surprising enough the Saudi regime 
itself had provoked such sentiments.
105 
During these years Saudi was severely criticized. The most important 
point was that the new Wahhabism was in the final stage of its 
development and it separated itself from the Saudi regime and even stood 
against it,
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from Bin Laden to other people and groups who had fought 
against the Soviet Union earlier in Afghanistan.
107
 But the problem was far 
graver. Although they believed the basic canons of the Wahhabi faith they 
distanced themselves from the official Wahhabism in force in Saudi 
Arabia and accused it of having been serving the Saudi regime. The anti-
American and anti-Western feeling of the new ideology which had been 
latent for years had suddenly erupted and came to the scene.
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Meanwhile, the conditions were ready for the emergence of the new 
ideology. The Soviet Union had disintegrated, the United States wished to 
become the only superpower and manage the world, the U.S. attacked and 
occupied Iraq in a very brutal manner and the tough American sanctions 
had killed hundred thousands of Iraqi children. These factors gave rise to 
anti-American feelings and the U.S. was accepted and introduced as an 
enemy.
109 
The nineties began in this manner. The Arab world had lost its 
solidarity and was in its lowest spirit in the international arena. The 
regimes which had supported or opposed Saddam Hussein were ashamed 
and subdued. The Arab states which had been accustomed to close ranks 
and unite had no means to maneuver. There was no acceptable and 
compensable ideology. The police pressure in Arab states which had been 
relaxed to minimum during the American-Iraqi war was again intensified 
and the Islamist groups who were influenced by the Arab Afghans and 
their thought were under inspection, pursue and torture. It was for the first 
time that the Arab Afghans gained security and dangerous concept.
110
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In the situation, this ideology became more radical and Qutb‟s thought 
was accepted more, which means that it should be revolted against any 
Muslim regime that does not put the Islamic teachings into practice. 
Excessive police pressure gave birth to radical groups and made them 
popular and more extremist. Such volatile feeling was more acute in 
Islamic centers in the West because of their relative freedom compared to 
those found in Islamic states, but it was found everywhere.
111
  
Some religious scholars welcomed the new ideology and supported it. 
Surprising enough these clerics became more and more popular.
112
 They 
maintained that the United States and the West had rivalry and hostility 
against Islam and Muslims
113
 and were trying to avenge the historical 
wounds they had received from the Arabs in the past. Of course, a series of 
incidents happened that intensified such ill feelings. 
According to radical clerics, the war in the Balkans and the massacre of 
Muslims in Bosnia and Chechen was a good example. The atmosphere was 
so hostile against the West that the government appointed clerics in Saudi 
Arabia who spoke against the U.S. in Friday Prayers which were organized 
by the government, and the hostile sermons was broadcasted by Saudi 
radio and TV and satellite channels.
114
 
This is a small example to show that the Muslims had become 
politically volatile during the nineties. They were angry against foreign 
powers which had thrown them into disaster. The new Salafism developed 
and reached perfection under such circumstances. Now conditions were 
ripe for their operation even in rightist countries like Saudi Arabia and the 
Sheikdoms in Persian Gulf.
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Things became difficult for the the Arab Afghans after the Mujahedin 
in Kabul ousted Najibullah. The Afghans had bitter experience about the 
Arab Afghans. The Saudi regime had demanded the Afghan jihadist 
groups to expel them from Afghanistan. Now Saudis became their enemy, 
and not their supporters.
116 
The pressure from Mujahedin led to armed conflict with the Arab 
Afghans and compelled many of them to leave Afghanistan. Some went to 
other countries and were arrested, but their leaders moved to Sudan where 
a new Islamic government had been established.
117 
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This new ideology was called al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda had started to 
mobilize members. They were making plans for the future. They wanted to 
know where to start and how to attract the youth.
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But al-Qaeda didn't stay long in Sudan, because the country was not 
suitable for their purpose. It was a vast country with sparse inhabitants 
who believed in a Sufi sort of Islam. Although in the beginning the 
authorities in Sudan had welcomed al-Qaeda but the country was not 
suitable for their operation. In addition, Egypt and some other Arab 
countries via Egypt were pressuring Sudan to expel them. At last one of 
their headquarters was bombed by the United States. This compelled the 
leaders of al-Qaeda to move to Afghanistan and become the guests of 
Taliban. Although Afghanistan was not an Arab country but the conditions 
for partisan war for a militia organization like al-Qaeda was far better than 
Sudan or another country. Wahhabism had penetrated into Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. They were armed and were good fighters and the different 
tribes living in perilous mountainous resorts in the two countries made 
conditions suitable for their operation. The United States could not launch 
a massive operation against their bases in the mountainous country 
compared to Sudan which was a flat and desert country.
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The Taliban was composed of the students of Wahhabi schools which 
the Saudi government or Bin Laden and his colleagues had set up in 
Pakistan with the help of Saudi Arabia. Most of the conscripts were poor 
people who had been attracted to these schools during the eighties. Instead 
of focusing on Islamic jurisprudence the seminaries were teaching the 
students how to mobilize people and fight the Russian occupiers and their 
allies. They taught them some general information about Wahhabi faith 
and offered some military drills. They only taught the easily understood 
and superficial codes of Islam to them.
120 
As mentioned earlier, these schools had been founded during the sixties 
at a time that Wahhabi teachers tried to penetrate the Deobandi Sunni 
seminaries which were old institutes in the Indian Subcontinent and their 
principles were close to Wahhabi principles with regard to theology. Once 
Saudi Arabia became rich they had increased their influence in the 
seminaries and had quickly built many new ones during the seventies, 
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particularly in Pakistan.
121 
  The theoretical instructions they received during the eighties were 
similar to that which they had received a couple of decades ago. The only 
difference was that the canons were far severe and the severe codes 
adapted well to their tribal culture. But no military training was offered to 
the students during the sixties.
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The Taliban militia had emerged from these seminaries, although not all 
the graduates joined the Taliban ranks. Only those from Pashtoon tribe 
joined the Taliban camp. Non-Pashtoons either refused to join them or 
gradually deserted the camp.
123 
When the al-Qaeda leaders returned to Afghanistan they preferred to 
fight along with the Taliban and not fighters of other religious sects 
because al-Qaeda ideology was much closer to the Taliban beliefs. Both 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban followed Wahhabi and Salafi tenets. They had 
known each other for years and had cooperated with each other. 
Meanwhile the Taliban was the biggest jihadist group in Afghanistan.
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When Taliban and jihadist groups were fighting against Kabul's 
government al-Qaeda was fighting along with them and when Taliban 
seized power in Afghanistan they helped them under every pretext. In fact 
the capture of Afghanistan by Taliban had gladdened all Wahhabi and 
Salafi followers in the Islamic and Arab world because Taliban was trying 
to realize a revolutionary Islam based on the tenets of Hanbali and ahl al-
hadith.
125 
Here, we must explain the role of the wealthy Wahhabis and Salafis in 
order to understand how al-Qaeda and Taliban groups were formed. 
As we mentioned before the Salafi codes and jurisprudence is as old as 
the birth of Islam. The Salafi sect has always existed and will exist. Of 
course, their significance and influence has ebbed and flowed in the course 
of the history. Here, we are speaking about the Saudi version of Salafi 
faith modified by the Wahhabi faith and not the teachings of Seyyed 
Jamaluddin Asadabadi and his student Mohammad Abdoh who emerged at 
the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. The 
mission of Asadabadi and Abdoh was to fight backwardness, illiteracy and 
superstition and encourage Muslims to resort to science and reason in 
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order to resurrect the past glory of Islamic civilization.
126
  
The deep religious fervor after the seventies affected not only the youth 
and academicians but many classes of Muslims. Many of these young 
academic students grew rich and became prominent figures and remained 
faithful to their beliefs. From the eighties onward there were large and 
scattered groups of intellectuals who were wealthy and had high 
government posts. These wealthy elite helped various Salafi jihadist 
factions including Taliban and al-Qaeda to fight for their religious ends.
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In fact many civilian and military figures in Pakistan's government are 
Salafi. They support Salafi subversive groups and try to help them by 
different methods. These Pakistani figures assist the jihadists because they 
believe their mission like many wealthy people in Saudi Arabia and other 
Sheikhdoms who are still funding Taliban and al-Qaeda.  
It is difficult to believe that the presence of Taliban and al-Qaeda side 
by side led to a sort of ideological interchange. Principally, these two had 
the same ideology although their goals were different. Al-Qaeda was 
trying to launch a global war against the West and non-Muslims and was 
trying to mobilize Muslims for the global war, but Taliban was trying to 
govern Afghanistan according to the pure Islamic jurisprudence. Taliban 
was trying to defeat its enemies and help the Pashtoon tribesmen to 
become masters in Afghanistan.
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From that point of view Taliban's ideology resembled that of 
conservative Wahhabi sect in Saudi Arabia. Both insisted to enforce true 
Islamic codes. For that reason Taliban was fully supported by Wahhabis in 
Saudi Arabia and those Salafis in the Islamic world who sided and 
sympathized with the Wahhabis.
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After the 11 September when the U.S. issued an ultimatum to the 
Taliban to expel al-Qaeda from Afghanistan after a series of consultations 
Taliban said that Bin Laden and his followers were their guests and they 
could not expel their guests from the country. This does not mean that they 
had similar beliefs or ideology for defense. It was quite obvious that the 
two camps had different goals in mind.
130 
According to the documents discovered after invasion of Afghanistan in 
keeping with their subversive and revolutionary ideology al-Qaeda had 
From Conservatism to Extremism                                                           187 
 
decided to embark upon a big global war against the United States and its 
allies. Although they had started their war far earlier their biggest 
operation was the blast of the twin towers in New York on 11 September. 
This subject can be examined from different angles, but the U.S. 
reaction against the Arabs and Muslims badly annoyed them. The insult 
was so deep that angered and subdued several rightist Muslim and Arab 
regimes which were Washington's allies. They were displeased because 
they were allies of Washington and they tried not to speak about their 
friendship.
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The annoyance boosted the reputation of al-Qaeda ideology particularly 
in the Arab world. Such a reputation encouraged Al-Qaeda to take further 
subversive steps both in the Islamic and non-Islamic countries. According 
to their ideology those who were not Muslims were heathens (jahili) and 
al-Qaeda was representing true Islam. Such belief in their integrity was a 
tool in their hand to destroy those who did not believe like them.
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Of course, it is not still clear if all the subversive operations were 
handled by al-Qaeda, but al-Qaeda ideology was such that justified such 
conclusion. But their brutal subversive operations had many evil 
consequences among which one must refer to the loss of their 
popularity.
133
  
The most important thing which helped to revive al-Qaeda was the 
second war between the United States and Iraq. When the war broke out 
Al-Qaeda leaders tried to show that the presence of the U.S. in Iraq was 
similar to the ex-Soviet Union in Afghanistan. They claimed that the 
United States had occupied a Muslim country and on this basis, it was 
their religious duty to fight against Washington. Such propaganda helped 
them to mobilize many volunteers and the majority of the suicide 
operations in Iraq were carried out by these volunteers.
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The invasion of Iraq changed the ideology of al-Qaeda. The main 
source of their ideology was the Salafi-Hanbali-Wahhabi hostile stance 
against the Shia. Although these three faiths disagreed with other Muslim 
faiths they were far hostile against the Shia Muslims. But before the 
second war between the United States and Iraq there was no trace of 
hostility against the Shia in the al-Qaeda camp, although during their 
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collaboration with Taliban they had killed some Shia followers because 
they believed in the Salafi which differed with Shia teachings.
135 
The majority of the population in Iraq was Shia. The Shia Muslims in 
Iraq were trying to ratify a new constitution, launch a democratic election, 
form a popular government and expel the U.S. troops from the country. 
Naturally they wanted the Sunni Muslims and the Kurds to join the new 
government in Baghdad.  
Al-Qaeda tried by all means to throw the country into chaos. Their 
other object was to fight with the Shia and to kill even their children and 
women. Meanwhile they wanted to prevent any sort of solidarity and 
stability in the country and the best method was to provoke sectarian feud 
and violence.
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Thus, the war between al-Qaeda and the United States stretched to 
children and women and civilians in general. They tried to provoke 
different sects to fight with each other under various pretexts. After that 
they provoked hostility against Iran and warned the Iraqis and Arabs that 
Iran was trying to spread its influence in Iraq and intended to revive its 
former historical glory. They said that the Shia Muslims in Iraq were the 
vassals of the Iranian government.
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In fact, an ideology like al-Qaeda is resolved to fight those whom it 
considers to be its enemy and it resorts to every instrument to reach its 
goal. It does not accept any objection and tries to achieve its end by all 
means. The reason they succeeded earlier to spread their network was not 
because they were right in their ideology. It was because they benefited 
from the boiling anger of the young Arab Muslims to advance their goals 
and were masters of the field for a while.  But it is not an ideology which 
can continue forever and is doomed to be forgotten sooner or later, 
although they may launch a series of operations before they die away.
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The conditions were such until Arab Spring erupted and gave birth to 
conditions which conflicted with the strategy and reputation of al-Qaeda. 
In fact it was the despotic Arab regimes which set up the terrorist 
organizations. The leaders of these regimes continually warned the world 
about the danger of al-Qaeda operatives and they fought and suppressed 
them to justify their claim. But the repression of al-Qaeda had a negative 
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impact on the masses and the youth and enhanced al-Qaeda's prestige.
139
   
Another feature of Arab Spring is its anti-despotic position, quest for 
dignity and anti-corruption drive. The protesters succeeded to topple 
several regimes, the revolt continues in several other countries and the rest 
of the Arab world has remained relatively calm. The most important result 
of such protests is that the despotic regimes in other countries cannot 
operate like before. They are compelled to observe human rights and 
combat corruption.
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As we said even if the present revolts are suppressed in countries where 
the opposition has not yet triumphed and the calm in other countries, 
which are witnessing the revolt, continues, the embattled regimes will be 
compelled to observe human rights and combat corruption.  This means 
that the conditions and parameters have been changed and there is no 
chance for despotic subversive organizations like al-Qaeda to survive.  
Of course in countries like post-Mubarak Egypt we can see the 
widespread growth of Salafi forces. Presently they are strongly present in 
the field and have taken steps which have angered the Islamic groups, 
parties, and figures. Similar conditions are notable in other Arab states 
where their regimes have been changed.  
In fact presently the Salafism is influenced by foreign politicians. This 
does not mean that they are vassals and servants of foreign countries. Their 
leaders are not completely independent and they often follow the 
instructions of foreign powers. Of course such a trend may change and the 
influence of foreign countries may decrease or increase. As a whole, 
radical groups which operate blindly can better serve foreign powers 
compared to non-radicals.
141 
Another point is that even though the Salafi faith is close to al-Qaeda 
ideology they do not operate like al-Qaeda and cannot pretend to be 
supporters of it. The reputation of al-Qaeda at the beginning of the present 
century was a private matter. Even at that time no one dared to speak 
publicly about it. 
Another important point is that under the existing circumstances it is 
logical for al-Qaeda to modify themselves.  They cannot change the rules 
of the games as they wish. A nation which has turned its back against its 
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despotic rulers will surely oppose the dictatorial manner of group and 
party.
142
 
A good proof of the above assertion is the position of Salafism in Tunis. 
Before the recent elections in that country the laic groups tried by different 
means to anger Islamist groups and provoke them to react. One of their 
tactics was to stage two films which insulted Islam. The Al-Nazr Islamic 
party urged its members and supporters to stay calm. That tactic was 
understandable, but even the Salafis did not react to the laic provocation. 
As a consequence the two profane films benefited the Islamic groups and 
hurt those who had produced them.
 
That which helped the Salafis was their restraint. In other words they 
tried to be logic and they moderated their demands and expectations. The 
same thing will happen in other countries. Of course in a country like 
Yemen with its tribal system and despotic military regime (which is 
supported by regimes inside and outside the region) the local Salafis can 
hardly resort to moderation. At least moderation cannot be expected from 
them in a short time. 
Notwithstanding, the Salafi ideology will continue and remain 
influential even after the Arab Spring. Of course, they will adapt 
themselves to new conditions but one can say with assurance that the 
conditions are not in favor for subversive Salafis activists. Even if they 
remain active for a while gradually these groups and their extremist 
ideology will be forgotten.
143 
But such an assertion is not applicable to Taliban. Although they follow 
the Salafi and Wahhabi faiths, their ideology differs with al-Qaeda. 
Taliban receives its strength from the Pashtoon culture and socity, a big 
majority in Afghanistan. They are Hanafi Muslims who in recent years 
have approached the Wahhabi and Salafi doctrine. But in the end, they are 
Afghans, Pashtoon, and Hanafi. Their goal also differs with subversive 
Salafi groups although their method of operation has been influenced by 
al-Qaeda method and their attitude about the application of the Islamic 
jurisprudence (taqbiq al-shariah) is close to Conservative Wahhabis and 
Salafis in Saudi Arabia. They will remain although in the present situation 
the probability of modifying their ideology is weak. In addition, their 
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modification is more cultural than ideological.
144  
For example, Taliban is too severe with women. They do not respect 
their rights and give them little weight, all of which originate from 
Pashtoon ethnic culture. They must first of all moderate their culture in 
order to moderate their approach towards women.
145 
Unfortunately, sectarian Salafi subversion will continue as before and 
will not be modified under the existing conditions. As we explained before 
that first of all, these ideas are deeply rooted in the belief and history of 
Salafism. Secondly, the difference among the sectarial polarization in the 
region will help them survive. Thirdly, there are regimes in the region 
which are investing money to keep such inclinations alive.
 
From that standpoint their ideology does not originate from social 
realities. It originates from political conditions of the region. 
6 
Arab Spring and Socio-Political Stability in “GCC” 
It seems as if the completion of this thesis was preordained to coincide 
with the Arab Spring developments. The Arab world is taken by an 
ongoing wave of developments and unrests. These developments will 
probably continue and it is not yet clear how the Arab World would look 
like after the dust of these events settles, what would be the impacts of 
these developments on the peripheral spheres and at the same time, how 
would the peripheral, regional and international realities would influence 
the current Arab environment.  
1-  Among the groups of co-cultural countries, i.e. those with common 
history and heritage, the Arab countries have their own specific 
commonalities; their mutual interaction is deeper and much more serious.
1 
While the Latin American, Black African, Central Asian or Far Eastern 
nations could also be more or less categorized as co-cultural groups of 
states, their sense of a common fate, as well as common identity and 
feelings are much less than what prevails in the Arab World. This is 
despite the fact that the differences in per capita income and material 
welfare in this part of the world is much deeper than in any other groups of 
co-cultural nations. Some Arab states have the highest per capita income 
in the world, while some are among the poorest countries. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the people and even the elites and leaders of these 
countries have the feeling that they belong to a common culture and 
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identity. They have common self-esteems and even the same problems, 
and their destiny is closely tied to each other, particularly in the present 
world.
2
  
This can be confirmed as a fact by anyone who is familiar with the Arab 
world and the psychology and inner personal structure of the Arabs. At 
least, they have been so in their contemporary history; now this feeling has 
become stronger and more common than ever. They have the feeling that 
the world, especially the Western world, has stood against them and has 
taken degrading hostile positions. This is an important element in creating 
a sense of intimacy and common sympathy.
3
  
It is noteworthy that the developments of the last two or three decades, 
especially the developments of the past decade, has strengthened such 
feelings, to the extent that those individuals or groups who had different 
views and interpretations about the relations between Arabs and the West 
are now more or less isolated and went out of the debates. This has 
practically been in the interest of those whose views were just mentioned; 
a view that is currently prevailing in the Arab World.
4
  
2- This thesis focuses on "Change and Stability in the Persian Gulf 
Sheikhdoms". However, this will not be separate from the developments of 
the whole Arab World, and more significantly this group of states has a 
more determinant role and significance in the policies of the Arab World, 
due to reasons that will be discussed later on. This is due to the fact that 
their domestic and foreign policies as well as their social and political 
stability are deeply inter-connected.
5
  
At the beginning of the unrests and after the fall of Bin Ali and 
Mubarak, tensions also occurred in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain. In 
Saudi Arabia, the unrests were mainly concentrated in the mostly Shiite-
residing eastern parts of the country, as well as the more modern and 
larger cities of Riyadh and Jeddah. At the outset, the Shiites demanded the 
freedom of those who, for years, had been held in detention without trial. 
Later, they asked for the removal of discriminations against Shiites. 
However, the protests in Riyadh and Jeddah were mainly influenced by the 
reformist and freedom-seeking movements in Tunisia and Egypt in those 
days.  
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In Oman, the protests were primarily focused on unemployment, 
poverty and difficult labor situation, while in Bahrain the protests were of 
a different nature which will be discussed later on. Small scale protests 
were also observed in Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates which 
were soon suppressed through the measures by the governments and the 
normal life was resumed. In Oman and Saudi Arabia, except in eastern 
region, the situation calmed down by means of various measures. This 
meant that the Arab Spring was not able to shake up the pillars of the 
society, and the social and political stability in those countries, especially 
in areas where it related to the Sunni majorities.  
The main reason for this was- and remains to be- that the ruling regimes 
in this region, except for Bahrain and eastern parts of Saudi Arabia, enjoy 
a sufficient level of popularity. Although the political system and the 
political, cultural and social structures of these countries are traditional in 
nature and far from being considered as modern, these are proportional to 
their structures, as well as to the social, historical and identity realities; 
and this is the exact reason for their stability.
6
  
The majority of analysts and the Western and American political 
authorities have criticized these regimes because of their undemocratic 
nature, which is rather meant to refer to their old-fashioned and traditional 
political structures. Such criticisms have even amplified after 11 Sept. 
2001. However, the Arab Spring clearly showed that the stability of these 
regimes is mainly due to their popularity. Even in Qatar, where the regime 
is eager to be considered as modern, open and pioneer system, the political 
stability is only due to its tribal and traditional structure. These countries 
are willing to enter into the modern world while keeping, at the same time, 
their old structures; and this is what the majority of the citizens in those 
countries want, though each for a different reason. The future of this 
situation is something that will be discussed later on.
7
  
3- Among the six Sheikhdoms, Bahrain is an exception. Apart from its 
extensive historical, civilization and cultural ties with Iran, the majority of 
the Bahraini population was and is Shiite. However, the government and 
all elements of power, including the political structures, the military, the 
media and to a great extent the economic elements, are in the hands of the 
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ruling regime; thus leaving the Shiites subject to discrimination.
8
  
It would be a long debate to discuss the historical backgrounds of this 
inequity and its evolution. Important to note is that the social, cultural and 
then the political structures of this country are deeply influenced by this 
fact; it has thus shaped up the society on the basis of what the Arabs 
themselves call it as an sectarian reality, a concept which is different from 
tribal reality; these concepts have been discussed in the previous chapters.
9
  
Here, sectarian distinction means a division based on creed. Creed is 
meant to refer to various affiliations within a religion and in Islam which 
distinguishes one group from the other. The criterion is, thus, a judgment 
based on the affiliation of a person to this or that religious doctrine. 
Dignity and self-esteem of individuals, as well as their interests, 
exigencies and rights at the first instance depend on which school of 
thought they belong. Nevertheless, this is not the end of the story, as in 
such circumstances, the ruling powers try to accuse the other rival groups 
of lacking enough patriotic or nationalistic feelings, having links to the 
foreigners and even of being their mercenaries. This means that an ethnic 
affiliation, per se, can put a person into the best, or worst, social and 
political contexts.
10
  
This is the general concept of sectarianism in the Arab World. No 
doubt, this concept may change according to the peculiar historical, 
religious and cultural circumstances. However, this is the whole story 
concerning the Bahraini, and also Saudi, Shiites.  
Another important point is that in practice such thinking forms the 
political contemplation of the general public. They actually see the other 
group from a sectarian perspective and similarly assess their actions and 
activities. Therefore, the Bahraini Shiites belong to the Shiite section of 
the society even prior to the ruling class in Bahrain. The members of this 
group are viewed with a negative attitude and considered as the fifth 
column of the enemies and rivals.
11
  
As far as the Sheikhdoms and their stability or unsteadiness is 
concerned, the question is that such a line of thought is prevailing all 
across this region, even though at different levels. The majority of articles 
and analysis written by the authors and analysts of the region after the 
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unrests in Bahrain, were founded on the same concepts and were thus 
written within this context.
12
  
Moreover, the same applies to ruling regimes across the region. In 
many instances, as a part of the society influenced by the predominant 
culture, they think the same; however there are also those who may view 
and analyze the situation differently due to their familiarity and 
experiences, although they may act within the framework of sectarian 
policies, because they find it to be to their benefit. Such an approach is the 
best way to isolate their rivals and ensure their own immunity. People are 
keen on this kind of argument and propaganda, are convinced thereby and 
even believe that they are right.
13 
Moreover, the very basis of their media and advocacy is made and 
grown upon such culture and criterion. Even their theological advocacy is 
mixed with such ideas. Although Islam is one of the most lenient religions 
on racial, tribal, and ethnic issues, the mentality of the religious scholars 
and preachers in these countries is the same and acts in the same manner, 
especially when the state-sponsored religious advocacy is concerned.
14 
4- The concept and extent of sectarianism in the Sheikhdoms cannot be 
defined and delimited without due consideration to the northern shores of 
the Persian Gulf. As said before, this concept generally prevails across the 
Arab World, and particularly in the Middle East. But, ethnicity has its own 
characteristics in this region, and without it the internal situation cannot be 
understood.
15 
The whole northern coastlines of the Persian Gulf belong to Iran, a big 
and strong country, as compared to the other countries of the region, that 
owned even parts of the southern shores before the colonialism era. Iran is 
neither Arab nor Sunni and is a country with rich social and political 
transformations.
16 
At the time of the British presence in the region, the Arab countries did 
not fear Iran, especially because Iran itself was in one of the feeble periods 
of its history. After these countries gained their control over their affairs, 
Iran became one of their main concerns. The behavioral logic of these 
countries, both in their domestic and external affairs, could only be 
interpreted, taking into account this reality which is deeply connected to 
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their social and political stability.
17
  
Since the whole question is related to the Shiites, the best they could do 
was to accuse Shiites of being Iran's agents and mercenaries. This 
accusation was understandable and defensible both for the citizens of these 
countries and the people of the GCC‟s countries that had a deep sense of 
common destiny. This was also true for the extended Arab World whose 
morale, advocacy and political support was much needed by the 
Sheikhdoms.
18
  
As a result, all the negative historical background of the Arab-Ajam 
[non-Arab] as well as the Shiite-Sunni controversies along with fears from 
Iran and what they call as Iranian expansionist policy, served  to increase 
the sectarian contemplation of the Bahraini, and to some extent Saudi, 
societies. 
Undoubtedly, many people have in recent centuries immigrated from 
Iran to Bahrain or vice versa; they have been dissolved in the local 
cultures. Nowadays many people in Iran have 'Bahraini' or 'Bahrani' family 
names indicating their Bahraini origin, while people of Iranian origin form 
a major portion of the Bahrain population.
19
 
The fact is that, the people of Bahraini origin in Iran live along with 
other Iranians with no sensitivity whatsoever, just as do others have 
originally come from Iraq, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, India, 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. However, this is not true on the opposite side. 
This question is somehow understandable. But various social and political 
pressures and restrictions imposed on these people are far beyond the 
acceptable limits.
20
  
In any case, in light of Iran's presence with all its characteristics, the 
concept of being Shiite, and not followers of Shiism as a religious school 
of thought, in Bahrain and eastern parts of Saudi Arabia was formed and 
developed, though with differences. At the moment, this is the prevailing 
concept which exists as the basis of actions and reactions.
21
  
On this basis, the demands of the members of this group of people are 
viewed as the demands of an ethnic group which is separate from the main 
part of the society to which they belong. Such an approach, especially in 
the current situation of the world, leads to further extremist approaches on 
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the part of the opposition, that in turn not only leads to further disparity 
between the government and the opposition but also results in deepening 
of the social gaps. In other words, the Shiites and non-Shiites in the 
Bahraini society are going apart and this skepticism is also extended to 
other countries of the region and leads to a kind of polarization of the 
societies.
22
  
As a result of the ruling regime's defiance and resort to violence, the 
opposition in Bahrain, whose demand at the beginning was only limited to 
the change of the Prime Minister who has been in power for forty years 
and was believed to be the head of financial and administrative corruption, 
as well as the mastermind and implementer of the measures which violated 
the rights of the Shiites, asked for the overthrow of the regime upon the 
influence of the popular movements in the Arab countries which chanted 
the same slogan. The fact is that only part of the opposition raised this 
demand, but the overall public opinion in Bahrain, the region and the Arab 
world encouraged the other opposition groups to raise the same demand or 
remain silent vis-à-vis those who demanded so.
23
  
5- The movement of the Bahraini Shiites also provoked the Shiites in 
Saudi Arabia. It can be said with confidence that at the beginning the 
Shiites' protests in the eastern Saudi territory was mainly influenced by the 
rapid trend of developments in Tunis, and especially in Egypt; thus the 
demands were limited to specific issues. But, after the rise of the protests 
in Bahrain and the police violence in Lo'lo' [Pearl] Square, they also rised 
to support the Bahrainis. 
One should also take into account the differences between the situation 
of Shiites in Saudi Arabia and those in Bahrain. Bahrain is a small country 
with a Shiite majority, while Saudi Arabia is a big country with enormous 
resources and a Shiite minority. Moreover, the social, cultural and 
religious structure in this country is such that the Shiites' protests may not 
create major domestic problems. In practice, an international denunciation 
of the maltreatment of the minorities was the most important problem that 
the Saudis might have faced. 
Due to reasons mentioned earlier, the Shiites' protests have even 
increased domestic solidarity and stability. The prevalence of sectarian 
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thinking over the minds of the Sunni Saudis and their political and 
religious system, have caused some kind of skepticism against the Shiites 
and Iran; thus the Saudis have gained some kind of immunity against the 
Shiite protests. In some instances, the Saudis even needed these protests.
24
  
After the Saudi military intervention in Bahrain, protests occurred in the 
form of demonstrations in the eastern parts of Saudi Arabia. But these 
protests failed to create a crisis in the Saudi government and country. 
Their problem was how to limit the scope of the protests without killing 
the demonstrators. As mentioned earlier, the Saudi government's main 
problem was no more than saving its face abroad, especially in the west, 
and that it should not be accused of mistreating the minorities. And for 
different reasons, the Saudis paid much more attention to their external 
prestige than before.
25
  
Beside these unrests in the eastern parts of the country, unrests also 
occurred in two major cities of Riyadh and Jeddah influenced by the 
developments in Tunis and Egypt. The youth were mainly behind these 
protests as they sought more rights and freedoms and objected to the 
financial and administrative corruption of the ruling regime and the royal 
family. This was an alarm for the Saudis.
26
  
We have already discussed in previous chapters that in the autumn of 
1979, simultaneous unrests took place in Mecca, as well as in the eastern 
part of Saudi Arabia
27
. Extensive demonstrations in this region in early 
Muharram 1400 Hijri, corresponding to November of 1979, and the Shiites 
who held mourning ceremonies for Imam Hussain (A.S.) mainly in the 
form of groups of mourners marching from one place to another, tried to 
transform these ceremonies into anti-government demonstrations. More or 
less, they took this model from the demonstrations in Iran which led to the 
overthrow of the Shah regime in Iran.
28
  
Many people were killed or wounded in the clashes between the 
security forces and the demonstrators. A larger number of people were 
arrested. However, these incidents failed to seriously threaten the regime. 
The regime and its supporters had the main leverages at their hands and 
due to the sectarian thinking, the general public were pessimistic towards 
the Shiites and their demands. As a result, such protests had indirectly 
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strengthened the regime, as they did.
29
  
However, the ideological protests in Mecca which led to the seizure of 
al-Haram Mosque in November 1979 was rooted in the Wahhabi's idea, 
which itself is part of the ruling Sunni thought that sought the return to 
pure Wahhabism
30
. In their view, the ruling regime has diverted from the 
pure Wahhabism.
31 
As opposed to Shiite uprising, this movement had the potential to shake 
the pillars of the regime, as it did. The participants in this movement 
belonged to the tribes from which the members of the security forces had 
also come; thus they didn't want to fight against their tribal brothers.
32
  
The above example is evidence to show that the Sunni protests in Saudi 
Arabia, unlike the Shiite uprisings, can become a challenge for the ruling 
regime. As a result, the protests in Jeddah and Riyadh soon became a 
matter of concern for the regime, although they were smaller in scope as 
compared to the Shiite demonstrations in the eastern region. If the 
government hadn't prevented the speeding up of the events, these protests 
might have expanded and caused deep challenges for the Saudis.
33
  
Religious and economic leverages were used to counter this movement. 
During its rule over the country, the Al-Saud family has repeatedly 
resorted to these two leverages. The Wahhabi religious institution banned, 
as haraam, any protests and demonstrations, the suppression of which then 
became a religious duty. At the same time, the King allocated extensive 
financial resources for the people. It has also been said that the King urged 
his affiliates to act against financial irregularities, violations of laws and 
the abuses by the members of the Al-Saud family; and this was meant to 
be a campaign against corruption.
34 
Somehow, these two initiatives saved the regime and prevented further 
expansion of the protests, especially as the Saudi regime is equipped with 
a kind of 'religious militia', composed of the Wahhabi youth under the 
command of the Amr bil Ma'ruf wa Nahy an al Munkar Agency, command 
the good and forbid the evil, affiliated with the Saudi Ministry of 
Interior.
35 
The youth members of the militia have a more effective and efficient 
role than the security forces and serve as the ideological guardian forces of 
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the regime. In critical situations they take the responsibility to protect the 
political and religious bases of the regime.
36
  
At the moment, apart from the scarce demands by women to acquire the 
right for driving, the social situation in Saudi Arabia remains under control 
and the Arab Spring has not been able to inflict changes in the regime and 
its policies. This is especially true, as the Americans who are the main 
critics of the Saudis, are now standing by them.  
6- Revitalization of the Saudi Arabia's role in the Arab World is an 
important issue for the Saudis which is related to the Arab Spring 
developments. Saudi's presence in the Arab world has always been known 
to be with an attitude of calmness and conservativeness. This was 
especially true after the 1991 war.  
Although their tough enemy was defeated, this war was a defeat for the 
Saudis too. Their reputation was severely damaged and they were thus 
considered as the American mercenaries
37
. Even their traditional friends 
among the regimes, political parties, groups and individuals were either 
separated or pretended not to be Saudi friends as they were afraid of the 
public opinions. As a result of this war, the Saudis were confronted with 
numerous domestic problems, because the Muslims and religious scholars 
who had fundamentalist inclinations accused the Saudi regime of 
collaboration with the infidels and allowing the infidel soldiers enter the 
holy land
38
. This line of thought ultimately ended up in the subversive 
ideology of Al-Qaeda. 
39 
It took a long time for Saudi Arabia to regain its image. Ever since, they 
adopted a restraining and inward policy towards the Arab world. This was 
particularly important as a person like Mubarak was willing and had the 
capacity to rise and implement the Saudis' wishes. Mubarak was the voice 
that was heard from the Arab world. The Saudis had reasons to support 
Mubarak, and he also raised issues that pleased the Saudis.
40
  
After 11 September 2001, the Saudi policies became further inward and 
defensive. Arabs and the Arab world were accused and attacked for those 
incidents, and the Saudi royal family was criticized the most. Under such 
circumstances it was quite evident that the Saudis would adopt more 
restraining policies.
41
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It was a little while after the beginning of the Arab Spring, especially 
after the fall of Mubarak and cessation of protests in Riyadh and Jeddah 
that the Saudis actively returned to the Arabian scenery. The main reason 
for this change in attitude was that the Saudis felt that despite what others 
said, and maybe they themselves believed, they enjoyed a kind of popular 
acceptability, stability and constancy more than other Arab regimes.
42
  
The criticisms by the Western world of the Saudi regime, especially by 
the Americans, dated back long time ago. The majority of the authors and 
analysts who had written about this country have criticized the closed, 
traditional, non-democratic and violent Saudi system
43
. Occasionally, even 
the political authorities have explicitly or implicitly expressed their 
criticisms. This continued until 11 September 2001. After those incidents 
when it became known that Saudi citizens had a major role in the 9/11 
incidents, both from operational and financial point of view, the Saudis 
confronted extensive candid and frank criticism. Although other Arab 
regimes, too, faced some criticisms, the extent and quality of the criticisms 
against Saudi Arabia was very much different from those of Egypt and 
Tunis. It seemed as if these countries were more democratic and 
progressive than the Saudi regime.
44
  
The Arab Spring showed to the Saudis and other Sheikhdoms that 
modernity, and following a progressive and western style democratic 
system in itself will not guarantee their stability, continuity and popularity. 
The traditional and tribal political system in these countries was much 
more popular than the modern political system in the Arab world. This 
gave the Saudis enormous self-confidence and encouraged them to play a 
rising role in the developments of the Arab world.
45 
Their military presence in Bahrain is partly due to this same situation. 
The same logic lies behind their active presence in Yemen, Syria and 
Egypt and the reactivation of their policies towards Jordan, Morocco and 
Palestine. Moreover, the Saudis are now controlling the Arab World's 
mass media empire, including the satellite channels and the press of the 
Arab world, through which they try to lead and direct the present and 
future developments.
46
  
The Saudis feel that the Arab Spring will not bring about critical 
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domestic problems. However, these developments may have impacts on 
their foreign policy. In the mid and short terms, the overall atmosphere of 
the Arab world may influence the public opinion and increase public 
demands especially in terms of civil rights.
47
  
No matter what their objectives and ideas would be, what will be the 
final outcome of the developments and whether, at all, they can achieve 
those objectives, there is no doubt that the Saudis are now active in all 
areas that they may have an influence. In the past it was not the case and at 
the moment no other Arab regime is as active as they are. It can even be 
said that these regimes are now rather inactive than active.  
No doubt, one of the main objectives of the Saudis is to cut Iran's 
leverages in the region. This could not have been done before the Arab 
Spring as the situation was static and they didn't believe in their capacity. 
However, they can now do that in view of the changing circumstances and 
the existing excitements, which are altering everything. 
7- Among the six Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia were more significantly hit by the Arab Spring. However, the other 
four countries, too, were directly or indirectly affected by these 
developments.  
First, Oman is the poorest country amongst the GCC states. It is 
marginalized from the geographical as well as political and cultural points 
of view; indeed this is what the government itself needed.
48
  
Majority of the people follow the Ibadhi faith, a branch of Islam with its 
own literature and beliefs. In the past, the majority of Sunnis were 
pessimistic towards this group; nowadays, however, they have milder 
beliefs. As a result of its geographic situation, religious beliefs and culture, 
historical background and social structure, Oman does not feel proximity 
with its neighbors. This could have been the reason why during the crisis 
in Zofar, Oman asked for Shah's assistance
49
. People in Oman had the 
feeling that the Arabs, especially the leftist Arab regimes were supporting 
insurgents in Zofar, while at the same time the rightist regimes were not 
willing to assist Oman. As a result, they asked for Shah's support. In those 
days, these events brought up extensive criticisms by the Arabs and the 
leftist Arab regimes against Oman, and also Iran.
50 
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In any event, this decision per se and the lack of cooperation of Arab 
regimes with Muscat was an indication that this country is not within the 
scene of Arab developments. The decision helped further distancing of 
Oman from the Arab world and the other Sheikhdoms.
51 
This situation was altered in early 1980's which coincided with the 
Islamic revolution in Iran, beginning of Iraq-Iran war and the 
establishment of Gulf Cooperation Council. Like Yemen which at that 
time was divided into Northern and Southern Yemen, Oman too could not 
have stayed outside the Council. Oman was on the shores of the Oman Sea 
and controlled the southern part of the Strait of Hormuz, the northern part 
of which being controlled by Iran. 
These realities compelled Oman to enter the Council, and it did. 
However, Oman always kept its own peculiar policy. This policy can only 
be understood in light of Oman's balanced policy towards Iran over three 
decades and its differences with the policies of all, or majority, of the 
Council members.  
In any event, Oman is in such a situation and indeed it is willing to be 
so. It is a vast and geographically arduous country with scanty oil 
resources which tries to find its way to development based on its own 
human resources. As a result the number of proportion of migrant labor 
force in this country is much less than other countries of the region.
52
  
At the same time, due to expansion of communication systems and 
mass media, the Omani people are increasingly aware of the economic and 
livelihood situation in other Persian Gulf countries. Their dissatisfaction is 
more due to their increased expectations than their poverty.  
However, Oman is also suffering from its own specific problems which 
are different from the problems in other Sunni countries. Until recently, 
the majority of the people were engaged in agriculture. As mentioned 
earlier, the vast and mountainous territory, with sufficient water supply 
and fertile land had historically caused the prevalence of agriculture in this 
country.
53
  
Other countries of the Council, except Bahrain, suffer from lack of 
fertile land and fresh water; as a result they had no traditional agriculture 
activities. In Oman, such was the case and a large portion of people were 
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involved in agriculture.
54
  
The developments of the last three decades weakened the traditional 
agriculture and the younger generation of farmers preferred to immigrate 
to urban areas. This added to economic and unemployment problems. 
They were unskilled and lacked the capacity for their employment in the 
new industrial and non-industrial sectors of the country. It was quite 
evident that in such cases foreign labor forces were to be utilized; this led 
to intensification of unemployment and wage reduction.  
As a result of Arab Spring, the unseen problems of the society in these 
areas were revealed. However, certain protests were directed against 
financial corruption of a number of state officials, who were immediately 
replaced. This was a noteworthy move by the government as due to its 
more or less homogeneous social composition, the regime did not feel that 
responding to such a demand would be interpreted as a withdrawal against 
the protestors who might raise the level of their demands after such 
moves.
55
  
In circumstances where the opposition belongs to a specific group who 
have been oppressed for any reason whatsoever, there is a concern that a 
response to one demand may lead to other demands. Such a risk is much 
less probable in a homogeneous and uniform society.  
At any event, through replacement of the corrupt officials, the regime 
managed to prevent expansion and deepening of the people's 
dissatisfaction and dissent. It was also able to temporarily control and 
contain poverty and unemployment through financial assistance of the 
GCC. No doubt, the Sultan's personal characteristics and popular status 
had a significant role in this context. When talking to the protestors, he 
used a soft language and sympathetic approach. He didn't threaten or 
degrade them. All these elements helped the country to pass the sensitive 
period created by the Arab Spring which could have shaken its security 
and stability.
56 
8- Kuwait must be viewed separately. Despite significant common 
features between Kuwait, UAE and Qatar, including their enormous 
wealth and foreign labor force, Kuwait is in fact different from these two 
countries and the GCC as a whole. This difference has its main roots in the 
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historical and social backgrounds.
57
  
The history of Kuwait is not older than two centuries
58
; however, from 
the very beginning, the people in this region were in contact with others, 
including Arabs of the region, Iranians, Ottomans,  Europeans especially 
the British, Indians and other Asians. This was required by Kuwait's 
geographical location. As a result, as compared to other countries of the 
region, Kuwait was born and grown in a rather open environment.
59 
This historical experience had a significant influence on Kuwait's 
peculiar psychology and the creation of its social, political and intellectual 
structures. Such psychology and structures survived and are still active 
despite bitter experiences, numerous threats and even full occupation of 
the country. These structures are more modern than other countries of the 
region.
60
  
It is exactly for this reason that the reactions of this country to the 
outside developments are different from its peer countries of the region. 
The majority of people are Sunni; however there exists a large Shiite 
minority. A minority within the Sunnis is Salafid with fundamentalist 
tendencies. The majority of the Salafids do not have deposing tendencies, 
despite the fact that some the senior members and authorities of Al-Qaeda 
were- and are- from Kuwait.
61 
There is also a minority among Shiites with revolutionary inclinations. 
But due to prevailing situation in Kuwait, this minority should be seen 
within the context of non-revolutionary Shiites, while the minority 
Salafids are viewed in the context of the Sunni majority. This is what is 
duly noted by the Kuwaiti government and people. The government is in 
fact utilizing these realities for the sake of its own balance and stability.
62
  
As mentioned earlier, Kuwait is more modern than other members of 
the Council. One of the manifestations of this modernity is the relative 
weakness of the tribal and sectarian structures versus the power of the 
Kuwaiti nationality. As a result, tribal and sectarian realities play a less 
significant role in that society. It doesn't mean that such realities do not 
exist at all; but it can be said that they are weaker than what can be 
observed in other societies. For instance, the problems in Bahrain have 
created less problems for the Kuwaiti Shiites as compared to Shiites in 
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other Sheikhdoms. The main reason behind this could be the strength of 
Kuwaiti nationality and the weakness of the tribal and sectarian 
structures.
63 
Apart from all these, Kuwait is a rich country. It is the first country that 
has found this wealth and it has been distributed to the people. This was 
unlike what happened in Saudi Arabia which found this wealth 
immediately after the Second World War. In Saudi Arabia, the wealth was 
gradually increasing but it was all distributed among members of royal 
family and their affiliates. Therefore, the ordinary people tasted the oil 
wealth much later than the Kuwaitis.
64 
It was probably due to the same reason of having extensive and long 
term contacts with the outside world that the Kuwaiti rulers had also 
invested their huge national wealth in suitable and prospective centers. 
They also distributed the wealth among their original Kuwaiti citizens in 
an appropriate and satisfactory manner. These measures helped stabilize 
the ruling regime. As a result, the people's demands were not rooted in 
economic issues, and were mainly focused on social, political and legal 
requests. This continues to be the case.
65 
Having all these in mind, the Arab Spring did not have significant 
reflections in Kuwait and it couldn't have that. Of course, as Kuwait and 
Kuwaitis deeply consider themselves Arabs and dependent on Arab 
culture, identity and behavior, any development in the Arab world will 
draw the attention of the ruling elites and the public. But this didn't have 
domestic implications and didn't lead to protests and demonstrations. It 
can even be said that the majority of the demands of Kuwaiti people have 
domestic roots and are less influenced by the outside world.
66 
After the fall of Bin Ali and spread of protests in Egypt leading to the 
fall of Mubarak, some movements took place in Kuwait which was mostly 
self-motivated and emotional; these could not be categorized as political, 
social and economic demands. However, after the expansion of 
demonstrations in Bahrain and especially after the use of violence, the 
killing of a number of demonstrators, and intervention of the Saudi forces, 
the Kuwaiti Shiites reacted in support of the Bahraini demonstrators. In 
other words, the Arab Spring had its indirect impacts on Kuwait too.
67
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Kuwait showed a conservative reaction to these developments, because 
it should have kept the domestic balance and in an effort to prevent a 
collision between Shiites and Sunnis, especially the Salafids who are the 
main rivals, and at the same time it should avoid tensions in its relations 
with the GCC, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The government's indulgence 
and its vast interaction with the influential Shiite figures extensively 
helped resolve the problem and it is very unlikely that the Arab Spring 
could effectively create tensions in that country. This is especially true 
because this country has effectively used, and continues to use, the Salafid 
leverage to control Shiites and vice versa.
68 
9- Among the Council members, Qatar and the Emirates are the most 
similar to each other. However, they are following totally different foreign 
policies; thus they should be studied separately. First we focus on Qatar.
 
Qatar entered practically the contemporary time and developments of 
the region upon the coming of the present Emir to power. Although Qatar 
became independent in 1956 and it started oil exploration in 1960's, it 
remained one of the most isolated among the Arab countries and even in 
the region.
69 
The current Emir came to power in 1995 after a nonviolent coup. With 
the assistance of a number of the elites of the ruling family, he tried to 
follow an active, open and even adventurist policy. This policy in these 
days is active both in the context of Arab world and at the international 
level.
70 
The important thing is that Qatar has tried to create the requirements of 
such a policy. Establishment of Aljazeera satellite network, and later 
creation of other networks affiliated to the main Aljazeera entity, an active 
and high profile airline company, Qatar Airways, hotels, conference halls 
for international gatherings, increasing presence in sport, culture and youth 
activities and laying down the necessary infrastructures, efforts to create a 
Qatari nationalism using all required means, from creation of locations 
indicating Qatar's history, art and architecture to domestic media 
propaganda and revision of school books.
71 
Their main modality is based on establishing neutral and friendly 
contacts with all parties of any development and trying to play a mediatory 
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role. This role has particularly proved more effective and successful in the 
Arab world. The main reason for this success is the enormous financial 
resources of Qatar and a vacuum in the leadership in the Arab world, 
especially after the early 1990's.
72
  
The problem was not with the lack of Arab leadership, per se, but it lies 
with the isolationism and lack of eagerness of the Arab countries to play a 
role at regional and international arena. Larger Arab countries that had the 
power to influence were not willing to do so, each for its own reasons. 
Thus the ground was paved for a country like Qatar. It was a small country 
with no historical background. At the same time it is a rich country and 
although it has no historical, cultural or even political weight, it had at the 
same time no negative point in its profile, while many potentially 
influential countries had gloomy profiles.
73 
Undoubtedly, the Arab world and the outside world needed a country 
like Qatar with such characteristics and ambitions, especially as it was able 
to pay the costs of its own measures. Within the Arab world there were 
countries, like Saudi Arabia, that did not like to compete with the policies 
of this tiny Sheikdom, but was not in a situation to oppose it. Such 
dissatisfactions were imperfect enough not to stop Qatar or affect its 
policies.
74
 Now it should be seen how Qatar dealt with the Arab Spring. 
The Arab Spring created almost no problem for Qatar. However, 
Aljazeera which is more or less directly or indirectly influenced by Qatar's 
foreign policy played a significant role in these developments. Basically 
after its establishment, this network played a major role in leading and 
politicizing the public opinion; it still does. Its success was mainly due to 
its more or less independent, progressive, Arab nationalistic, active and 
update approach. It can even be said that this network reflects the thoughts 
and ideals of Arabs, especially the youth, and the political and dynamic 
forces.
75
  
It was probably due to these reasons that relations between Tunis and 
Aljazeera, and subsequently Qatar itself, were severed, as a result of which 
the Qatari Ambassador was ultimately summoned from Tunisia. This 
negative background, in turn, helped more effective reflection of unrests in 
Tunis.  Similarly, the coverage of the unrests in Egypt helped the fall of 
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Mubarak, although in Egypt's case, the role of Aljazeera was less 
significant due to the possibility of the live coverage the developments in 
Egypt by other major western and global networks.
76 
News and analytical coverage by Aljazeera of the unrests in other parts 
of the Arab world from Libya to Yemen and other countries where 
demonstrations were held continued with no specific problems. The only 
problem was in the case of Bahrain. Despite the traditional problems 
between Qatari and Bahraini regimes, Aljazeera followed a totally 
different approach towards the developments in Bahrain to the extent that 
one of its famous and veteran members, Ben Jeddou, resigned. This was 
not the sole problem. Qatar's policy towards the Bahraini crisis was in line 
with that of Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states. However, the Saudi 
and Qatari policies are generally different and even contradictory. Bahrain 
was one of the rare cases when these two policies went hand in hand.
77 
At the beginning of the unrests in Libya and Benghazi, Qatar stood 
beside the European governments against Gaddafi and resorted to 
measures which were later trimmed down. In the case of Yemen, Qatar 
stayed beside the Council.  
In general, Qatar's position on Arab Spring was either based on 
approval or silence, with Bahrain being the only exception. Although 
Qatar did not agree to send security forces like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, 
it approved the Saudi military intervention and thus did not follow a 
neutral policy.
78 
10- Now, we should study the position of the Emirates towards the 
Arab Spring. 
As concerns the domestic and foreign policies, the UAE is one of the 
most conservative regimes in this region. Although in general these 
regimes are conservative, one can say that the UAE stands on top in terms 
of its conservative policies.
79 
The conservatism is rooted in the fragile structure of this country. The 
UAE is composed of seven states that in 1971, and at the time of 
independence, decided to form a unified state.
80 
To maintain and sustain such a group of states in the ever evolving 
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situation of the region required some kind of conservatism. The first ruler 
of the Emirates, Sheikh Zayed who was named as the Arab Sage by the 
Emiratis and the Arabs as a whole, followed such a policy. He was one of 
the most successful and well-known Arab rulers who indeed enjoyed vast 
popularity.  
This success and popularity was exactly in line with the conservative 
policy which in turn was rooted in the tribal structures. Patience, tolerance 
and hesitation along with a pragmatic and unambitious policy and a 
realistic and even positive approach towards the modernity and modern 
civilization, were among the main elements of his success. He was 
practically the founder of the political culture of his country. His approach 
and modality influenced the Emirati authorities and they always acted, and 
continue to act, in the same framework. Undoubtedly, this policy was in 
line with the ethics and spirits of the Emirati people especially some of 
their rulers, including the former ruler of Dubai and his son, Sheikh 
Mohammad.
81 
Although Arabs are essentially a sensitive and emotional nation, such 
characteristics are rare in the UAE. They are more seeking a peaceful life 
with welfare and free from troubles. Their past forty years of experience 
after their independence shows the same. They have experienced their 
contemporary history and world through such prerequisites of welfare and 
well-being.
82
  
In any event, their overall approach towards various developments has 
been like this. Most of the time, they watch the regional and Arab world 
developments with suspicion and anxiety, although they generally prefer 
not to show such anxieties.
83
  
Thus it can be said that the Emirati rulers tackled the Arab Spring in the 
context of such notional and emotional perspective. Like their other 
counterparts in the Persian Gulf and even with more emphasis, the UAE 
rulers welcome stability, in whatever form it might be, than change. They 
are anxious about political change and it is natural that they will not 
welcome radical changes.
84
  
These developments have not caused any significant changes inside the 
UAE. But their foreign policy has been under pressure. They didn't expect 
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the fall of Mubarak and even in the early days, they felt a sense of vacuum 
and insecurity, because Egypt and its position, apart from whatever it did, 
was a source of serenity. They feel they need a strong and politically 
modest Egypt, because such an Egypt will put the Arab World in the path 
towards their favorite perceptions and ideals.
85 
Tensions in Bahrain made them really concerned. The position of the 
Shiite minority in UAE is so shaky that it cannot become a source of 
concern, like in Kuwait. From long time ago, the UAE rulers had also 
prepared themselves for such shaky situations. Thus the crisis in Bahrain 
did not create a serious domestic problem. However, the offshoots of the 
unrests in Bahrain would have definitely made the region unstable and 
exposed it to political rivalry of the regional and extra-regional powers.
86
  
Continuation of unrests in Bahrain and the incapacity of its regime to 
control the situation prompted the Saudi intervention. The Emiratis 
accompanied the Saudis against their own wishes and general policies. 
However, this companionship and partnership was more symbolic. They 
were not genuinely satisfied with it and perhaps the Saudi pressure was the 
main cause for their partnership.
87 
11- As stated, the Arab Spring had impacts in the domestic and foreign 
policies of the six members of GCC in one way or another. Bahrain was 
the main cornerstone of such impacts. Others were mainly affected as a 
result of the situation in Bahrain. It should now be seen how they looked at 
this issue.  
The fact is that all of them are aware of the repression and cruelty 
against Shiites. However, they believe that the main issue is much deeper. 
They thought that the movement of the Bahraini Shiites will lead to the 
provocation of their fellow Shiites in other Sheikhdoms and also the whole 
Arab and Islamic world. It was also noted that the demands of the Bahraini 
Shiites which at the beginning were only focused on internal reforms, 
dramatically changed into their request to overthrow the ruling regime. 
The third point was that the Bahraini protestors were considered as Iran's 
proxies in Bahrain and the whole region. These three elements prompted 
these Sheikhdoms to be sensitive towards Bahrain's developments and 
have practically placed them not beside, but behind the Bahraini regime. 
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Some had officially and openly expressed their support, while others stated 
their support through unofficial channels and the governmental and semi-
governmental media. In proportion to these fluctuations, the non-Shiite 
public opinions in these countries as well as their media took a negative, or 
even very negative, approach. Probably no such negative and hostile 
attitude towards Arab Spring has ever been seen in other regions.
88
  
This clearly indicated the interdependence and domestic and political 
fragility of these countries. The political structure and modalities on 
transfer of power and election of the rulers in these countries are basically 
the same; and this is one of the main reasons for the close relationship 
between these countries. This proximity is both an element of stability and 
sustainability, as such a homogeneous structure has caused their common 
destiny, and a source of instability and fragility, because any changes in 
this structure will naturally create a challenge for the others as well. If the 
political system in Bahrain is to fall apart after a popular movement, then a 
same movement can directly threaten all these six nations.  
Although it might be right to say that the ruling regimes in the other 
five countries enjoy some kind of popular support as a result of which the 
fall of the regime in Bahrain will not entail a threat in the short term, 
however a disruption in the balance is a threat, especially as this model 
could recur in other countries. Such an experience could at least be a 
tempting one. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this argument is even more 
accurate. 
There is another point relating to the position of the Shiites in these 
countries. As a religious minority, the Shiites enjoy their best status first in 
Oman and then in Kuwait. Although the Shiites have a more appropriate 
situation in these two countries as compared to the other four countries, 
they are still under suspicion. Such suspicion is not necessarily political in 
nature and in many instances has social and cultural origins. No doubt, the 
situation of the Shiites in other countries is more fragile and unsteady, as 
they are subject to even further suspicion.
89 
This is because these countries in general lack the modern basic 
requirements of statehood. Tribal and sectarian realities are still strong and 
the individuals are first viewed as belonging to their tribal and sectarian 
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affiliations than citizens enjoying equal rights. It is the level of their tribal 
and sectarian attachment that determines their loyalty to the ruling regime 
or even to their country. Most important of all, the ruling regime 
categorizes its citizens according to their tribal and sectarian affiliations.
90
  
Undoubtedly, this is one of the most significant vulnerabilities of the 
Persian Gulf countries. Although the extent of the problem in each of these 
countries is different, it could be that in normal circumstances this problem 
may not have a clear manifestation. However, this can be revealed in 
critical and sensitive periods.
91 
No doubt, Iran's presence on the northern shores of the region has 
further intensified the tribal and sectarian realities of these countries. In 
general, these countries fear Iran and to a large extent such a feeling seems 
natural. Iran is a big and ancient country with rich natural, historical and 
humanitarian backgrounds which in various stages of history had all or 
certain important parts of the southern shores of the Persian Gulf under its 
control. Taking into account the position of these countries, such a concern 
was natural especially after the British forces left the region in early 
1970's.
92
  
After the Islamic Revolution, these concerns were intensified, mainly 
because of the vacuum of power after the fall of Shah and their lack of 
knowledge over the foreign policy of the new government especially with 
the certain provocative comments and statements. These concerns were 
further deepened after the breakout of war between Iran and Iraq, the fall 
of Khorramshahr and the expansion of battlefields and the subsequent 
fears and the insecurity in the Persian Gulf. Despite all these, Iran was 
always viewed as a cornerstone for the stability in these countries. They 
were confident that in the absence of Iran, their countries would have been 
swallowed by the Saddam Hossein regime or would have been destabilized 
by the South Yemen regime or even governments similar to Abdolkarim 
Qassim or Nasser regimes of late 1950's or early 1960's.
93
  
The approach towards Iran was altered after the end of Iran-Iraq war, 
and especially after the occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent war 
which ended this occupation. This became a new element in Iran's foreign 
policy in 1990's and later until the present time. 
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Iran was ready to continue its main policies on Palestine, its domestic 
policies and also the nuclear programme even if it required a confrontation 
with the US and the West. All these issues were challenges for these 
countries. The most significant challenge was the possibility of a military 
conflict which would have definitely affected all southern neighbors of the 
Persian Gulf.  
In these circumstances, the fact that some citizens of these countries, 
mainly Shiites, were inclined towards Iran and its policies were 
troublesome and would have caused internal split in the society. As a 
result, Iran became a question of domestic concern. Moreover, there was a 
situation whereas the Shiites showed the most inclination towards Iran. 
The main reasons for such tendency could be found in the expansion and 
deepening of the revolutionary feelings as well as their unpromising and at 
least unacceptable situation in addition to the repression they were facing 
in all aspects of life and their view towards Iran. All these, prompted the 
Shiites of the region show more inclination towards Iran than any other 
period in the contemporary history.
94
  
In any event, Iran was an important and strong neighbor that followed a 
policy different from the overall policies of the Sheikhdoms and, as such, 
was inspiring for many citizens of these countries, mainly Shiites. As such, 
Iran was considered as an element of threat. These two elements along 
with the first one, that called for the overthrow of the political system were 
the main determinant factors on the attitude of the Persian Gulf countries 
towards the uprising in Bahrain.
95 
It might be a separate debate to study the views of the Persian Gulf 
countries towards Iran, the evolving of these views, their positive and 
negative elements, their impacts on stability and instability of these 
countries, etc. These issues have been discussed before; however, one 
should not forget that the negative manifestation of these relations in 
critical situations does not entail the factual nature of these relations. Due 
to their historical memory and their political and geopolitical reckoning, 
the Persian Gulf nations believe that Iran is an element of balance and 
stability in the region. For different reasons, such a historical memory is 
less significant for the new generations; however, the geopolitical 
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considerations have found more importance than the past.
96
  
12- Another consequence of the Arab Spring was further widening of 
the sectarian differences and disparities. In short, a sect (ta'ifah) is a social 
group with firm beliefs in a specific religion or creed. For instance, the 
Maronites, the Druze, the Alawis and even the Coptic Christians are 
considered as ta'ifah, while the Berbers who are spread along the north 
African countries are not ta'ifah. 
Such a social structure exists in some of those countries, were social-
religious groups could be found. But it is even more noteworthy that the 
majority of Arabs, including those from the Arab Middle East are well 
familiar with this concept. They view the political issues and 
developments of the Arab world in this perspective, of course with an 
overall negative approach.
97 
As mentioned, the sectarian distinctions within certain Arab countries 
exist as a fact, but their appearance and emergence as well as their 
influence depends on external circumstances. In general, the Arab Spring 
provided appropriate circumstances for the emergence of this 
phenomenon. Having discussed the situation in Bahrain, the impacts of the 
Arab Spring developments in other Sheikhdoms need to be studied further 
on.  
In this context, the developments in Syria are the most significant 
incidents to be studied. As concerns the sectarian composition within a 
country, Syria can be considered the most diverse one in the region. There 
is a Sunni majority, with the Alawi, Druze and Christian minorities each 
having its own multiple partitions. As concerns the heritage of eastern 
Christianity, Syria can be considered the richest and the most ancient 
country.  
Throughout history, the interrelations of these groups have been 
generally good and free from tensions; however, in certain historical 
epochs, mainly during the Ottoman Empire, these relations tended to be 
filled with tension and complexity. Syria, somehow, holds the heritage of 
this historical background.
98
  
At the early years of their control over the Syrian region, the Ottomans 
followed a tough policy against the Shiites and Alawis who were subject 
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to attacks and massacres. As a result, they preferred to escape and seek 
refuge in mountainous areas. In the middle of the Ottoman era, the 
situation was somehow calm and tolerable; however, the situation in Syria 
became more difficult at the later periods of the Ottomans and at the time 
that waves of nationalistic movements expanded across all Ottoman 
territory, from the European to the Arab parts of the Empire, especially 
after the rise of Turkish nationalism with its different manifestations and 
affiliations. The local Turkish rulers were, first of all, tough on the Arabs 
and the Syrians, and, secondly, adopted diverse policies against different 
groups and ethnicities.
99
  
To justify their policies, these rulers tried to create tension in the 
relations between the sectarian groups; and this was what happened in 
practice. Taking into account the historical and religious backgrounds, the 
major tensions rose between the Alawis and the Sunnis. The same trend 
also occurred within Turkey itself; however, with the rise of Ataturk, this 
tension waned and was gradually weakened.  
Today's developments in Turkey has prompted some kind of 
consolidation between these two and the policies of Turkey after Ataturk 
have encouraged and intensified this policy; a policy that is followed up 
more seriously by Erdugan‟s government. However, this development did 
not take place in Syria. As a result, the Sunni-Alawi conflict has continued 
as in the past. This was especially due to the fact that the ruling policy 
during the Baath regime and even before that, was based more on Arab 
ethnicity and identity than on national unity and Syrian nationality.
100 
It is only an emphasis on national unity and common feeling of 
citizenship that can resolve, or at least inhibit, such problems, as it 
happened in Turkey. Nevertheless, emphasis on Arab unity and 
nationalism is not capable to reduce the sectarian disputes. At the same 
time, as the Arab heritage in contemporary era is mostly considered as a 
Sunni legacy, any emphasis on that, at least in the long run, would imply 
the strengthening of the Sunni identity and declining the Alawi identity. 
This is a phenomenon that has occurred in post-Saddam era in Iraq in the 
context of the Sunni and Shiite identity.
101
  
As a result, the ethnic problem in Syria survived and was even 
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intensified. After the coming of Hafiz Assad and the Baath party to power, 
this phenomenon found a new form and was even institutionalized. Thus 
the best element to criticize the ruling elite, within or outside the country, 
was to charge them of being Alawi, and that the Alawis are doing this or 
that. As a result, the political competition was transformed into a sectarian 
rivalry. 
The heavy shadows of this competition, or hostility, can be observed 
during the whole period of Hafiz Assad's rule that on certain occasions 
even resulted in bloody clashes. The main cause of all such clashes was 
the sectarian conflict and revenge. During Bashar Assad's rule, these 
conflicts were reduced but with the rise of Arab Spring the conflict 
heightened again which was also supported by the countries that sought to 
weaken Syria. Among them, Arab countries stood in the first row. Now we 
study this issue within the context of the Arab countries, especially as the 
members of the GCC are concerned.
102
  
In the chapter on "Religion and Culture", an argument has been 
discussed according to which the Salafid thinking and also the Muslim 
Brotherhood has significant influence in the GCC states. The predominant 
ideology in Saudi Arabia is Salafid in nature which is promoted by the 
Wahhabi clerics and structures. The Salafid thought has considerable 
historical and social influence in other Sheikhdoms. Moreover, many 
Muslim Brotherhood scholars and personalities from different countries, 
especially from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Sudan, have immigrated to these 
countries especially to Saudi Arabia, where they have now gained 
significant theological, social and economic influence.
103
  
In principle, Salafids are in conflict with all non-Salafids. Such a 
conflict reaches its highest degree when it comes to the Shiites and Alawis. 
As a result of the 1970's and 1980's incidents in Syria, the Muslim 
Brothers in general and the Syrian branch of the group follow a flagrant 
hostility against Alawis and the ruling regime in Syria. These facts have 
provided the required social and media backgrounds for the current 
developments.
104
  
Of course, it should be noted that in many instances the members of 
Muslim Brotherhood have not immigrated, but have rather escaped. A 
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large number of the group's members have been under prosecution, 
persecution and torture in the majority of the Arab countries of the Middle 
East. This party has been essentially banned in these countries, to the 
extent that any affiliation to this party was considered as the heaviest 
political offense.
105
  
Before the recent developments which resulted in the weakening of the 
Syrian regime, the members of the Muslim Brotherhood could not openly 
express views that could be beyond the predefined policies of the society 
in which they lived. After the recent uprisings, however, they were able to 
openly express criticisms against the Alawi group; the views that were 
generally welcomed by the political officials of the host country.
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As concerns the GCC regimes, these countries had never been 
sympathetic towards Syria. First of all, in their view, Syria is a leftist 
regime which is not favorable for these countries. Secondly, Syria is an 
ally of Iran and Hezbollah. And thirdly, Syria's policy on Israel is totally 
different from the policies adopted by these Sheikhdoms.  
Despite all these, Syria was tolerated and it was felt that at certain 
points its presence was required and necessary. They were confident that 
Syria will ultimately move within the path of Arab world's interest and 
exigencies and its decisions are more logical and reasonable. Its proximity 
to Iran, though it could be in the interests of Iran and its ally  Hezbollah, 
but it could serve as the most convenient channel of communication with 
this country, especially at the difficult times of crisis. It could also serve as 
an element of control. Even more, they also knew that Syria's resistance 
against Israel is not based on war or adventurism; thus, despite the 
differences in position and attitudes, Syria's policy could be acceptable to 
them. What was a matter of concern for the Persian Gulf regimes was a 
warmonger policy, not the sole policy of resistance.
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It was due to all these reasons, and even more other reasons, that Syrian 
regime was considered acceptable, despite the tensions that existed in their 
relations. For instance, the Saudis were not fond of the Syria's policy in 
Lebanon and openly criticized that.  
This trend continued until the beginning of the unrests in Syria. Salafids 
of Saudi Arabia and even the clerics associated with the Saudi government 
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played an important role in provoking Syrians to rise against their regime. 
They openly announced that the Alawi group is deviant of religion. 
Assad's family, especially Hafiz Assad, was criticized and the people were 
called to rise against them. People were provoked to launch uprising 
against the regime, even if it required that one third of their population 
lose their lives.
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Political authorities remained silent against these statements and even 
resorted to measures which were interpreted as approving the views of 
these clerics. According to certain reports, they even sent weapons and 
equipment for the anti-regime militants. These were intended to encourage 
those who sought to overthrow the government for religious and sectarian 
incentives and were involved in the assassination of the security, police 
and military forces. Although Syria was not the scene of a civil war similar 
to what took place in Libya and Yemen, the protests were not peaceful 
either, unlike what happened in Tunis, Egypt and Bahrain. A considerable 
number of government forces were killed. Undoubtedly, as it happened in 
those three countries, the majority of protestors demanded nonviolent 
demonstrations, while a smaller group resorted to assassinations and 
terror.
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The continuation of the demonstrations resulted in the weakening of the 
regime and its prestige. It was at this point that the Saudis started their 
open criticisms. They believed that the fall of Syria would cut Iran's hands 
in the region and would restrict Hezbollah and reduce the Shiite stress. 
And they favored all these to happen.  
It should be said that the revival of the sectarian hostilities was one of 
the consequences of the Arab Spring. The members of the GCC, especially 
the Saudis, have tried to divert the potentials of this movement as a 
campaign to seek freedom and justice and the fight against corruption into 
a sectarian clash. This movement will definitely impact the future of Syria 
and all countries with sectarian structures. It can also influence the future 
and stability of the Sheikhdoms.
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Having said that, if a significant development takes place in Syria to the 
extent that it results in changes in the Syrian policies on Israel and 
Palestine, the overall policies of the Arab World will change and the social 
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and popular pressures resulting from such a development will definitely 
influence the countries of the Persian Gulf.  
The fact is that the question of Israel and Palestine is not solely a 
political issue for the Arab regimes. They are also involved with the public 
opinion, especially with regards to those who show higher sensitivity to 
this issue and are more politically active than other classes of the society. 
If these regimes bypass certain limits in their approach towards Israel, they 
will face internal reactions. Most important of all are the reactions by 
those groups who are political and at the same time seek pretexts to openly 
express their protests. It happens that these groups are generally young and 
dissent and their protests can be easily expanded in a way that such 
protests may not be limited to the policies on Israel.
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It is also noteworthy that these young people have, in general, Islamic 
and puritan inclinations and can be easily attached to radical ideologies 
like Al-Qaida. Even more significant, is that they can have an impact on 
the public opinion that is not satisfied with the policies of the Arab 
regimes over Israel. And this can lead to more general protests.
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This situation prevails in many GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia. It 
can be said that the public opinion and the radical youth have remained 
silent over the policies of their leaders on Israel and Palestine. But this 
silence is fragile and can be broken at any moment. Even a report by 
satellite media channels can prompt the silence to be broken.
113
  
What helped these regimes in their policies versus Palestine was the 
overall policy of the Arab world. And Syria played the leading role in 
creating a balance in such a general policy.  
Syria has always been the leader of the resistance front and the pioneer 
element of the Arab policy. Its position had firstly helped the greater 
popularity of the conservative regimes for the Western countries and 
allowed them to adopt a more independent policy than what the 
Westerners and Israelis wanted. Secondly, Syria and its allies were the 
symbol of commitment, self-esteem and pride of the Arab world. Although 
the more politically active youth who lived in these conservative countries 
had objections to the policies of their regimes, but they considered 
themselves as Arabs and felt that at least a part of the Arab world is 
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following a revolutionary and pioneer policy against Israel. And this gave 
them confidence.  
Nobody knows in the absence of a regime like Syria to rise and support 
its revolutionary allies, what would happen to the overall Arab policies 
against Israel. It is not clear what would be the nature of interaction with 
Israel, and to what extent the policies of the conservative regimes will be 
tolerated. Even more important, the reactions of the committed and 
revolutionary youth and the potential social, political and even cultural and 
religious are not known. No doubt, all these developments will influence 
the social and political realities of the Persian Gulf countries, and such 
impacts will be more significant than any other Arab country. 
The anti-Israeli sentiments of the Arabs are rooted in their history, 
culture, identity and religion. Thus, such sensitivity will not diminish with 
time and difficulty of the circumstances. The sensitivity will remain and 
will be intensified for the active youth, whether they have political or 
theocratic affiliations. Now the question remains to be what would be the 
approach of the Arab regimes towards these demands? Undoubtedly, any 
approach would be much easier in the presence than the absence of Syria 
and its allies. 
From this perspective, the question will not be if an unpopular regime 
will be shaken with the provocation of sectarian controversies, but it 
would that with such a shake-up the whole general policies of the Arab 
world and its power to ensure the silence of the public opinion and radical 
youth would diminish and will bring about a new fragility for Saudi 
Arabia and its allies.
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NOTES 
Preface 
1. Concerning Saudi Arabia, Fred Halliday says: "No country in the world, 
with the possible exception of Tibet, has been the object of such 
misrepresentation and mystification as Saudi Arabia, a Country of More than 15 
Million people, site of a quarter of the world's known oil reserves, and location of 
the two holiest cities of the Muslim religion, Mecca and Medina. Pascal 
Me'noret, The Saudi Enigma, Page,  xi. 
This idea can be generalized with respect to other Sheikhdoms. Also see 
Madawi al- Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 231. 
2. One of the famous Ambassadors of Kuwait who is close to the prominent 
governing figures of his country and other Sheikhdoms told me: The fundamental 
principle for them is keep quiet and the worst thing for them is to become 
exposed concerning the problem and difficulties and always recommend each 
other to remain quite so that the issue should not be exposed. 
3. Even the elite class is also like this… See al-Hujaj al-Qawiyyah fi Wujub 
al-Difa’ ‘an al-Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah, p. 82. 
4. The situation of the Sheikhdom should be understood with respect to the 
Arab world. Usually, the Arabs have no a positive view concerning the 
sheikhdoms. See Badawiyyun fi Urubba, Slateen al qarn al ishreen, Riyah al 
Samum, 105-119. 
5. See the research of Yukihiro Takabayashi, Towards a modern Islamic 
Kingdom. 
6. Probably, the best method for the understanding of social and cultural 
peculiarities and mind setup of these people is to talk with the various classes of 
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the society. The author of Riyah al Samum explained the intellectual, social, and 
political consequences of the Kuwait occupation aftermath. (p. 43-56) 
7.See al Jazriah al arabia fi Qarn al Ishreen, p. 139-140. 
8. “When the regime of Shah of Iran, which had proceeded with nation 
building in the form of pure westernization excluding traditional powers from the 
regime, was overthrown by the Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khumeini in 
1979, a number of western scholars began to entertain apprehensions about the 
future of Saudi Arabic. Towards a modern Islamic Kingdom, p.1. Furthermore, 
the author believes: “there are two crucial keys to solve the theme. One is the 
prince Faisal succeeded in expanding the rational ruling system of Hijaz to the 
whole kingdom when he was king. He promoted the political economical 
modernization of Saudi Arabia, making success its basic.” 
 9. See the interview of Etela'at Newspaper with Mohammad Masjed Jame'e, 
entitled: Revolution of Tunis, dated in 26/2/2011. 
10. However, the writing of the twentieth-century history of Saudi Arabia 
should explore the internal social dynamics that have shaped the character of this 
country, political system and adaptation to rapid change. To understand the last 
100 years, one needs to engage in an „unending dialogue between the present and 
the past.‟ This dialogue cannot be muted by the obvious material transformation, 
but should explore its progression, tensions and contradictions. A History of 
Saudi Arabia, p.13. This statement could be generalized with respect to other 
Sheikhdoms. 
11. Tahavvul va Sabat dar Khalij e Fars, p. 305-306. 
12. Howsoever, the emphasis on Islam, in the transitional period, to modern 
society has an important role.  "The other is that the Islamic consciousness and 
ideal of modernization of the New Middle class as a product and promoter of 
modernization should be analyzed. Is the New Middle class contrary to 
traditional values? Does the New Middle class regard westernization as the ideal 
way of modernization by receiving secular education? Is the New class trying to 
cause a repetition of what happened in Iran?" (Ibid, p.2) 
13. Once Bin Laden said, "You will witness the Arabian Peninsula producing 
several Juhaymans."  Rasael Joheman al Utebi, p. 7. For various reasons, 
Arabian Peninsula nourishes Juhayman type people. Furthermore, most of the 
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Salfids in other sheikhdoms originally belong to Saudi Arabia and specially 
belong to the Najd tribes. Arabia Unifies, p.29. 
14. What is perceptible is that the sectarian, tribal and regional tendencies will 
be strengthened in the Arab world. Especially, because a lot of the regimes 
believe that strengthening this process will end up in their favor. The GCC 
members believe likewise albeit not at the same level.  See al Harkat va al Jamat 
fi sayasiya fi al Bahrain, p. 131. 
15. It is noteworthy that Professor Maurizio Vernassa has approved the 
general discussed issues. Whatever is in this dissertation that is my views and I 
bear the sole responsibility of it. 
Chapter One 
1- Due to considerable significance of the post Islamic era of the Arabian 
Peninsula in the history of Islamic teachings, numerous books have been written 
since the early post-Islamic centuries to describe the specifications of this region. 
A full enumeration of these books is almost impossible here, and there are few 
parts of the Islamic territories that have been studied and scrutinized so 
intensively. Such studies cover issues from geographical and natural environment 
and climate, to the tribes living in these territories and their battles, from water 
wells and resources to major and even less important roads. One reason for such 
attempts to better understand this region was the fact that the Hajj pilgrims had to 
go through this territory to arrive at Mecca and Medina. For instance, see "Sifat 
Jazirat al-Arab" written in the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 centuries AH [After Hejira]. To review 
the titles and contents of the most important classical books on this topic, see 
Ibid, p.p. 7-23. 
Also, for the section on the Arab geographers and the Arabian Peninsula, see 
"Mer'at Jazerat al-Arab", p.p. 5-8. 
An example of the more recent studies on the Arabian Peninsula can be found 
at "Darasat fi tarikh al-Jazierat al-Arabia, al-Hadith va-l mo'aser" 
2- One of the officers of the Ottoman Naval force who resided in Mecca and 
Medina for many years wrote about the difficulty of livelihood in the Arabian 
Peninsula as follows: "No other location on earth can be found where the people 
are so accustomed to thirst and hunger. Those who can find one meal a day are 
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lucky and there a numerous people who are forced to suffer hunger and thirst for 
two or three days. See Sabri Pasha, "Mer'at Jazerat al-Arab", p. 283. This book 
was published in late 19
th
 Century in Istanbul. 
3- Of course, areas with good climate and weather can also be found in the 
Arabian Peninsula. For instance, see "Al-Bahwa al-Saeeda", a book written by 
Bertrand Thomas who was in the service of Muscat Government. The book was 
written by the author during his discovery voyage in the southern parts of the 
Peninsula from 1927 to 1930. In a more brief account, Ayoob Sabri Pasha 
reported that: "The weather and natural conditions in Oman is excellent and the 
capacity for production is higher than other areas. Agricultural products and 
fruits are cultivated in its cities and villages, and for this reason the residents [in 
Oman] have a better and milder behavior. … Apart from agriculture, people are 
also involved in fishing and they also catch pearl from which they earn good 
income." Op. cit, p. 235 
4- "The tribal structure was like the structure of a larger family, as the tribe 
itself is composed of a group of families of the same descent." "Darasat fi tarikh 
al-Jazierat al-Arabia, al-Hadith va-l mo'aser", p. 12 
5- Many articles have been written by Arab and western authors on the 
cultures and value system of the tribal structures in the Arabian Peninsula. For 
example, see Jazirat al-Arab fi al-Qarn al-Ishreen, pp. 12; Ibn Saud‟s Warriors 
of Islam, pp. 8-9. 
It is important to note that it is only through a due consideration of these 
subjects that many of the contemporary issues in the Saudi Arabia and the 
Sheikhdoms can be understood and analyzed. Hafiz Wahbe, the political advisor 
of Abdulaziz who later became the Saudi Ambassador in Britain, has commented 
on the tribal fanaticism as the main element in the tribal culture, as follows: "… it 
is for these reasons that the tribal fanaticism is so important. It is on this basis 
that the position of an individual versus his children, and his cousins is 
strengthened. If this element is not strong enough, it can then be further 
strengthened through affiliation and bonds with another tribe, as a result of which 
both sides will become strong enabling them to safeguard themselves against the 
threats from other stronger tribes."  
6- Al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-Arab Qabl al-Islam, vol. 4, pp. 5-127. 
7- Ibn Saud‟s Values of Islam, p. 15; A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 15. 
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8- Daneshname Jahan Islam vol. 14, Essay: Hireh. 
9- Fajr al-Islam, p. 108. 
10- Al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-Arab Qabl al-Islam, vol. 4, p. 5-127. 
11- On the changes in the situation in Arabian Peninsula after the relocation of 
capital to Kufa, see "Darasat fi tarikh al-Jazierat al-Arabia, al-Hadith va-l 
mo'aser", p. 11. Studies in Jahiliyyah and Early Islam, p. 76-77. 
12- Tahshil al-Maram fi Akhbar al-Bayt al-Haram, vol. 2, pp. 558-99. 
13- For example, see Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, vol. 1, ppl 149. 
14- A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 14. Sultan Salim reinstated the nobles of 
Mecca in their position. "Mer'at Jazerat al-Arab", p.p. 16-17. Morris, James, "Al-
Moluk al-Hashemium", translated by Ahmad Mohammad Khalid, p. 15. "The 
Ottomans exempted residents of Mecca and Medina from paying taxes and 
recruiting to military service. They even helped them to be calm. As a result of 
the far distance between Hijaz and the capital of the Ottoman Empire, this region 
was not influenced by the European culture and civilization. Thus, the Arabian 
Peninsula was considered as a surreptitious secret for the outsiders, as the non-
Muslims were barred to enter Mecca and Medina." 
15- On 5 May 1916, the leader of the Arab revolution, Sharif Hossein, 
declared independence in Mecca. He opened fire from his palace to the Turk's 
garrison and led the attacks against them. He asked the Turkish ruler to surrender. 
However the ruler rejected and subsequently the Arabs initiated their attack and 
occupied the grand bazaar, the Ruler's headquarters, the governmental buildings 
and the Great Mosque (Masjid al-Haram). Lawrence: Qissatu Hayatihi wa 
Haqiqatu Mawqi’ihi min al-Thawrah al-Arabiyyah, p. 160 
16- The Ottomans paid special attention to the normal operation of Hajj 
caravans and in order to ensure their security and welfare, assistance was 
provided to the tribes living along the routes of the caravans. see "Mer'at Jazerat 
al-Arab", p.p. 15-16 
17- In a meeting with the British representative in the Persian Gulf, the ruler 
of Kuwait said: "Due to various restrictions, the Sabah clan was forced to migrate 
from Najd to Kuwait around the year 1710." , "Kuwait: Mazi-ha and Hazero-ha", 
p. 324 
18- The Saudi dynasty and the Rulers of Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar are 
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originally from the same tribe, 'Ghanire'. "Arabia Unified", p. 29.  As a result of 
livelihood problems, the Arabs of Ghanire tribe were continuously moving and 
relocating. Majority of them were residing in the northern parts of Najd. "Mer'at 
Jazerat al-Arab", p. 249. Al-Shirbassy says: "There is no definite theory about the 
history of the establishment of Kuwait. In other words, the al-Sabah and al-
Khalifa clans had arrived in Kuwait, …. around the year 1100, probably about the 
time that Kuwait was established." He then added, "Kuwait was not the main 
hometown of al-Sabah clan. They had migrated from Najd. They were born there 
and witnessed clashes between themselves and others." See "Ayyam al-Kuwait", 
p. 9. 
19- The Al-Khalifa family emigrated from Najd to Bahrain in mid 18
th
 century 
and took the power later on. See al-Bahrayn Qissat al-Sira’ al-Siyasi, pp. 9-26. 
20- About the origins of the Al-Khalifa family, see al-Jazirah al-Arabiyyah fi 
al-Qarn al-Ishreen p.p. 98-100. 
21- On the situation of maritime navigation in the Persian Gulf since 16
th
 
century, especially after 18
th
 century, see Duzdan-e Deryai der Khalij-e Fars.  
22- The success of the British forces in their victory over the primitive 
Bedouin and coastal Arabs was mainly due to their use of the modern weapons 
which were completely unknown to those Arabs. "The number of the Saudi 
attackers were about 500. But after one the canons fired, they were frightened 
and escaped". See "Al-Kuwait va alaqateha al-dowalia khelal al-qarn al-tase'e 
ashar va avail qarn al-eshrin", p. 42 
23- Apart from the modern weaponry, the Arabs of the region were also 
surprised by the courage, alertness and management of the British. This can be 
understood from a good number of resources. For instance, see Jazirat al-Arab fi 
qarn al-eshrin, p. 279, where Abdulaziz expresses his surprise and appreciation 
over the British and the British officers and diplomats in the region. Hafiz Wahbe 
has repeatedly made reference to this point in his book. There are too many 
evidences on this issue that cannot be mentioned here.  
24- The British and the French went to India through Aleppo and then the 
Persian Gulf, which was the shortest and most appropriate connecting route to 
India. "Al-Kuwait va alaqateha al-dowalia khelal al-qarn al-tase'e ashar va avail 
qarn al-eshrin", p. 40. Also see, Persia and Persian Question, vol. II, p. 40. 
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25- In 1838, Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary said that, "our mission 
in the Persian Gulf is to bring it under our maritime rule away from the influence 
of any other governments that might stand against our sovereignty, provided that 
this policy does not cost us too much.  "Kuwait: Mazi-ha and Hazero-ha", p 180 
26- After the First World War, with the defeat of Germany and internal 
problems of the Russian Empire, Britain became the only remaining power in the 
region. Prior to the War, the presence of these powers was increasingly 
expanding. This trend continued for some time, as stated by the secretary general 
of the British Foreign Office in 1924: "Now our position in the Persian Gulf is 
better and more stable than any other time in the past". "Kuwait: Mazi-ha and 
Hazero-ha", p 196 
27-  Jazirat al-Arab fil-Qarn al-Ishreen, p. 93.  
28- After various developments which led to the uprooting of piracy in the 
Persian Gulf region, the Arab residents of the coastal areas acquired totally 
different behaviors and morality. For example, at the early 20
th
 century Charles 
Billgrave wrote the following about the Kuwaitis: "As the courage, skills, 
cooperation and good behavior is concerned, they are the best residents of the 
coastal areas."  "Kuwait: Maziha and Hazeroha", p 181. About the culture of the 
Emirati authorities, from a negative point of view, see Ashr Sanawat fi Madharib 
Aal Nahyan. 
29- At the early years of the 20
th
 Century, an agreement was signed between 
Kuwait and the British India Shipping Company according to which every week 
a ship carried cargo and passengers between India and Kuwait. This later 
expanded to the extent that the Kuwaiti Emir, Sheikh Mubarak, decided to open a 
representative office in Bombay to assist the Kuwaitis travelling to India. 
"Kuwait: Mazi-ha and Hazero-ha", p. 42. Hafiz Wahbe who in 1920's paid a visit 
to Bahrain says that apart from the original residents, a number of people from 
India and the Eastern Christians as well as a few Europeans live there." Jazirat al-
Arab fi qarn al-eshrin", p. 93 
30- On the education movement in Kuwait, see "Ayyam al-Kuwait", p.p. 83. 
On the problems arising from the new schools and the invited teachers, see 
"Tarikh-a Ta'leem fe al-Khalij al-Araby", p.p. 140-148. On the publications 
imported to Kuwait, see "Ayyam al-Kuwait", p. 336. It is to be noted that this 
information dates back to 1953 when the book was written. 
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31- Min Huna Bada’at al-Kuwait, pp. 33. 
32- On the impact of the intellectual and social developments and in particular 
the anti-colonialist developments of the Arab countries of the Middle East in 
Kuwait, see: "Men hona bed'at al-Kuwait", p.p. 54-59, in which the process of the 
establishment of the parliament [Majlis] and the opposition thereto which 
resulted to public demonstrations have been reviewed. On the intellectual 
developments, for example, see the first magazine entitled Kazima published in 
1948 which prompted certain reactions, as the government believed that the 
magazine invited people to communism or other dangerous ideologies. Ibid, p. 64 
33- Apart from the political issues and Iran's political influence in Bahrain 
over the last four centuries and almost until the end of the Second World War, 
there was a strong social bond between Iran and this territory. The best evidence 
for this is the great number of families in Iran whose family names are Bahraini, 
Bahrani, or other names originally taken form the names of the locations or 
personalities in Bahrain. In Iran many letters similar to this document can be 
found. This letter was written in mid 18
th
 century by one of the great Bahraini 
clerics, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Mojtahid Bahraini, addressed to the then 
Prime Minister of Iran, Mirza Aqassi. In the letter, Sheikh Mohammad had sought 
assistance to resist against the invaders: "From long time ago, the land of Bahrain 
had always been part of the territory of Iran and has been subject to the rule of 
the [Iranian] government". See "Bahrain va Masa'el Khalij e Fars" [Bahrain and 
the Question of the Persian Gulf", p. 18 
34- Jazirat al-Arab fi al-Qarn al-Ishreen, pp. 93. 
35- On the immigration of labor force to Bahrain after the oil discovery, see: 
"Al-hejra le-therva", p.p. 75-77. The British insisted that the Iranian and Iraqi 
workers should have been reduced and replaced by Indian workers (p. 83). On 
the impact of the strikes of the Saudi workers in 1953 on the labor strikes in 
Bahrain and the report of the British representative on these unrests, see p.p. 106-
107. 
36- Al-Bahrayn, Qissat al-Sira’ al-Siyasi, pp. 9-26; 37-44. 
37- The Asharqia in Saudi Arabia is a Shiite residing region opposite the 
coasts of Bahrain. Although after the discovery of oil a number of Sunnis 
immigrated to this region, these two regions had a constant link and many 
commonalities. Moreover, people of the both regions speak Arabic and this has 
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brought them closer together and made their relations invincible. This is while 
their relations with Iran made their link vulnerable as the latter was not Arab.  
From this point of view, Bahrain remains to be an element in the internal 
stability and security of Saudi Arabia. As a result of small population and 
territory, and lack of mineral resources as well as other restrictions, the Saudis 
brought Bahrain under their supervision and almost established a direct 
protectorate; a situation which is welcomed by the ruling regime.  
The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is in fact a cover-up for the Saudi 
control over Bahrain. Without such a cover-up, the Saudis were not able to 
interfere in that country's internal affairs. 
38- In principle, Hejaz which was controlled by Sharif Hossein and the 
Ottomans, had a different nature from Najd and welcomed relations with the 
outside world." Lawrence; Qissatu Hayatihi wa Haqiqatu Mawqifihi min al-
Thawrah al-Arabiyyah; Towards a Modern Islamic Kingdom, pp. 13-15.  
Moreover, after his rule was established, Abdulaziz was forced to remove the 
previous openness. "The King tried to severely enforce the Wahhabi ideology for 
two reasons. First to satisfy the demands of the Ikhwan, and second to stabilize 
his own power and position." See, Tarikh al-Arabiyyah al-Sa’udiyyah, p. 355. 
39- The Akhwan which formed the skeleton of Abdulaziz's military force until 
the final establishment of his rule, had no inclination towards openness. They 
considered all manifestations of the modern civilization as signs of heresy and 
opposed using such manifestations. For instance, they believed that the use of 
telephone and telegraph and vehicles are haram [forbidden]. See Tarikh al-
Arabiyyah al-Sa’udiyyah, p. 352. The details of this incident can be found in 
Abdul-Aziz Kama Araftuhu. 
40- For example, reference can be made to "Men hona bed'at al-Kuwait". In 
the introduction of the book, its Kuwaiti author wrote that he had written the 
book to prove that his country has not begun with oil and has not been a territory 
far from civilization. (see p. 5). On the costly welcoming of Earl Curzon at the 
time that he was India's representative the author says that: "This was intended to 
show that Kuwait is not a remainder of the dark ages, as was perceived by the 
public opinion". (p. 40). 
Al-Shirbassy, the Egyptian author of the book "Ayyam al-Kuwait", who had 
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lived and worked there for  many years, says: "I love the Kuwaitis because they 
treat their Arab and Muslim brothers with patience and passion". This book was 
published in 1953. (P. 384) 
41- Tahawwul va Sabat der Khalij Fars, pp. 70-72. 
42- Mir’aat Jazirat al-Arab, pp. 235; Zofar, pp. 19-54. 
43- Oman: al-Dimuqratiyyah al-Islamiyyah. 
44- Safahatun Mishriqatun fi Tarikh Oman, by Dr. Mustafa al-Najjar.  
45- Zofar, pp. 11-14. 
46- Tatawwur al-Siyasah al-Amrikiyyah fi Mantiqat al-Khalij al-Arabi, pp. 
19-20. 
47- The entire infrastructure of the Arab lands under the Ottoman Empire was 
realized by the Germans. See al-Thawrah al-Arabiyyah al-Kubra, pp. 35-27. 
48- At that time, the Saudi Arabia's main source of income rapidly decreased 
as a result of the war. In 1938, the number of pilgrims was 63,800, while in 1940 
it was reduced to 32,100 and in 1941 only 9700 pilgrims visited this place. See, 
"Tatavvor as-Siasat al-Amrikiyat fi mantaqat al-Khalij al-Arabi 1941-47", p. 77 
The economic situation was so difficult that it was proposed that loans should 
be granted to the Saudis in order to ensure the stability of their regime and also 
preventing unsteadiness in the Arab World, Ibid, p. 78 
49- Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the US had found out 
about the rich oil resources of Saudi Arabia. During the War, it was concerned 
about the security of the oil rich areas and normal flow of oil to the markets. It 
had even considered sending forces to these areas. Ibid, p. 55. 
50- To find out more about the new perspectives at the later years of the 
Second World War and the years after, see Ibid, p. 283 
51- As compared to the Arabian territories of the Persian Gulf region, Hejaz 
was the most volatile area. Such instability was due to the ideas on the 
establishment of an Arab Caliphate under Sharif Hossein's leadership on which 
the British played a major role. Ibid. p. 283. Refer to al-Thawrah al-Arabiyyah 
al-Kubra. 
52- Thawrat al-Arab didd al-Atrak, pp. 320-326 (Rashid Reza's statement), 
342 (The Reply of Sharif Hussein to Reza‟s statement). 
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53- Al-Thawrah al-Arabiyyah al-Kubra, pp. 84-86. 
54- Ibid. pp. 17-22. 
55- Anti colonialist moves in Iraq as well as certain waves of sentiments were 
reflected in Palestine, Egypt and Syria and in particular in Kuwait, as a result of 
which the British as well as the Kuwaiti Emir were concerned. See Tarikh al-
Ta’lim fi al-Khalij al-Arabi. Such sentiments were also observed in Bahrain.  
56- Al-Harakat wa’l-Jama’at al-Siyasiyyah fi’l Bahrayn, pp. 54-55. 
57- Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah fi’l-Khalij al-Arabi. 
58- The social and political attitudes in the majority of Islamic countries of the 
Arab Middle East after 1970's was proportionate to the way their traditional 
societies were opened to the modern civilization. In principle, the traditional 
societies of these countries were closed but after they contacted the modern 
civilization they tried to become closer and more protective in order to preserve 
their original features and to protect their children and younger generations. In 
the more developed countries of the region- like Iran, Egypt and Syria- the 
traditional society tore out its surrounding veils and tried to be present in the 
scenery of the social developments. It was indeed from this point that the 
tendencies began towards Islam as an ideology and the Islamic movements were 
initiated. For example, see Masjed-Jame'e, Mohammad, "Ideology and 
Revolution" [in Persian], p.p. 130-159, which describes how Iran's traditional 
society was opened. See also Mubarak, Mohammad, "Al-fekr al-Islami al-hadith 
fi movajehat el-afkar al-qarbi", which reports on the inclinational towards Islam 
in Syria.  
59- On the labor unrests in Saudi Arabia which mainly took place among the 
workers of the Aramco oil company and was influenced by the labor strikes of 
the Bahraini and Asian workers in Bahrain, see: "Helm al-thervah lel-hejra", p.p. 
106-107. On how this wealth was wasted especially before the rule of King 
Feisal, see: Tarikh al-Arabiyyah al-Sa’udiyyah, pp. 554-5. 
The overthrow of Saud and his replacement with Faisal which was basically 
made possible with a conspiracy within the Royal family and the religious clerics 
was due to the same reason, see Ibid. pp. 552-3. 
60- Secrets of the Kingdom, pp. 33; The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 107-8. 
61- With the exception of the Royal family and a small group of businessmen 
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and dealers as well as a group of other people who were close to the Royal 
family, other people did not enjoy the oil wealth. See Ibid. p. 555. This situation 
continued until mid-1960's.  
62- On the Radio Cairo's broadcasts, see S. Shazl, the Arab Military Option, 
p. 98. On the broadcasts of Radio Baghdad which replaced Radio Cairo after the 
rise of the Ba'athists to power, see A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 131. 
63- The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 130. 
64- For the social and political movements in Bahrain, see al-Harakat wa’l-
Jama’at al-Siyasiyyah fi’l-Bahrayn, especially, pp. 7-8. 
65- Hulum al-Hijrah lil-Tharwah, p. 98; Min Huna Bada’at al-Kuwayt, p. 
373. 
66- Bahraini and Arab workers received less wages than the Asian workers, 
while the latter even received less salaries and privileges than the European 
personnel. Hulum al-Hijrah lil-Tharwah, p. 91. After Aramco was established it 
was increasingly expanded, in the period between 1942 and 1947 to the extent 
that it became the largest American enterprise outside the US territory. Here, 
even the European personnel were subject to discrimination. For instance, the 
Italian ambassador had repeatedly complained to the Saudi authorities about the 
complaints by the Italian personnel who comprised 6% of the total personnel of 
the company and were not satisfied with their low salaries and benefits. Ibid, p.p. 
103-105 
67- On the migration of Iranians to Bahrain to be recruited in the oil industry, 
see Hulum al-Hijrah lil-Tharwah, p.p. 75-77 
On the impacts of the "Tudeh Party" [People's Party] in Bahrain, see: "Tatavor 
as-siasat al-amricia fi mantaqe al-Khalij al-Arabi 1941-1947", p. 284. 
68- In 1971, Iran recognized the independence of Bahrain. Prior to this date, 
Bahrain was considered as Iran's thirteenth province and had a representative in 
the Iranian Parliament. The last Representative from Bahrain was Mr. 
Abdulrahman Faramarzi, who was the editor-in-chief of Kayhan newspaper 
which at the time was the most widely published newspaper in Iran.  
69- On the salaries of Kuwaiti laborers working in the oil industries of their 
country and big difference between their salaries with the British and Western 
workers which resulted in protests and strikes, see: " Helm al-thervah lel-hejra", 
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p.p. 67-69. 
On other unrests and demonstrations, see: Min Huna Bada’at al-Kuwayt, p. 
84, which describes the student unrests. It was noteworthy that after Abdulkarim 
Qassim announced the merger of Kuwait to Iraq, the Kuwaiti women launched 
demonstrations against him. Ibid, p. 88. Taking into account the conservative 
nature of the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, such demonstrations were 
considered as unique incidents.  
70- Increase in oil exports from Kuwait was due to the nationalization of oil 
industry in Iran as a result of which Iran's exports were stopped.  
71- In that period, the new intellectual layers of society in Kuwait were in 
favor of the unification with Iraq.  
At certain moments, even a decision to change the education system from 
Iraqi to Egyptian model faced widespread protests. See Min Huna Bada’at al-
Kuwayt, p. 84. 
In the meanwhile, Abdulkarim Qassim's claims was a shock for everybody, 
from the government to the intellectuals and the general public, and even the 
women. About the Emir‟s speech see Ibid. p. 399.  
72- Riyah al-Samum, pp. 49-56: Attacking the Kuwaiti psychology from 
inside, which caused the Kuwaiti personality to be shocked, creating such 
reactions that resulted in a complete and extreme rejection of whatever is Arab. 
73- Tahavvul wa Sabat, pp. 84-87. 
74- The details of these developments can be further studied in: "Al-fekr al-
Eslami al-hadith va sellat be-l-afkar al-Qarbi", and "Al-fekr al-eslami al-hadith fi 
movajahate al-afkar al-Qarbi". These were the backgrounds which later led to the 
ideology of Seyed Qotb who was the inspiring the Salafid deposing ideologies.  
75- For further details, see: "Tahavol va sobat dar Khalij-e Fars" [Evolution 
and Stability in the Persian Gulf], p.p. 68-69.  
76. Riyah al-Samum, pp. 182-3. 
77- On the stability in Saudi Arabia as the most significant country of this 
group of states after 1973, see: A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 133. 
78- The Return of Ayatollah, pp. 105-112. 
79- Ibid. pp. 99-100. 
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80- "Despite their differences, Shah and Faisal tried to suppress the 
revolutionary movements in the [Persian] Gulf region. The Saudis wanted to 
strengthen their relations with Oman which enjoyed a strategic location and at the 
same time was neighboring Saudi Arabia; however, King Faisal did not respond 
to Sultan Qabus's request for assistance against the Zofar insurgents. In principle, 
an open intervention in Oman was not in line with the Faisal's policy. On the 
other hand, the Saudi opted to close their eyes on Iran's military intervention in 
April 1973." Tarikh al-Arabiyyah al-Sa’udiyyah, p. 524. 
81- The Sheikhdoms were ready to bear the costs of the existing British forces 
in their region. See, Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah fi al-Khalij al-Arabi, p. 129. 
On the Sheikhdoms fears about the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, see Tahavvol va Sabat, 
pp. 120-125. 
82- On the mutual relation between the Iranians and the Arabs and the 
elements influencing such relations, see "Tahavol va sobat dar Khalij-e Fars" 
[Evolution and Stability in the Persian Gulf], p.p 190-198, and also "Riah as-
Samum", p.p. 395-97. 
83- Tarikh al-Arabiyyah al-Saudiyyah, pp. 524. 
84- The Return of Ayatollah, pp. 199-200. 
85- I have personally heard from the Arab diplomats about more sympathy of 
the Gulf people towards the post Revolution Iran. Of course, such conversations 
took place outside the official diplomatic context. During my mission to the Holy 
See from 1991 to 1997, I heard the Saudi Ambassador in Italy, Mr. Khalid Al-
Zaki, more than once saying that the behavior of the Shah's regime was not 
understandable for them. According to the Saudi Ambassador, Shah acted like an 
emperor; however, such a behavior was not seen after the Revolution.  
86- On the Saudi's view on the communist regime in Afghanistan and the 
Soviet intervention, see: Secrets of the Kingdom, pp. 115; The Statement of 
President Jimmy Carter in January, 1980: Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah fil-
Khalij al-Arabi, pp. 47; Amrika wal-Sa’udiyyah Takamul al-Hadhir Tanafur al-
Mustaqbal, p. 35. 
87- In many books and articles written and published on the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution by the authors from the [Persian] Gulf region, it has been 
contemplated that this Revolution is inspired by communist ideas, or that it is a 
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communist conspiracy with an Islamic disguise. For example, see Ibid. p. 33.  
88- Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah fil-Khalij al-Arabi, pp. 44-5. 
89- Ibid. 50-56. 
90- Jazirat al-Arab fi’l-Qarn al-Ishreen, pp. 48: Differences of Handicraft in 
Najd and the Persian Gulf Coast. 
91- Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah fi’l-Khalij al-Arabi, pp. 14. 
92- Despite enormous expenditures by these countries during 1970's and 
1980's to buy weapons, they failed to take any action during the occupation of 
Kuwait. It is noteworthy that the amount of these military expenditures ranked 
second in the world only next to Taiwan.  
93- Riyah al-Samum, p. 52. 
94- Tahavol va sobat dar Khalij-e Fars, p.p. 157-159. 
95- For the Attitude of Sheikhdoms about Iran, see Tahavvul va Sabat, pp. 
105-119. 
96- Riyah al-Samum, pp. 52. 
97- Amrika wa’l-Saudiyyah Takamul al-Hadir Tanafur al-Mustaqbal, pp. 33. 
98-Tahavvul wa Sabat, pp. 205-253. 
99- For example, refer to Secret of the Kingdom, pp. 112; Riyah al-Samum, 
pp. 58-75; The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 163. 
100- Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah fi’l-Khalij al-Arabi, pp. 81. 
101- Riyah al-Samum, p. 50. 
102- Ibid. p. 59. 
103- On the backgrounds of the Iraq-Kuwait frontier disputes, see: "Al-Khalij 
al-Arabi", p.p. 386-388.  
104- Tahavvul va Sabat der Khalij-e Fars, pp. 12-13. 
105- I have repeatedly heard from the Kuwaiti people who escaped to the 
neighboring countries after the occupation of the country that the Sheikhdoms, 
especially the Emiratis, treated them inappropriately. On the feelings of the Saudi 
government after the occupation, see Riyah al-Samum, pp. 43-52. 
106- The reaction of the Arab nations to the Sheikhdoms after the occupation 
of Kuwait was even more hostile than other nations. Many Arab regimes showed 
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a similar reaction. Many of the Arabs were willing to take revenge over the 
arrogant behavior of these Sheikhdoms.  
107- "Tahavol va sobat dar Khalij-e Fars" [Evolution and Stability in the 
Persian Gulf], p. 22 
108- After the end of the occupation of Kuwait, many articles were published 
in the Kuwaiti media in which the Arab nationalism and the activities of the 
Kuwaiti government in support of this idea were criticized; see Riyah al-Samum, 
pp. 50-51. 
109- During the first half of 1990's, I personally heard repeatedly from the 
Arab ambassadors in Italy that the Arab world is deeply suffering from disparity 
to the extent that they can hardly organize joint luncheon or dinner receptions, 
while in the past they used to get together for monthly meetings.   
110- During my mission to Morocco, I repeatedly heard from the Moroccan 
personalities that although King Hassan stood on the side of the Western forces, 
he did not express this in his country's internal scene and had asked the mass 
media not to discuss this issue. It was due to the fact that the public opinion was 
in favor of Saddam Hussein. These personalities described this attitude as a sign 
of King Hassan's caution and vigilance.  
111- Hulum al-Hijra lil-Tharwah, pp. 115. 
112- About Sadat‟s opinion about the Saudi Royal Family and its sympathy to 
Egypt, see al-Sira’ al-Sa’udi al-Misri Hawla al-Yaman, pp. 36. 
113- On the recognition of Taliban and the assistance provided to this group, 
see Mas’alat al-Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah, pp. 162-165. 
114- The then Saudi Crown Prince, Malik Abdullah, pressured Kuwait to 
allocate more share for the Jordanian labor force. See: "Helm al-hijra letherva", 
p. 116 
115- On the coup d'etat in Qatar and the subsequent developments, see Riyah 
al-Samum, pp. 297-310. 
116- The story of the creation of various protesting Salafi affiliations in Saudi 
Arabia, which were very soon turned into terrorist and deposing attachments, can 
be found in many Arab and Western sources. The works of the Saudi 
anthropologist residing in the UK, Ms. Azawi al-Rashid, are among the most 
modest sources that have comprehensively studied and analyzed this 
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phenomenon. See,  "Mas'alat dowlat as-Sa'oudia", from the same author, p.p. 43-
255 
117- About the invitation of USA and the other Western countries and the 
reactions that it caused in the religious circle and the public opinion  Saudi 
Arabia, see the The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 164-171. 
118- Ibid. 165-166. 
119- Mas’alah al-Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah, pp. 202. 
120- In one of my meetings with the Saudi Ambassador, Mr. Khalid Turki, in 
1994 he strongly criticized the tough behavior of the religious police in that 
country, meaning the agents of the Amr bil Ma'ruf wa Nahy an al Munkar 
["Command the good and forbid the evil"] Agency. A few days prior to our 
meeting, he, along with his wife, had gone to Mecca where they were treated 
inappropriately and they were even asked to show documents indicating their 
marital status. He sadly said "they even asked such documents from an old man 
like me". On the differences between the evolved and the traditional Wahabisms, 
see: "Mas'alat dowlat as-Sa'oudia", p.p. 180-188 
121- In the articles published by the Bahraini Shiites after the Arab Spring, it 
was generally mentioned that as a result of the unbalanced social situation and 
oppressive policies of the ruling regime, every ten years a round of public 
protests takes place in Bahrain. This is a noteworthy point that has been 
mentioned in Baysooni‟s report.  
122- Al-Harakat wa’l-Jama’at al-Siyasiyyah fi’l-Bahrayn, pp. 137-142. 
123- Al-Amalah al-Ajnabiyyah fi Aqtar al-Khalij al-Arabi, pp. 479; and 53, 
124, and 139. 
124- The fact is that the majority of the people from [Persian] Gulf region are 
inclined to trade activities to productive activities. Thus, to be called as "ibn 
sane'e" [son of a producer] is one of the most offensive insults. They loved trade; 
therefore they paid more attention to trade and accounting when they got in touch 
with the modern world.  
125- For example, visit: 
http://realestate.theemiratesnetwork.com/developments/dubai/palm_islands_ar
.php.   
126- It is generally known that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
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the separation of the new independent republics, a large number of Russian and 
Ukrainian women travelled to Dubai to make money. Their number in a small 
region like Dubai was so considerable that their presence was considered as 
troublesome.  
A while later, a number of social and religious personalities of Dubai met with 
the Ruler, Sheikh Mohammad, and urged him to resolve this problem. In 
response, he said that this problem can be resolved very quickly but if a decision 
has been made that Dubai is to be an open society for everybody, then the 
consequences should also be tolerated. Dubai's economic boom is due to such 
open policy, thus such consequences should be accepted.  
127- An ambassador of one of the Arab governments of the [Persian] Gulf 
Cooperation Council, whose name I prefer not to mention here, told me that "the 
basic principle for our rulers is that the disorders and problems are to be dealt 
with a policy of denial and covering up." Such a policy currently exists, or better 
to say prevails, in all these countries.  
128- For a perfect example of such an approach, see: Bernard Lewis, "What 
Went Wrong". 
129- Mas’alat al-Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah, pp. 22-29. 
130- After the 9/11 incidents a wave of an anti-Arab pessimistic attitude 
prevailed in the West. Many articles written by various authors criticized the 
impolite language of the Westerners. During my mission in Morocco, I 
repeatedly witnessed the criticisms against the Americans by the Arab diplomats, 
whose names I prefer not to mention.  
The fact is that the Americans' attitude towards the 9/11 incidents caused the 
negative response from various social layers of the Arab world. According to an 
opinion poll conducted in 2003, 90% of the Saudi people supported Bin Laden. 
See Mas’alat al-Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah, pp.  
131- Mas’alat al-Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah, pp. 135-137. 
132- Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah fi’l-Khalij al-Arabi, pp. 75 and 25-28. 
About women‟s situation in the Sheikhdoms in the past, see Safahat min Tarikh 
al-Kuwayt, pp. 8. 
133- Mas’alat al-Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah, pp. 140-141. 
134- For example, visit: 
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http://www.champress.net/index.php?q=ar/Article/view/117087.   
135- Except al-Qaeda, the other Islamic groups along with their variations, 
and the Liberal groups, for the reason of the humiliating American policies 
against the Arabs, they resorted to the ruling regimes. 
136- See the chapter on "How the Gulf people view Iran" in Tahavol va sobat 
dar Khalij-e Fars [Evolution and Stability in the Persian Gulf], p.p 105-119, in 
which the historical, cultural, political and religious backgrounds for the views of 
the people from the Persian Gulf towards Iran has been analyzed.  
137- See the interview of Etela'at Newspaper with Mohammad Masjed Jame'e, 
entitled: Revolution of Tunis, dated in 26/2/2011.  
138- Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah fi’l-Khalij al-Arabi, pp. 7-8. 
139- The question of Bahrain is currently swayed by this country's 
membership in the GCC and the Saudi invasion which, in turn, has been carried 
out on the pretext of the membership in this organization. If this hadn't happened, 
the extensive popular protests would have resulted in the overthrow of the 
government or fundamental reforms therein and would have brought the country 
out of deadlock. 
140- Regarding to the sectarian policies of the Bahrain regime, see al-Jama’at 
wa’l-Harakat al-Siyasiyyah fi’l-Bahrayn, pp. 112, 131, 139, and 141. 
141- Al-Tanmiyah fi Duwal Majlis al-Ta’awun. 
142- Jazirat al-Arab fi al-Asr al-Hadith, p. 1.  
143- Tahavvul wa Sabat, pp. 305-317. 
144- Even in the past, the strong link between the wealth and management in 
these countries has been a source of concern. On the dissolution of Parliament in 
Kuwait, see al-Kuwayt al-Ra’y al-Aakhar, pp. 13-15. 
145- “The Emir is thus the pure mirror through which you can get to know the 
psychology of the people and whatever is in their minds.” Min Huna Bada’at al-
Kuwayt, pp. Up to now, this definition is still correct in the Sheikhdoms. 
146- For instance, see Hulum al-Hijrah lil-Tharwah, pp. 193-194; Sira’ al-
Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah fi’l-Khalij al-Arabi, pp. 73-74. Criticism of Ben Laden to 
the Saudi government about the Muslim manpower: “While the West manpower 
enjoys many privileges and rights, the Muslim manpower has no other way than 
dreaming with such privileges.” Mas’alat al-Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah, p. 179. 
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147- Beyond All, pp. 110-16. 
Chapter Two 
1- Abdulaziz's advisor, Hafiz Wahbe, who was a knowledgeable person, had 
reported his conversation with one of the people from Najd in 1932. The Najdi 
man asked him about the government system and the people in power in Europe. 
Hafiz briefly replied that everything there is controlled by law, and it is the law 
that sets the limits of the power of the rulers. In response, the Najdi man said that 
they are not kings. If someone is unable to spend from the treasury at his own 
discretion, he is not a king. Then Hafiz added that "this is the whole context of 
their thinking. And it is within this framework that the Arab governments have 
been formed, except those countries that have been influenced by the Turks. The 
forms of government in Kuwait, Bahrain, Najd, Qatar and Oman are the same. It 
is a basic simple method free from complexities of the government in the 
developed countries. However, the level of justice in these systems depends on 
the personality of the ruler and his successors and that to what extent they are 
inclined toward justice and fairness." See Jazirat al-Arab fi al-qarn al-eshrin, p.p. 
139-140 
2- For example, in Men hona bed'at al-Kuwait, it has been mentioned that 
"like other cities and villages, Kuwait was formed when people and small groups 
got together here. They were forced or voluntarily decided to come to this 
territory from different parts of the Arabian Peninsula because of the bad 
situations or other problems they were facing." See: : "Men hona bed'at al-
Kuwait", p. 12. Also see, "Kuwait: Mazi-ha and Hazero-ha", p. 324  
3- Tahavvul va Sabat, pp. 63-65. 
4- Ibid. 
5- On the Sheikh's leadership and commitment towards his tribe and its 
members: "The people of Ajman have about 120 local boats with which they 
travel outside Ajman for fishing or carrying goods. It happens quite often that 
they spend five months of the year out of their hometown. During their absence, 
the ruler supervises their families like a father and helps them in case they need 
anything. In an interview with Al-Va'deh Magazine, he said 'the residents here are 
like my children and I consider myself as their father…' ", see Khalije fars, 
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ashnaee ba emarat aan [in Persian], p. 300 
6- Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah, pp. 33. 
7- Ibid. pp. 21. 
8- Jazirat al-Arab fi’l-Qarn al-Ishreen, pp. 139-140. 
9- A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 3; Toward a Modern Kingdom, pp. 101. 
10- Tahavvul va Sabat, pp. 64-65; al-Kuwayt al-Ra’y al-Aakhar, pp. 13-5. 
11- For example, Muhammad al-Mubarak, a Syrian religious scholar, explains 
the painful experience in the transitional period from the end of the Ottoman 
reign to 1960‟s, which is a very different experience from the Sheikhdoms. See 
al-Fikr al-Islamiy al-Hadith fi Muwajahat al-Afkar al-Gharbiyyah. 
12- Ideologie va Enghilab, pp. 150-6. 
13- Beyond All, pp. 112. 
14- Khalij- Fars: Ashna’ei ba Imarat-e aan, pp. 200-217 and 300-308. 
15- There is no difference in the forms of life of the members of the tribe. 
Everybody, from the Sheikh and Emir to the ordinary people eat rice, meat, milk 
and dates. All of them wear deshdashe [long cotton dress] over which they put 
aba [sleeveless loose cloak], and wear turbans over their head. They enjoy full 
freedom. A nomad stands in front of the ruler and defend his rights." See Jazirat 
al-Arab fi al-qarn al-eshrin, p. 12. 
16- Secrets of the Kingdom, pp. 184; Ms. Bahijeh Behbehani,  and essay about 
the Emir of Kuwait, published in al-Qabas Newspaper, dated in 29/8/2011. 
17- What was said mostly applies to the four sheikhdoms, except Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain. In these Sheikhdoms, the situation has been more or less the same. 
"Sheikh Saeid ben Maktoom, father of the current Ruler of Dubai- and 
Grandfather of Sheikh Mohammad- ruled the Sheikhdom for 60 years with 
gentleness and sympathy. He was a moderate, fair, vigilant and popular figure 
among his people. In the contacts with him, the author had personally observed 
these characteristics. In 1958 he withdrew from power in favour of his elder son, 
Sheikh Rashed bin Saeid Maktoom and passed away about one year later."  
"Khalije fars, ashnaee ba emarat aan" [Persian Gulf: more to know about its 
emirates] [in Persian], p. 227. However, their personality and behavior has not 
always been so humane. For example, see Ibid, p.p. 307-308 
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18- Dirasat fi Tarikh al-Jazirah al-Arabiyyah al-Hadith wa’l-Mu’asir, pp. 13-
9. 
19- Tahavvul va Sabat, pp. 127-131. 
20- Sira’ al-Dawlah wa’l-Qabilah, pp. 43-52. 
21- After the Arab Spring, various articles have been published in the media 
of Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Oman. In majority of these articles, the authors 
supported their ruling regimes and used the terms that are more or less similar to 
those used for their ancestors or chief of tribes.  
22- For instance, refer to al-Hujaj al-Qawiyyah ala Wujub al-Difa’ ‘an al-
Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah. 
Chapter Three 
1- Tahavvul va Sabat, pp. 47-53. 
2- The relations between England and Kuwait dates back to 1776. The English 
mailing courier returning to England from India were passing to Aleppo via 
Kuwait and the East India Company relocated its main office from Basra to 
Kuwait. "Kuwait: Mazi-ha and Hazero-ha", p. 180 
Kuwait was located in the middle of the trade route between Muscat, Bahrain, 
India, Qatif and the western territories. See Jazirat al-Arab fi al-qarn al-eshrin, p. 
83. In 1922, about 10000 Kuwaitis were involved in the pearl caching for which 
they used 800 boats., ibid., p. 52 
3- Al-Kuwayt Madhiha wa-Hadhiruha, pp. 234-47. 
4- About the position of Kuwait and its readiness to join the new world, see 
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29. Tahavvol va Sabat, pp. 157-9. 
30. Secrets of the Kingdom, pp. 94-7. 
31. About the Saudi mufti Ben Baz, Juhayman al-Utaybi said that this man is 
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pp. 182. 
32. The details can be found in Rasa’l Juhayman, pp. 42-4. 
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